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Mohammed J. M. Shareef 
 
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ: 
CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?    
 
Abstract 
 
A substantial amount of commentary has been dedicated to George W. Bush‘s policy 
towards Iraq, with many perceiving it as a departure from traditional US foreign policy 
practice. The objective of this research is to address and challenge this contention. This 
thesis takes 1979 as the launching point from which to examine this assertion, as it is both 
the year in which Saddam Hussein gained power as president of Iraq and also the year 
when the United States began tilting favourably towards, and reviving its relations with, 
this country. 
To embark on this study a descriptive and analytical narrative of the evolution of US 
foreign policy towards Iraq is presented, ending with the George W. Bush terms of office. 
This study contends that US policy towards Iraq has two major dimensions: the first is US 
policy towards Arab Iraq and the second its de facto policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan; both 
are defined by US strategy at the supra-national level. To guide this study, continuity and 
change were used as guiding concepts for analysing US Iraq policy at the national and sub-
national levels.  
 
The study argues that US Iraq policy is primarily one of continuity rather than change, as 
US national interests and security, as regards Iraq, are defined by the same fundamental 
concerns, regardless of the nature of the American administration in office. The research 
concludes that, from the inception of the Bush administration, and the attacks on 9/11 that 
followed, the actual invasion of Iraq and US actions in its aftermath were all guided by the 
same considerations and goals. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and 
violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to 
transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of 
millions. America‘s interests in security, and America‘s belief in liberty, both 
lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq. 
George W. Bush, 26 February, 2003.
1
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
Since the US assumed and acknowledged its role as a superpower, it has not shied from 
pronouncing the centrality of the Middle East as a national interest priority. Not that long 
ago in 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt described this region as of ‗vital interest‘ to the 
US. He stressed the ‗maintenance of peace‘ in the Middle East as central to US and 
international concerns.
2
 Several decades later, and with the demise of the British Empire, 
and later Britain‘s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the late 60s, the US adopted the 
role of the new security guarantor in the Middle East. This US goal was initially achieved 
indirectly, through proxies, only to evolve gradually into direct US military intervention. 
From its inception to superpower status, the US has taken its policing role seriously and 
assertively. It has insisted that peace be preserved, however, only on its own terms.  
 
Throughout the Cold War, the US maintained its presence at the helm of the Middle East 
attempting to deny its chief nemesis, the Soviet Union, influence or authority over this 
strategically valuable region. The US was largely successful in denying the Soviet Union a 
foothold. The security of Israel and access of world markets to oil were also secured during 
this period. At the height of the Cold War US strategy was restricted simply to managing 
regional actors and dissuading them from Soviet influence. To this end, it became US 
policy to maintain friendly relations with willing regional actors on the one hand, and on 
the other to discourage regional adversaries from engaging in relations with the Soviet 
                                                 
1
 George W. Bush. (2003c). President Discusses the Future of Iraq. [The White House] Available at: <URL: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html> Access Date: 20 
June 2008.   
2 Franklin D. Roosevelt. (2005). 2005 Topical Symposium Prospects for Security in the Middle East 
April 20-21, 2005. [National Defense University] Available at: <URL: 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Symposia/Topical2005/Agenda.htm> Access Date: 20 June 2009. 
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Union. Throughout these events Iraq, which is the focus of this thesis, engaged in a 
fluctuating relationship with the United States, depending on the nature of government in 
Baghdad and the distinctive geopolitical context. Iraq, like other regional actors, was part 
of the regional make up of the Middle East and as such was affected by the superpower 
rivalry for the region. The US continued this policy after the end of the Cold War, 
attempting to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons through the pursuit of strategies 
of containment, deterrence and confrontation with potential competitors to US hegemony 
in the Middle East region. However, as Iraq advanced and discarded its colonial past with 
the overthrow of the pro-British monarchy in 1958 it embarked on a nationalistic discourse 
as it too aspired to reach regional power status. This aspiration in turn became an 
inconvenience for US interests, and as a consequence a challenge America was willing to 
confront.  
 
This study takes 1979 as the launching point. This year is greatly significant as it is the 
same year Saddam Hussein gained ultimate power as the president of Iraq, ironically the 
beginning of the US tilt towards Iraq. The Carter administration‘s desire for revived 
relations with Iraq was only further strengthened with the Reagan administration‘s 
engagement with Saddam‘s regime. This was also a policy pursued by the George H. W. 
Bush administration, only to be revised after Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait and continued by 
President Clinton.  
 
Thus it is indeed compelling to assess US foreign policy towards Iraq during President 
George W. Bush‘s administration as Saddam Hussein‘s eventual demise came at the hands 
of the United States, under his administration and on his personal orders. The George W. 
Bush presidency provides an excellent platform from which to assess continuity and 
change in US Iraq policy which is the central premise of this thesis. The attacks on 9/11, 
perpetrated during the early months of the George W. Bush administration, provide a 
major and significant baseline from which this study attempts to gauge US policy towards 
Iraq. George W. Bush‘s administration was extremely significant as his two terms in office 
were undeniably rich in major events. Some of these events were external, outside his 
control, while many were within his control and a direct result of his proactive foreign 
policy.  
  
The premise of this study involves three interacting, yet distinct phases in US Iraq policy. 
The first phase starts with the Shah‘s overthrow in 1979 and its replacement with a hostile 
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and theocratic regime in Iran. The dethroning of strategic US ally Iran compelled the US to 
rethink its strategies in the Middle East region. As a result, the US chose to pursue a new 
role in the Gulf with a new regional security strategy at heart based on the strategic 
balancing of regional actors. With this new strategy in practice Iraq gradually gained a 
favoured status as a potential regional ally and a practical replacement to the valuable but 
now lost regional and valuable asset, Iran.  
 
The second phase of US-Iraq relations was triggered with Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait. As 
a result of this aggression, Iraq was seen as a hostile and irreconcilable actor in the region 
neither willing to act nor capable of acting within the confines of acceptable international 
behaviour, and a threat to major US interests. The US perceived Iraq as inherently adverse 
to its regional interests; beyond moderation, and as a result changed its strategy. Iraq was 
reclassified as a rogue terrorism-sponsoring state that defied the possibility of reform 
which once had been hoped to be achieved.  
 
The third phase of US Iraq policy, which is the prime focus of this study, emerged in the 
aftermath of the attacks on 9/11. The heightened international security fears established 
after the attacks in the United States provided the necessary grounds for a third 
reassessment in US strategy towards Iraq.  
 
1.1  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The main focus of this research is based on the observation of consistencies and departures 
in US Iraq policy. This study attempts to use both facets of continuity and change as 
implicit and underlying parameters in order to provide an angle of original insight to the 
study of US Iraq policy. To achieve this objective, the study observes three major levels of 
US interaction with Iraq. The first is US Iraq policy at the national level: at this level this 
research studies US policy towards Iraq as a nation state. It attempts to study, using a 
detailed historical narrative, the political events and disturbances in Iraq and the Middle 
East that have affected and influenced US-Iraq relations since 1979. This level, this study 
argues, can be defined as US policy towards Arab Iraq as the Kurds, the second largest 
ethnic group in the country, are largely absent in this interaction.  
 
The second level of analysis this study attempts to address is US Iraq policy at the sub-
national level. This level attempts to study US policy towards the Kurds in Iraq. At this 
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level of observation, this thesis discusses US policy towards the Kurdish nationalist 
movement in Iraq and the US interests involved in avoiding or sometimes engaging this 
relationship. This level of observation is logical and necessary as it completes the study of 
US foreign policy towards Iraq. With this second level of observation an attempt is made at 
introducing a unique and original contribution to US foreign policy scholarship reflecting 
the novel nature of the issue in question. This study contends that, while US has an Iraq 
policy, it also has a de facto policy towards Iraq‘s Kurds. The study finds that, although US 
policy towards the Iraqi Kurds is not formally articulated, there is evidently a US policy 
towards Kurdish Iraq as the very nature of US interaction with the Kurdish movement 
makes US Kurdish policy a tangible and observable reality.    
 
The third level of analysis is the supra-national level addressing US global strategy and the 
effect it has had on US Iraq policy. This highest level of US foreign policy consideration 
observes whether there have been any changes in US Grand Strategy in response to 
changes in the global security order.  
 
This thesis is a contemporary historical narrative of US foreign policy towards Iraq. The 
study attempts to provide a meticulous piece of foreign policy analysis and narrative of 
diplomatic history to allow understanding of US Iraq policy. The research follows through 
Iraq‘s invasion of Iran, and Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait up to the attacks on 9/11. Through 
this narrative the research attempts to determine whether US Iraq policy under the George 
W. Bush administration was one of continuity or change. A study of the three phases 
(timelines) and the three levels (supra-national, sub-national and national) of focus is an 
attempt at providing an understanding of the core pillars of US Iraq policy. Overall this 
study maintains and concludes that US Iraq policy has been consistent throughout. 
Changes in strategies and tactics have occurred but the policies have largely and primarily 
remained the same.     
  
1.2  RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 
This study is significant for three major reasons. The consistencies and departures on 
which this study is premised are highly important, since conventional wisdom and current 
scholarship primarily perceives the George W. Bush policy as unconventional in its 
approach and as a dramatic departure in US foreign policy. Secondly, this study hopes to 
provide an original angle of interpretation as very little study has been conducted on the 
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actual continuities and changes in US Iraq policy. Thirdly, very little attention has been 
paid to the issue of Iraqi Kurds in US foreign policy. Hence, this study attempts to engage 
this important area through in-depth analysis of this subject.  
 
Existing literature available in the field addresses US foreign policy towards Iraq within 
the larger context of the Middle East or deals with elements and aspects of US foreign 
policy in general of which Iraq is a component, and as such little can be found focusing 
solely on US Iraq policy. Furthermore, within this context, even less can be found on US 
policy towards Kurdish Iraq. Modern scholarship fails heavily in describing accurately the 
highly significant and parallel US interaction with Iraq‘s Kurds. It is therefore inevitable 
and necessary that US Iraq policy is described accurately and completely, encompassing 
both its Arab and Kurdish dimensions as US policy towards Arab and Kurdish Iraq are 
heavily linked to each other.  
 
The Kurdish issue has been largely neglected by scholars, mainly due to the lack of a 
Kurdish nation state but also for lack of skill in the Kurdish language. The author of this 
study was able to overcome the latter challenge due to his command of the Kurdish 
language, giving him access to material otherwise difficult to exploit. As regards the 
former, the Kurdish issue has been largely perceived as a nationalist movement, denying it 
the attention it deserves in International Relations scholarship. The Kurds have had a 
considerable impact on the international relations of the Middle East and thus need to be 
addressed appropriately. Additionally, US-Kurdish relations are distinct and elaborate yet 
still an inseparable part of US Iraq policy. The Kurdish issue has played a major role in 
Iran-Iraqi relations. It has also been a major issue affecting Turkish national security, 
Turkish relations with Iraq and US-Turkish relations. Since 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan has 
enjoyed a de facto nationhood under US protection. This relatively newly found status 
seems to have changed international and regional perceptions to one of intrigue and 
consideration in contemporary international affairs. Yet still very little scholarship has 
been produced to study directly this issue. To address this deficiency this study sets out to 
make a contribution towards addressing a large and important gap in the understanding of 
US foreign policy and subsequently introduce a fresh understanding of the role and 
influence of the Kurds on Iraq and the region. 
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1.3  METHODOLOGY 
An analytical and descriptive route is pursued to achieve the objective of the study as the 
nature and scope of this research is of a qualitative nature, dealing mostly with accounts of 
contemporary historical events. Due to the empirical nature of this research, the study 
focuses primarily on what, how and why these policies and decisions were made by policy 
makers. The thesis attempts to derive from the events and consequent decisions an 
understanding and a formula defining US Iraq policy. The foreign policy analysis 
presented in this research is mostly analytical in nature, endorsed by the narrative of events. 
It is also descriptive as it deals with the purposes and reasons for the strategies adopted by 
the preceding administrations and the Bush administration in particular.  
 
The study has approached this research from an interpretive stance, comparing and 
contrasting the contemporary history of US Iraq policy, based on the primary and 
secondary data available. The contemporary nature of this research denies it many useful 
classified governmental documents. But this does not deny it the necessary resources to 
embark on this study. Substantial use has been made of the large library of primary and 
secondary material available. This study exploited five major sources of primary material 
to allow a thorough understanding of the debates and issues related to US Iraq policy.  
 
The first source of primary material utilised for this research is (mostly face-to-face) semi-
structured interviews, and in a few cases telephone interviews with senior US officials. To 
obtain these material the author spent three months in Washington, D.C. in 2008 to 
conduct interviews with relevant policy practitioners, academics, key and influential 
figures. Interviews were conducted with officials from the National Security Council, the 
State Department, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States 
Congress, Office of Special Plans (OSP), Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Operation Provide 
Comfort (OPC) as well as several key think tank academics.  
 
Secondly, recently declassified official documents from previous administrations and some 
from the Bush administration have been used extensively to help support this research. 
These documents made available through The National Security Archive and the State 
Department‘s Office of the Historian provided insights and helped develop a 
comprehensive understanding of US Iraq policy that could not have been understood 
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otherwise. These untapped documents, declassified in 2006, were especially useful for the 
author when writing the chapter relevant to US relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. 
 
The third source of primary material has been the public records available. Public 
statements made by senior administration officials in speeches, interviews and press 
conferences, and oral testimonies in congressional hearings as well as official and 
governmental reports have offered a rich source for this study.  
  
The published memoirs of administration officials has proved particularly useful in 
advancing this study are the fourth source. Due to the controversial nature of the Iraq war, 
many of the major players in the Bush administration have written memoirs of their 
experiences and recollections of the events. This gave an insiders‘ insight and subsequently 
the researcher access to invaluable information in relation to strategic decisions made. It 
provided invaluable insights into the discussions and debates that currently classified 
documents would have provided. Although the memoirs primarily defend their authors‘ 
positions, they still constitute a major source of invaluable primary material as all the 
players, although with different views, broadly confirm each other on the content and 
nature of debates, discussions and decisions made. The final primary source has been 
newspaper articles and news magazines that are heavily exploited for this study.  
 
Published literature, primarily books, produced by leading investigative journalists in the 
field have been used as the sixth source of information of secondary material. Books by 
Bob Woodward, George Packer, Gordon Trainor, Michael Gordon and Thomas Ricks were 
some of the material examined for this study. These publications of course had their 
shortcomings as they did not have access to a wide range of undisclosed documents and all 
senior US personnel. The other category of secondary literature used to advance this study 
are the valuable books and academic articles written by leading academics in the field. 
These academics have been divided in their interpretations: some are defensive of the Bush 
foreign policy and others highly critical. The author also made use of several PhD theses of 
previous students who had worked in similar fields. All this material combined provides a 
deep understanding of why and how certain decisions were made and helped the author 
develop a detailed picture of US Iraq policy pre and post invasion.                                                                                                                                        
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1.4  OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
This introductory chapter provides the reader with an introduction to the issue at hand, 
describing briefly the work that is reported in this thesis and the outline and structure of 
this research. As the purpose of this thesis is to familiarise the reader with the intricacies of 
US foreign policy towards Iraq chapter one attempts to establish a structure that allows a 
detailed study of US Iraq policy.  
 
Chapter two focuses primarily on US policy towards Arab Iraq. The study uses this chapter 
to give a detailed historical narrative of US policy towards Arab Iraq starting from the 
Carter administration and Saddam‘s accession to power in 1979. This chapter extends 
through the successive administrations up to the George W. Bush administration, including 
its first eight months in office. This chapter describes phases one and two of US-Iraq 
relations. Phase one begins with US engagement with Iraq after the fall of the Shah in 1979; 
and phase two the review of US Iraq policy after Saddam Hussein‘s occupation of Kuwait 
and its subsequent containment policy. It is only through tracking these two phases that the 
necessary grounds are set to tackle and understand US Iraq policy during the George W. 
Bush administration.    
 
Chapter three takes a comprehensive look at the different intellectual groupings within the 
George W. Bush administration. In this chapter the author attempts to identify the different 
factions and their respective intellectual roots that influenced US foreign policy after the 
al-Qaeda attacks on 9/11. It attempts to observe how these various schools of thought 
engaged, interacted and consequently reassessed previously adopted strategies. This 
chapter helps give an understanding of the ideologies and the various interpretations of the 
US role on the world stage. The chapter deals primarily with four major groups deemed 
directly involved in the decision making process: The Assertive Nationalists, the Defensive 
Realists, the Neoconservatives and George W. Bush (the Compassionate Conservative).                   
 
Chapter four comprises two major sections. The first section introduces the actual 
decision-making process leading to the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam‘s 
regime. It recalls the debates and discussions leading to military action to overthrow 
Saddam. This chapter tackles phase three of the US Iraq policy that started as a result of 
the terrorist attacks on 9/11. The second section of the chapter studies the various reasons 
and objectives that made the US invasion of Iraq possible. For simplification, the study has 
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used a geological analogy, subdividing the objectives of the invasion into crust, mantle and 
core. This subdivision allows a thorough understanding of the publicly stated and 
underlying US intentions from regime change in Iraq.       
 
Chapter five describes the aftermath of the Iraq war. It looks at US actions, mistakes and 
its dealings with the fall of the regime on 9 April 2003. This chapter describes the post 
invasion era in US Iraq policy. It studies the US management of the occupation of Iraq and 
the events leading to the nominal handing over of sovereignty on 28 June 2004. This 
chapter follows US policy towards Iraq until the end of the Bush administration, in an 
attempt at forming a concluding picture on US Iraq policy and the US objectives from a 
Saddam free Iraq. 
 
Chapter six addresses the second major focus and the most original contribution of this 
study. US policy towards the Kurds, similar to US policy towards Arab Iraq, is influenced 
by the three distinct phases. This chapter starts with the first phase and unsuccessful 
Kurdish attempts to create a relationship with the US after 1961. A brief engagement from 
1972-1975 is also discussed followed by an era of non-interaction until the 1991 Kurdish 
uprising. This engagement was intensified with the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, and further 
strengthened with change in US mood after the 9/11 attacks. The final section of this 
chapter deals with the Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq and US policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan.  
 
The final chapter summarises and assesses all three major levels of continuity and change 
in US Iraq policy throughout the three phases covered. It also addresses continuity and 
change during the two terms of the Bush administration; continuity and change with the 
preceding administrations of Clinton and Bush senior and finally continuity and change 
with US foreign policy in general. In this chapter attempts are made to identify the 
consistencies and departures with regards US policy towards Arab Iraq, US policy towards 
Kurdish Iraq and US global policy. This chapter suggests there are more arguments for 
continuity than change in US Iraq policy. This chapter contends that US policy towards 
Iraq is far more consistent than is often assumed.   
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Chapter 2:  
 
THE BUSH PRESIDENCY PRE SEPTEMBER 11: 
RECONISING A FAILING IRAQ POLICY 
 
We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States 
and Iraq...we do not feel that American-Iraqi relations need to be frozen in 
antagonisms. 
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 14 April, 1980.
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To better prepare our understanding of continuity and change in George W. Bush‘s foreign 
policy towards Iraq it is necessary to conduct a historical review of the preceding US 
administrations‘ policies. This chapter attempts to do this by taking US Iraq policy back to 
the initial US tilt towards Iraq during the Carter administration. In 1979, US Middle East 
strategy was forced to change. It was in this year that the United States strategic ally, the 
Shah of Iran, was overthrown; simultaneously, it was the same year that Saddam Hussein 
took power. As the US tilt towards Iraq came during Saddam‘s reign and his demise also at 
their hands, this chapter helps explain the evolution of Iraq in US foreign policy discourse. 
The concluding section of this chapter focuses primarily on US policy towards Iraq under 
the Bush administration pre-9/11, serving as a benchmark to measure consistencies and 
departures in US policy before and after the invasion. Both this chapter and the three 
chapters that follow, excluding chapter six, attempt to focus on US Iraq policy at the 
bilateral national level: US policy towards Arab Iraq.  
 
2.1  THE TILT IN US IRAQ POLICY: JIMMY CARTER AND RONALD REAGAN   
The US departed from its previous disposition with the accession to power of Islamic 
revolutionaries in Iran in 1979. As a consequence, the US strategic relationship with Iran 
ended and with it the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine relied primarily on the 
dependency of the US on its ‗twin pillars‘ to maintain its interests in the Gulf: the Shah‘s 
Iran and the royal Saudi household. However, no longer, through the support of proxies, 
                                                 
1 Zbigniew Brzezinski quoted in Larry Everest. (n.d.). 1980-1988, Iran-Iraq: Helping Both Sides Lose the 
War. Available at: <URL: http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue51/articles/51_30-31.pdf > Access Date: 
20 June 2007. 
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could the US maintain hegemony, balance of power and stability in the region. On 23 
January 1980 this shift materialised, in response to the Islamic revolution and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. In a joint session of Congress Jimmy Carter stated: 
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, 
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.
2
   
This declaration known as the Carter Doctrine was similar to the Truman Doctrine, only it 
stipulated the defence of friendly Arab Gulf states in the region instead of Turkey and 
Greece.
3
 It appears that the US had no appetite for any other revolutionary regimes to 
emerge, and would not allow friendly client regimes to be toppled either. In a response to 
critics as regards the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia, Reagan responded: ‗We will not 
permit [Saudi Arabia] to become another Iran.‘4 Consequently, with the collapse of the 
Nixon Doctrine and subsequently the ‗Twin Pillar‘ concept, the US became further 
engulfed in the politics of the region.  
 
America was in a dilemma. A revolutionary regime in Iran was a disadvantage to US 
interests in the region. But so was a radical Arab nationalist regime in Iraq. So as the 
tension escalated between Iran and Iraq, leading eventually to the invasion of Iran by Iraq 
in 1980, the US response was mild. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war the United States 
declared neutrality.
5
 The US showed no interest in taking sides. America took a neutral 
stance according to President Carter‘s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. It 
did, however, provide Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia 
in response to a Saudi request, resulting from fear of Iranian attacks on their oil 
installations.
6
 Former Carter official Gary Sick denies that Washington directly encouraged 
Iraq‘s attack, but instead let ‗Saddam assume there was a US green light because there was 
no explicit red light.‘7 The purpose of this attitude was to contain the new revolutionary 
                                                 
2
 Jimmy Carter. (1980). State of the Union Address 1980. Available at: <URL: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> Access Date: 14 December 2009.  
3
 Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its 
Implications, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 92.        
4 ibid., p. 93. 
5 ibid. 
6
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), pp. 451-54.  
7 
Gary Sick quoted in Larry Everest. (2003). Four Questions for Saddam -- and the US. [New America Media] 
Available at: <URL: 
http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=c33335175cc184e56416dbb1d1ebc595> 
Access Date: 20 June 2009.   
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Iran and weaken Iraq. Henry Kissinger in a 1980 meeting with the Jewish Community in St. 
Louis, Missouri, captured the US sentiment, ‗It‘s too bad they both can‘t lose this war.‘8  
 
Testimony to this neutrality was a United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) resolution 
479 passed [by the UN Security Council] on 28 September 1980, characterising the war as 
‗The situation between Iran and Iraq.‘ This so-called neutrality was in itself, however, a 
clear policy of weakening both warring sides – another variety of containment.9  This 
policy checked Iraq‘s and Iran‘s power by sustaining their involvement in a costly, lengthy 
and lethal war. This attitude was not too dissimilar to the ‗Dual Containment‘ policy 
pursued by the Clinton administration from 1993, which will be explained at greater length 
later in this chapter. US neutrality continued up to mid 1982 until Iran started to gain an 
upper hand in the war in May 1982. Amid growing concerns that an Iranian victory would 
damage US interests, Ronald Reagan issued a National Security Decision Directive 
(number classified) in the June of that year to support Iraqi efforts.
10
 Howard Teicher a 
former National Security Council (NSC) official described the US position in a testimony 
to a Florida District court as a dilemma between either ‗maintaining strict neutrality and 
allowing Iran to defeat Iraq‘ or ‗intervening and providing assistance to Iraq‘, which was 
on the ‗brink of losing its war with Iran.‘11 Secretary of State George Shultz described the 
support to Iraq as ‗a limited form of balance-of-power policy.‘12 It was clearly a policy that 
helped maintain a balance of power between Iraq and Iran, leading to an eight year long 
war.       
 
With this came the opportunity to divert Iraq from its alliance with the Soviet Union. And 
in turn came the opportunity for the United States to develop relations with Iraq which the 
US thought would replace its missed alliance with Iran as the future guarantor of US 
interests in the region.
13
 Peter Galbraith, former US ambassador and senior Congressional 
staffer, argues that the Reagan administration‘s tilt towards Iraq early in the war was not 
                                                 
8 Henry Kissinger quoted in Robert Cohn. (2008). Best of Bob: Presidents and Precedents. 
[jewishinstlouis.org] Available at: <URL: http://www.jewishinstlouis.org/page.aspx?id=125519&page=8> 
Access Date: 20 June 2009.  
9
 Peter Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 17.  
10 Howard Teicher. (1995). United States District Court Southern District of Florida. [The National Security 
Archive: The George Washington University] Available at: <URL: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf> Access Date: 20 December 2007.     
11
 ibid.  
12
 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), p. 176.    
13
 Galbraith (2006), op. cit., p. 17.    
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merely to disallow an Iraqi defeat, but also to create out of Iraq a ‗potential ally.‘14 Iraq, a 
founding member of the State Department‘s State Sponsors of Terrorism list in 1979 along 
with Libya, South Yemen and Syria, was removed from the list of countries supporting 
terrorism in 1982 to allow US support. A new tilt towards Iraq was born.
15
 To permit this, 
Iraq expelled the Abu Nidal terrorist group from its territory.  
 
Middle East envoy Donald Rumsfeld visited Iraq twice, in late December 1983 and March 
1984, resulting in resumption of full diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 1984. Iraq 
had severed relations with the US as a result of US support to Israel during the Six-Day 
war of 1967. The US was already aware of Iraqi use and technological advancements in 
chemical weapons production.
16
 Although reports of Iraq‘s use of chemical weapons 
against Iran were confirmed by the Reagan administration in 1983, the United States did 
not wish to antagonise Iraq. During Rumsfeld‘s first visit to Baghdad in December 1983, 
little mention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was made. Rumsfeld only made it 
known to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the United States was concerned about 
chemical weapons as part of a list of issues concerning America.
17
 Saddam Hussein told 
US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, that the decision to establish relations with the US 
was taken in ‗1980 during the two months prior to the war between us and Iran.‘18 This 
reflected Saddam‘s knowledge of the change in US attitude towards Iran. For the US this 
was a healthy development, due to the changed regional circumstances. Franklin 
Roosevelt‘s Secretary of State described Nicaragua‘s Anastasio Somoza Garcia as ‗our son 
of a bitch.‘19 Saddam Hussein was seen fit to play the same role. 
  
The US tilt toward Iraq intensified after the failure of the Iran Contra initiatives, as it did 
not produce the required results. The US was persuaded by Iraq to provide support for its 
war efforts. The US allowed purchase of non-military technology as well as sharing 
military intelligence on the movements of Iranian forces obtained through American 
AWACS reconnaissance flights.
20
 The State Department continued its policy of 
engagement with Iraq, hoping it would allow influence on Saddam‘s regime. It even went 
                                                 
14
 Galbraith (2006), op. cit., p. 20.  
15
 ibid., p. 19. 
16
 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East, (New York: PublicAffairs, 
2008), p. 162.    
17
 ibid., p. 163.  
18
 Saddam Hussein, ‗The Glaspie transcript: Saddam Meets the US Ambassador‘ in The Iraq War Reader: 
History, Documents, Opinions, ed. Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf. (New York: Touchstone, 2003). p. 61. 
19
 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 58.   
20 Khadduri and Ghareeb (1997), op. cit., p. 94.  
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so far as to contend: ‗Human rights and chemical weapons aside, in many respects our 
political and economic interests run parallel with those of Iraq.‘ 21  However with the 
escalation of the Iraq-Iran war and oil tankers being targeted in the gulf, the UN Security 
Council intervened on 20 July 1987 by passing a mandatory resolution to create a cease-
fire between both countries: this time to put an end to the war.
22
 On 20 August 1988, Iran 
and Iraq signed an armistice to end their bloody struggle. During this period the United 
States continued to believe that Iraq‘s behaviour could be moderated. Haywood Rankin, a 
US embassy official in Baghdad, stressed that the US believed that if Saddam no longer 
had to fight Iran, he could become the ‗man we wished he could be.‘23    
 
2.2  THE TILT AND UNTILT IN US IRAQ POLICY: GEORGE H. W. BUSH 
President George H. W. Bush signed a national security directive 26 (NSD-26) in October 
1989 declaring ‗normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our 
longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.‘ He also 
continued to believe that Iraq could ‗moderate its behaviour‘ if provided with sufficient 
incentives.
24
 Before that in January 1989 Bush‘s foreign policy team prepared a report 
entitled ‗Guidelines for US Iraq Policy.‘ The guidelines established Iraq as a potentially 
helpful ally in containing Iran and helping advance the Middle East process.
25
 April 
Glaspie who had been appointed as US Ambassador to Iraq in 1989, had instructions to 
broaden cultural and commercial contacts with the Iraqi regime in hopes of ‗civilising‘ it.26 
This was an implicit recognition of the brutal nature of the regime. Bob Dole in a visit to 
Iraq told Saddam on 12 April 1990 that President Bush had assured him that ‗he wants 
better relations, and that the US government wants better relations with Iraq.‘27 From 1983 
until 1988 the United States had provided annual credit to Iraq worth 500 million US 
dollars (USD) under a programme called the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). When 
Bush senior came to office he doubled the CCC to over to one billion.
28
 However, in the 
spring of 1990 the US congressional efforts to impose sanctions against Saddam‘s regime 
                                                 
21
 Power (2002), op. cit., p. 221.    
22 Khadduri and Ghareeb (1997), op. cit., p. 94. 
23
 Haywood Rankin quoted in Power (2002), op. cit., p. 200.  
24
 George H. W. Bush. (1989). National Security Directive 26. [Federation of American Scientists: 
Intelligence Resource Program] Available at: <URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf> Access 
Date: 20 December 2007.    
25
 Power (2002), op. cit., p. 233.  
26
 Knowlederush: April Glaspie. (2005). Available at: <URL: 
http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/April_Glaspie/> Access Date: 17 December 2008.   
27
 Bob Dole, ‗US Senators Chat with Saddam‘ in The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, ed. 
Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf. (New York: Touchstone, 2003). p. 61. 
28
 Power (2002), op. cit., p. 173.  
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resumed, this time in response to Saddam‘s threats in a speech to use chemical weapons 
against Israel. A Senate bill titled ‗Iraq International Law Compliance Act‘29, was passed 
regardless of strong opposition from the Bush senior administration to halt financial and 
military assistance to Iraq until the president could provide evidence that Iraq was in 
‗substantial compliance‘ with the provisions of human rights conventions. The bill passed 
on 25 July 1990 a week before Saddam‘s occupation of Kuwait.30  
 
However, the US government‘s taming policy totally changed with the Iraqi occupation of 
Kuwait. President Bush senior made the US position clear on 11 September 1990: 
An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military 
power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbours -- 
neighbours who control the lion‘s share of the world's remaining oil reserves. 
We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And 
we won‘t.31 
Saddam‘s miscalculations in Iraq‘s annexation of Kuwait rested on several assumptions. 
Firstly, that the US would need Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. Iraq also assumed that it was the 
leading Arab nation and that it was an important counterweight to revolutionary Iran.
32
 On 
6 August, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 661 (1990), imposing 
comprehensive economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was 
followed by a US-led military campaign to eject the Iraqi army from the country. President 
Bush senior on 15 February 1991 in a speech called on the Iraqi people and military to 
topple Saddam‘s regime. 33  His intention was to encourage a coup, not an uprising. 
However, when the preferred agent for the US government (the Iraqi army) failed to topple 
Saddam‘s regime immediately after the liberation of Kuwait, the Iraqi uprising went 
unsupported due to US fear of the potential instability it could create. President Bush, 
however, signed a ‗lethal finding‘ in October 1991 to authorise the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to create conditions for regime change. To this end, forty millions USD 
were allocated for this operation.
34
 Moreover, the US put forward United Nations Security 
                                                 
29
 *The first defeated Congressional attempt at imposing US sanctions on Iraq was stipulated in the 
‗Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988.‘ This is explained at greater length in chapter 6.  
30
 Galbraith (2006), op. cit., p. 36.    
31
 George H. W. Bush. (1990). Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and 
the Federal Budget Deficit. Available at: <URL: 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9> Access Date: 15 
December 2009. 
32
 Galbraith (2006), op. cit., p. 39.       
33
 Khadduri and Ghareeb (1997), op. cit., p. 191.    
34
 Jim Hoagland. ‗How CIA‘s Secret War On Saddam Collapsed; A Retired Intelligence Operative Surfaces 
With Details and Critique of US Campaign‘, The Washington Post, (1997, June 26). p. A21.  
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Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 on 3 April 1991, continuing the rigorous economic 
sanctions imposed on Iraq and conditioning the ceasefire upon Iraq‘s complete compliance 
with its disarmament mandate.
35
  
 
However, the disarmament was only a vehicle to destabilise Saddam and achieve the US 
objective of regime change.
36
 The Bush administration stated that sanctions against Iraq 
would not be lifted, regardless of Iraq‘s compliance with its disarmament stipulated in 
UNSCR 687.
37
 James Baker told a Senate Hearing on 23 May, 1991 that the US would 
‗never normalise relations with Iraq so long as Saddam remained in power‘, stressing that 
UN sanctions would be maintained as long as Saddam was in power.
38
 The lethal finding 
President George H. W. Bush forwarded to Congress stated that the United States would 
undertake efforts to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein.
39
 It was for this 
reason, even after Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait, that the US refused to interact with the 
Iraqi opposition, hoping Saddam‘s overthrow would come through a coup. It was only 
when the ban on official US contacts with the Iraqi opposition became publicly known in 
late March 1991, three weeks after the Iraqi uprising had started, that it was reversed the 
next day. The reversal was too late and the White House took the decision to let Saddam 
crush the post-war rebellions.
40
  
 
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that the US 
strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment within the George 
H. W. Bush administration that the coup had failed, and appears a decision was made to 
shift the US approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the diverse opposition 
groups that had led the post-war rebellions.
41
 Following the failed uprising and the 
immaterialised coup, the CIA helped create a united Iraqi front, culminating in supporting 
and sponsoring a conference of Iraqi oppositionists in Vienna from 16-19 June 1992 which 
                                                 
35
 Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of America’s Intelligence Conspiracy, (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2005), p. 4.    
36
 ibid., p. 4.  
37
 ibid., p. 5. 
38
 James Baker. (1991). Congressional Testimony: Hearing of the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1992: Washington, D.C.     
39
 Patrick Tyler. ‗Congress Notified of Iraq Coup Plan‘, The New York Times, (1992, February 9). p. FD1.   
40 Laurie Mylroie. (2001). The United States and the Iraqi National Congress. Available at: <URL: 
http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg78634.html> Access Date: 15 January 2009.     
41
  Kenneth Katzman. (2000). Iraq’s Opposition Movements (Order Code 98-179 F). Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service.     
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lead to the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
42
 The CIA recruited the Rendon 
Group, a public relations firm to conduct the job.
43
 This was followed by the first 
opposition conference on Iraqi soil in the Kurdish north on 28 October 1992. During this 
period it appears that the US objective was to create a viable united Iraqi opposition. 
However, no evidence exists to suggest that the US felt it could rely on such a weak and 
divided opposition and a coup was always deemed the most appropriate answer to 
Saddam‘s regime.44 
 
2.3  FROM DUAL CONTAINMENT TO REGIME CHANGE: BILL CLINTON 
Shortly afterwards the presidency changed and Bill Clinton became president. In May 
1993, Al Gore, the new vice president, received the INC in Washington, giving the 
struggle against Saddam further recognition. According to Elaine Sciolino, the Clinton 
administration maintained the 1991 lethal finding while denying it the necessary resources 
to succeed. The Clinton administration scaled back the programme from a high of 40 
million USD in 1992 to less than 20 million USD a year, after it concluded that the 
program had failed to weaken the Iraqi leader.
45
 According to a CIA source, it was, ‗How 
much can you get along on?‘ in the Clinton administration as opposed to, ‗How much do 
you need?‘ under the Bush senior.46 Kenneth Katzman, senior Middle East analyst at the 
Congressional Research Service, argues that many in and outside the Clinton 
administration believed that a coup could produce a more favourable regime without 
risking the fragmentation of Iraq. Many observers maintained that Shiite and Kurdish 
groups, if they succeeded in ousting Saddam, would divide the country into warring ethnic 
and tribal groups, and open Iraq to political and military influence from neighbouring Iran, 
Turkey, and Syria.
47
 
  
To this end, the Clinton administration devised the ‗Dual Containment‘ policy, first made 
public by Martin Indyk, then senior director of Near East and South Asian Affairs at the 
                                                 
42
 Gareth Stansfield. (2003). Can the Iraqi opposition unite? [Royal Institute of International Affairs] 
Available at: <URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/23/iraq.theworldtodayessays> Access Date: 
20 June 2007. 
43
 Events Leading Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. (n.d.). [History Commons] Available at: <URL: 
http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq&s
tartpos=100> Access Date: 17 December 2008.    
44
 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, (London: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 70.     
45
 Elaine Sciolino. ‗C.I.A. Asks Congress for Money to Rein In Iraq and Iran‘, The New York Times, (1995, 
April 12). p. FD8.   
46
 Hoagland. op. cit.   
47
 Katzman (2000). op. cit.        
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NSC, on 18 May 1993 at a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
(WINEP). Indyk emphasised that a particular focus on Iraq would only strengthen Iran. He 
also stressed that the older policy of sustaining the balance of power between both Iran and 
Iraq would not be pursued, as the US had enough regional allies to be able to succeed and 
to sustain its interests.  
 
However, the policy of ‗Dual Containment‘ was aimed at weakening, but not specifically 
overthrowing, Saddam Hussein, as well as keeping together an anti-Iraq coalition at the 
United Nations, and strangling Iran‘s economy as it tried to rebuild its military muscle.48 
The objective of this policy was to isolate Iraq and Iran, economically, politically and 
militarily. Secondary attention was paid to Iraqi opposition groups. No longer was the 
requirement the traditional balance of power concept, where either Iran or Iraq was 
favoured to keep the other in check.
49
 Under the Clinton administration there was no 
intention of putting teeth into overthrowing the regime. The administration was willing to 
do some things. Its policy was to contain Saddam and give some support to the opposition. 
Phebe Marr, Iraq expert and advisor to the Iraq Study Group
50
,
 stated, ‗If the opposition 
could do it fine. But few really expected the opposition to overthrow him on their own 
without military support.‘51   
 
The Clinton administration, however, was still in pursuit of the lethal finding and regime 
change. In September 1994, following an inspection tour to Iraqi Kurdistan, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee cleared the CIA to establish a semi-permanent base.
52
 In late 
January 1995 CIA operatives set up base in Iraqi Kurdistan. They believed supporting 
resistance fighters in the north of Iraq might lead to a successful insurrection and spread 
south towards Baghdad.
53
 The CIA officers had wanted gradually to strengthen the 
‗liberated‘ zone in the country‘s Kurdish north.54 Robert Baer was the chief CIA officer 
responsible for this attempt. He and three other CIA officers had arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan 
to set up the clandestine CIA base in northern Iraq. The purpose of the four-man base was 
                                                 
48
 Sciolino. op. cit.    
49
 Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, (USA: Yale University Press, 
2007), p. 48.     
50
 *The Iraq Study Group was a bipartisan panel appointed on 15 March 2006 by the US Congress to assess 
the situation in Iraq. It released its findings on 6 December 2006.    
51
 Phebe Marr, Interview with Author, 19 June 2008, Washington, D.C. 
52
 Hoagland. op. cit. 
53
 Evan Thomas et al., ‗Bay of Pigs Redux.‘ Newsweek, (1998, March 23), Vol. 131, No. 12, pp. 36-44.         
54
 Hoagland. op. cit. 
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to assist Iraqi dissidents overthrow Saddam.
55
 Baer states that the premise of this base was 
to take care of an ‗unfinished war.‘56 He asserts that his order was to support any serious 
movement to get rid of Saddam.
57
 Upon arrival a defecting Iraqi general had approached 
Baer and informed him of a coup plot by a group of cousins.
58
 Additionally the INC‘s 
Ahmed Chalabi had devised an ‗End Game‘ plan to be executed on 3 March 1995. The 
coup would coincide with Chalabi‘s plan. The ‗End Game‘ plan was composed of a 
Kurdish attack on Iraqi lines in the north, combined with a Kurdish fifth column creating 
disturbances in Kirkuk and Mosul. The Shiite groups would also attack the Iraqi army and 
consequently the army would revolt, leading to the end of the regime.
59
  
 
In the end, Washington had not supported nor committed to the venture. The US preferred 
to maintain the status quo.
60
 Washington refused to acknowledge both the diversion and 
coup and Robert Baer was recalled for a criminal investigation.
61
 All this demonstrated that 
faith in the Iraqi opposition to achieve change was minimal, in addition to the 
administration‘s wariness of the burden and difficulties such a shake up would bring. 
Democratic promotion seems to have had little impetus as well. The possibility of an 
independent Kurdistan, and an emerging Shiite satellite state in the south as a result of the 
weakening of a Sunni constituent, was a worry as well. Hoshyar Zebari, a member of the 
INC executive council, had expressed his frustration with this US attitude: ‗But surely after 
nearly four years of waiting for this coup, they must know that it is almost impossible to 
arrange.‘ He even went further to suggest that the West supported a coup over any other 
alternative since he believed it ‗would leave the country in safe, autocratic, Sunni hands‘ 
because the West opposed ‗the democratic solution…in which the majority Shiites find 
influence proportionate to their number‘ for ‗fear that the Shiites would fall prey to 
fundamentalist, expansionist Iran.‘62   
 
Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani stated that the INC had started with great potential and that it 
could have brought together all the major and minor parties in Iraq. But it failed due to two 
major reasons. The first was an ambiguous American policy. The Iraqis had initially 
                                                 
55
 Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism, (London: 
Arrow Books, 2002), p. 260.         
56
 ibid., p. 256. 
57
 ibid., p. 296. 
58
 ibid., p. 275.  
59
 ibid., pp. 285-86. 
60
 ibid., p. 304. 
61
 ibid., p. 307. 
62
 Hoshyar Zebari quoted in Michael Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, 
(Pennsylvania: Macmillan, 1999), p. 43.    
20 
 
believed that establishing the INC meant the United States would take a more active step to 
bring change to Iraq. According to Talabani, the Iraqi opposition soon discovered that the 
United States wanted the INC to be just a ‗propaganda organisation.‘ Secondly, the 
opposition groups had not found consensus since they had different ideas about how to 
change the regime. Talabani asserted that Ahmed Chalabi was not in complete compliance 
with CIA policy. The United States proposed that Chalabi be the main actor not the leader 
in the INC. Moreover, Chalabi, had favoured an armed struggle inside Iraq, and to do this, 
he wanted to establish an INC army. Meanwhile the CIA wanted the INC to organise a 
military coup and not develop any kind of military forces to fight against the Iraqi army. 
As a result the US government changed its mind about Chalabi and began to loathe him. 
According to Talabani he was initially ‗beloved‘ inside the CIA, then he was ‗hated‘ 
there.
63
  
 
Pressure within the Clinton administration to proceed with overthrowing Saddam 
accelerated when John Deutch moved from the Defense Department to become CIA 
director in May 1995, and intensified as the 1996 presidential election campaign moved 
nearer.
64
 The US again opted for a ‗quick coup‘ option mostly due to lack of faith in the 
external Iraqi opposition.
65
 The internal Kurdish fighting spanning May 1994 to November 
1997 was a major reason why the Iraqi opposition lost weight. Both the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the ‗two main 
pillars‘ of INC were heavily fighting each other.66  In early 1996 Ayad Allawi‘s Iraqi 
National Accord (INA) with the CIA‘s support attempted a coup through claimed contacts 
in the senior officer corps. Clinton even gave 6 million USD to support this operation. 
However, Saddam infiltrated this operation and in June 1996 executed some 100 of those 
involved.
67
 The CIA‘s Iraq Operations Group (a division within the CIA‘s Directorate of 
Operations) plotted the coup against Saddam Hussein. The ‗Silver Bullet‘ coup, as it 
became known, was approved by the White House, ordering CIA director John Deutch to 
press forward. The coup was scheduled for June 1996 before the US presidential 
elections.
68
 The coup was to incorporate the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM). An Iraqi non-cooperation with the inspectors would create a crisis prompting 
                                                 
63
 Jalal Talabani. (2002). Jalal Talabani: ‘No Grounds for a Relationship with Baghdad.’ [Middle East 
Forum] Available at: <URL: http://www.meforum.org/126/jalal-talabani-no-grounds-for-a-relationship-
with> Access Date: 20 June 2007. 
64
 Hoagland. op. cit.    
65
 ibid.    
66
 Hoshyar Zebari quoted in Gunter (1999), op. cit., p. 43.  
67
 Gunter (1999), op. cit., p. 51.   
68
 Ritter (2005), op. cit., p. 163.          
21 
 
US military strikes against Iraqi Special Republican Guards. This distraction would permit 
the coup plotters to take action.
69
 Scott Ritter, chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, 
describes it as ‗sanctions-assisted regime change.‘70  
 
Throughout this time the UN inspections were in process. Scott Ritter, a senior weapons 
inspector, states that the US had reservations about any inspection designed to ‗close the 
file‘ on missile disarmament issues.71 When UNSCOM 45 was over Ritter was satisfied 
enough to confirm that Iraq had been ‗disarmed of ballistic missiles.‘ However, these 
assessments were not recognised in Washington and considered flawed.
72
 The US 
intelligence community was interested in maintaining the perception that Iraq was not 
telling the truth.
73
 Essentially it was a policy of refusing to allow Iraq to be disarmed to 
maintain the sanctions.
74
 Madeleine Albright, in a speech on 26 March 1996, stressed that 
sanctions against Iraq would not be lifted as long as Saddam remained in power.
75
  
Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor during the first Clinton administration, had 
explained that the problem at the time was that the administration could not explicitly state 
that the purpose of US policy was the overthrow of the regime. To explicitly state the US 
goal of regime change would have blown apart the coalition and was not in the mandate of 
the UN resolutions. Lake argued that the very mention of full compliance with all the 
resolutions passed in the wake of the First Gulf War was essentially calling for Saddam 
Hussein‘s overthrow because, if ‗he observed the provisions calling for an end to 
repression, then his regime would fall.‘76  
 
Nevertheless, a change of strategy emerged in 1998. It became obvious that coups would 
not succeed. Republican and neoconservative voices of discontent were also rising in this 
respect. The US government knew that it had to reinforce its posture on Iraq as it seemed 
that Iraq was winning its war. In an effort to regroup the Iraqi opposition after many years 
of poor performance, in May 1998 President Clinton signed a bill giving 5 million more 
USD to the Iraqi opposition. According to this provision the funds would help the training, 
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organising and promoting the unity of the democratic Iraqi opposition.
77
 Additionally, the 
sanctions were already eroding. Iraq was already illegally exporting petroleum through 
Jordan and Turkey, a trade which provided substantial revenues to the regime. 
International support was constantly corroded with Russian and Chinese interests opposed 
to its continuation. Furthermore, due to increased reports on the humanitarian situation in 
Iraq, the UN Security Council, on 14 April 1995, adopted Resolution 986 to address this 
issue which came to be known as the Oil for Food Programme that went into effect on 10 
December 1996.  
 
The situation deteriorated further following Richard Butler‘s, Executive Chairman of 
UNSCOM, visit to Iraq in January 1998, reporting Iraq‘s refusal to allow access to 
presidential sites. After this incident the Clinton administration embarked on the effort to 
gain congressional support for a military strike against Iraq.
78
 However, the major thrust 
came in the summer of 1998. On 3 August, during a visit to Baghdad, Richard Butler, was 
told by the Deputy Prime Minister that he must certify to the Security Council that the 
requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991) had been met.
79
 The Chairman 
responded that he was not in a position to do so, and the Deputy Prime Minister suspended 
the talks. On 5 August 1998, Iraq halted cooperation with UNSCOM and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pending Security Council agreement to lift the oil 
embargo, reorganise the Commission and move it to either Geneva or Vienna. In the 
interim, Iraq maintained it would, on its own terms, permit monitoring under resolution 
715 (1991). However, after increased international pressure and the passing of UN Security 
Council resolution 1194, on 9 September 1998 the Commission reported to the Council 
that it was satisfied that it has been able to exercise its full range of activities, including 
inspections. Again on 31 October 1998 Iraq announced that it would cease all forms of 
interaction with UNSCOM and its Chairman and halt all UNSCOM‘s activities inside Iraq, 
including monitoring in response to the signing into law of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA).
80
  
 
The recognition of failing US policies towards Iraq had gained momentum. On 26 January 
1998 the Project for the New American Century, a Washington, D.C. (neoconservative) 
organisation, signed an open letter to President Clinton emphasising that the containment 
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of Iraq was eroding and that regime change should be pursued vigorously. This was 
followed by a second open letter on 19 February 1998 to President Clinton sponsored this 
time by Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf also requesting regime change.
81
 
However, the Clinton administration had no intention of using its own forces to bring 
about regime change. Also aware of the opposition‘s abilities, Secretary of State Albright, 
on 26 February 1998, in testimony before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, stated 
that the opposition is fragmented and that it would be ‗wrong to create false or 
unsustainable expectations‘ about what US support for the opposition can accomplish.82  
On 29 September 1998 Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) introduced H.R.4655, a 
bill ‗To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.‘ It was co-
sponsored by Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA). The bill ultimately known as ‗The 
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998‘ was passed in both houses of Congress.83 On 5 October, the 
House passed the ILA by an overwhelming majority and the Senate passed it unanimously 
on 7 October. The Act declared that it was the policy of the United States to support 
‗regime change‘ in Iraq. US President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law on 31 October 
1998, which also authorised 97 million USD in assistance to Iraqi opposition groups.
84
 The 
publicly declared policy of regime change was a stark contrast to the previously pursued 
‗Dual Containment‘ policy.85 On the day of signing President Clinton explained: 
Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655, the ‗Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.‘ This 
Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very 
different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal repression and external 
aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers.
86
 
Following Iraq‘s refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM with B-52 bombers in the air on 14 
November 1998 and within about 20 minutes of attack, Saddam Hussein agreed to allow 
UN monitors back in. The bombers were recalled and weapons inspectors returned. 
However, on 8 December 1998 Richard Butler reported that Iraq was still impeding 
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inspections. Cooperation ended again between Iraq and the inspectors when the country 
demanded the lifting of the UN oil embargo. UNSCOM and the IAEA pulled their staff out 
of Iraq in anticipation of a US-led air raid on Iraqi military targets. On 16 December 1998 
the United States and United Kingdom began a four-day air campaign against targets in 
Iraq codenamed Operation Desert Fox. Some opponents of Clinton charged that the attacks 
were a diversion as it was only three days before the House of Representatives impeached 
President Clinton. The stated mission: ‗to strike military and security targets in Iraq that 
contribute to Iraq‘s ability to produce, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass 
destruction.‘ On the day of the bombing Clinton stated publicly that ending the Iraqi threat 
would only come thorough regime change in Baghdad. He stressed US commitment to 
strengthen engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and ‗work with them 
effectively and prudently.‘ 87  These events further led to the continuation of the 
deteriorating status quo. This time Iraq refused the return of weapons inspectors 
permanently.
88
  
 
President Clinton signed the appropriation bill into law on 29 November 1999. Congress 
had allocated 10 million USD to support efforts to bring about political transition in Iraq, 
of which no less than 8 million USD would be made available to Iraqi opposition groups 
designated under the ‗Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105–338).‘ 89  The Clinton 
administration gave further recognition to the opposition and sponsored a major Iraqi 
opposition conference in New York. After the official ending in a speech before the 
assembly on the conference‘s closing day, 29 October 1999, Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, pledged that the United States ‗will actively support 
you not only until you are free, but also thereafter in rebuilding a new, democratic Iraq.‘90  
 
2.4  THE FAILING IRAQ POLICY: GEORGE W. BUSH   
Iraq was never far down on the Bush foreign policy agenda. During his presidential 
campaign Bush asserted he would be firm with regimes like North Korea and Iraq.
91
 In his 
campaign Bush also stated that if it was discovered that Saddam Hussein was pursuing 
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WMD he would ‗take him out.‘92 Bush believed that the Iraqi WMD programme was still 
active. Bush explained ‗Iran has made rapid strides in its missile program, and Iraq persists 
in a race to do the same.‘93 During the campaign in 2000 Condoleezza Rice described 
Bush‘s foreign policy towards Iraq as a clear case of deterrence writing, ‗if they do acquire 
WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national 
obliteration.‘94 She also referred to Iraq‘s isolation and described Saddam as having ‗no 
useful place in international politics.‘ Rice made it clear that regime change was not off the 
table, she stated that ‗nothing will change until Saddam is gone‘, it should be US policy to 
‗mobilise whatever resources it can, including support from his opposition, to remove 
him.‘95 As a candidate, however, Bush saw Iraq as a containable threat, on 16 February 
2000 he proposed to ‗keep them isolated in the world of public opinion and to work with 
our alliances to keep them isolated.‘96  
 
About a week before President Bush‘s inauguration, CIA director George Tenet and 
Deputy for Operations James Pavitt met with President-elect George W. Bush, Vice 
President-elect Richard Cheney, and the incoming National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice. He told them that al-Qaeda was one of the three gravest threats facing the United 
States and that this ‗tremendous threat‘ was ‗immediate.‘ The other two grave threats were 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and China‘s rising power.97 This gave the 
Bush presidency three major US National Security focuses.
98
 The second point directly 
associated with the potential threats of the Iraqi regime.  
 
When Bush was elected, Cheney also asked for a security briefing for the president-elect. 
William Cohen, Clinton‘s Secretary of Defense was told that the session should focus on 
Iraq.
99
 Moreover, when president-elect Bush met with Clinton a month before his 
inauguration, Clinton made clear to Bush that he had observed from his campaign that his 
major concern was National Missile Defense and Iraq; Bush confirmed this fact. However, 
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Clinton advised that his priorities should be: al-Qaeda, Middle East diplomacy, North 
Korea, nuclear competition in South Asia, and only then Iraq.
100
  
 
After his inauguration and on 6 February 2001, President George W. Bush announced that 
the US would resume funding opposition efforts inside Iraq for the first time since the Iraqi 
army overran opposition bases in 1996.
101
 On 16 February 2001 US aircraft targeted areas 
around Baghdad. The attacks were to send a warning to the Iraqi regime and also degrade 
Iraq‘s ability to shoot at pilots flying over the No-fly zones. The attacks were the first 
outside the No-fly zones in the north and south of the country since December 1998.
102
 
This was only to indicate to the Iraqi regime that there was no shift of focus or relaxation 
in the United States hostile attitude to Iraq. However, this did not mean or bring any 
significant change of US strategy towards Iraq. Even The Washington Post described a 
joint US-British attack on Iraqi installations on 10 August 2001 as minimal, affirming that 
‗yesterday‘s strikes appeared to continue the Clinton era pattern of hitting Iraqi air 
defences every six months or so.‘103 
  
After February 2001, allied forces continued strikes against Iraqi air defence installations, 
including an Iraqi mobile early warning radar in southern Iraq on April 19, an air defence 
site in northern Iraq on 20 April, an air defence installation 180 miles southeast of Baghdad 
on 18 May, and an air defence site in northern Iraq on 7 August and another on 10 August. 
The airstrike on 10 August 2001 was the most lethal since February. US and British 
aircraft hit three installations: a surface-to-air missile battery 170 miles southeast of 
Baghdad, an associated long-range mobile radar system, and a fibre-optic communications 
station 70 miles southeast of Baghdad. Before this strike, on 29 July, US National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice had told CNN that the administration was contemplating the 
use of ‗military force in a more resolute manner‘ and said that ‗Saddam Hussein was on the 
radar screen for the administration.‘104 
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Before 9/11 the Bush administration did not focus on the Iraq problem at the Principals‘ 
level.
105
 All discussion regarding Iraq was at the Deputies‘ level.106 In late Spring of 2001 
Condoleezza Rice‘s staff prepared a document entitled, ‗Freeing the Iraqi People.‘ It 
encompassed three steps to confront the Iraq threat. The first step was to provide 
immediate training and military assistance to the Iraqi opposition as stipulated in the ILA. 
The second step would be to arm the Iraqi oppositionists to enable effective action against 
Saddam‘s regime and finally to take action against the Iraqi regime by US forces.107 In a 
meeting on 22 June 2001, the Deputies discussed the proposal and the first measure they 
agreed upon for a new US Iraq policy was the ‗lethal training‘108 of the Iraqi opposition.109 
In a 13 July 2001 meeting, the Deputies returned to the Iraq issue particularly the No-fly 
zones and the constant attacks against US and UK patrols. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, argued that Iraqi targets should be hit severely to induce Saddam to 
stop ‗shooting.‘110  The Deputies had different assessments of the Iraq threat pre-9/11. 
Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, and John McLaughlin, Deputy CIA director, 
tended to downplay the threats posed by Saddam Hussein although they recognised them. 
Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby, Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney, stressed that the 
Iraq threat had not been contained and if the sanctions were removed Saddam would pose a 
greater threat that would be even more difficult to handle.
111
 In early 2001 Wolfowitz 
proposed a strategy for regime change that would not necessarily entail a US invasion. It 
would include, however, the broadening of international cooperation against Iraq, 
strengthen the Iraqi democratic opposition through US training. Also economically 
enhance the Iraqi opposition through the exclusion of the Kurdish northern region from the 
ongoing sanctions.
112
 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz asked if the US might 
create an autonomous area in southern Iraq similar to the autonomous Kurdish region in 
the north, with the goal of making Saddam little more than the ‗mayor of Baghdad.‘ US 
officials also discussed whether a popular uprising in Iraq should be encouraged, and how 
the US could best work with free Iraqi groups that opposed the Saddam regime.
113
 In a 
Principals‘ Committee meeting on 1 June four options were set on the table. Firstly, to 
                                                 
105
 *The Principals are the heads of the major national security related US governmental departments.  
*The Deputies are the second in command of the major national security related US governmental 
departments.  
106
 Feith (2008), op. cit., p. 199.  
107
 ibid., p. 206.        
108
 *Lethal Training means training for lethal operations.  
109
 Feith (2008), op. cit., p. 206.      
110
 ibid. 
111
 ibid., p. 203.                  
112
 ibid., p. 204.            
113 
Feith (2008). op. cit., The Wall Street Journal.      
28 
 
continue with the containment strategy. Secondly, to continue containment while actively 
supporting Saddam‘s opponents. Thirdly, setting up a safe haven for insurgents in southern 
Iraq. Finally, to plan a US invasion.
114
 
 
However, in the early months of the Bush administration there was no clear Iraq policy. 
Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, argues that President Bush and 
Rumsfeld had no set direction on US policy towards Iraq as late as the summer of 2001. He 
states that Rumsfeld‘s position on Iraq was war as a last resort, but with no effective 
alternative.
115
 However, the intention of a more radical approach to Iraq could be seen. 
Drifts and clashes of opinion were already to take hold between the realists at the State 
Department and hawks at the Pentagon, with further funds released to opposition groups 
and a more forceful air campaign against Iraqi anti-aircraft positions.
116
 When the Bush 
administration officials came to office they were thinking of either maintaining the 
containment strategy or revising it with a replacement.
117
 
 
Douglas Feith, argues that, pre-9/11, the debate focused on containment versus regime 
change.
118
 Before 9/11 CIA officials had floated the possibility of a coup, though they 
knew Saddam was far better at undoing coup plots than the CIA was at engineering 
them.
119
 Before 9/11 the CIA‘s Iraqi Operations Group chief thought there was a clear 
contradiction in the Bush Iraq policy; the administration‘s approach was irrational. On the 
one hand it was containing and deterring the Iraqi regime through the UN; on the other it 
had a standing order to the CIA advising their support to topple Saddam‘s regime. In their 
minds, the only way to succeed was a full US military invasion of Iraq.
120
 The focus was 
on how to pressure Saddam‘s regime through the instruments of economic sanctions, 
WMD inspections, and the No-fly zones. The differences amongst administration officials 
on how to deal with Saddam were deep. For regime change advocates the debate was 
between a military coup or a change of the Baathist Government. Discussions also 
included the suspension of the No-fly zone patrols that were being shot at on a daily 
basis.
121
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Paul O‘Neill the US Treasury Secretary indicated that the first NSC meeting in the Bush 
White House in January 2001 considered the Iraq threat and the possibility of the removal 
of Saddam.
122
 This clearly shows that Iraq was always considered a US national security 
threat, but in no way suggests that the Bush presidency was mentally fixed on removing 
the Baath regime. Henri Barkey, former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the US 
State Department, stressed that the US believed the French were breaking the sanctions and 
the coalition was crumbling. To him, O‘Neill had only confirmed an obvious concern. 
Barkey asserted that the attention paid to Iraq was only normal as it was considered the 
first threat and the most important threat to US policy at the time. The fact that Saddam 
was evading the sanctions was a troublesome sign in US circles. There were all kinds of 
American attempts at devising and creating new and smarter sanctions.
123
 Richard Clarke 
the anti-terrorism official on the NSC, also recalled the first meeting on terrorism in April 
2001 where the Iraq issue was given far more significance than al-Qaeda especially by 
Paul Wolfowitz.
124
 Douglas Feith admits that Saddam was considered a threat to US 
interests and the region, and stresses that it had been so for more than a decade pre-9/11 
since Iraq invaded Kuwait.
125
 Feith asserted that Saddam‘s threat was multi-faceted. 
Saddam had used his WMD domestically and internationally. He was harbouring and 
training terrorists, rewarding Palestinian suicide bombers, thus encouraging anti-Israel 
extremism – blocking a possible peace settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli peace.126 
 
Although the debate was intense as regards Iraq, Carole O‘Leary, Iraq expert at the 
American University, stressed that before 9/11 Powell was managing the US foreign policy 
portfolio and had no interest in nation building; concerning Iraq, his focus was on 
containment and on new, better targeted, so-called ‗smart‘ sanctions.127 Phebe Marr 
explained that Wolfowitz was pushing a policy of regime change, but not getting anywhere 
with it.
128
 Pre-9/11 the only Iraq policy the US adopted was to revise the terms of the 
sanctions imposed on Iraq. They introduced ‗smart sanctions‘ that would have less of an 
immediate effect on the general Iraqi public, but with a stricter flow on dual use equipment 
and material.
129
 In late February 2001, Colin Powell started a tour of the Middle East to 
start his new course to deal with Iraq. His intention was to create a new set of sanctions. 
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Feith argues, ‗in the months before the 9/11 attack, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
advocated diluting the multinational economic sanctions, in the hope that a weaker set of 
sanctions could win stronger and more sustained international support.‘130 Lawrence 
Wilkerson, Colin Powell‘s Chief of Staff, emphasised that US Iraq policy in first eight 
months of the Bush administration before 9/11 could be ‗summed up in one word, 
containment.‘ It was to make sure Saddam Hussein was kept from being a major threat to 
his neighbours, did not violate UN sanctions to the point where WMD did not become a 
problem for the region, and ensure that oil from the Strait of Hormuz flowed into world 
markets.
131
 The US frustration with the collapse of the sanctions was becoming evident. In 
a memo dated 27 July to the Principals, Rumsfeld suggested  that they could publicly 
acknowledge that sanctions did not work over extended periods and stop the pretense of 
having a policy that is keeping Saddam ‗in the box,‘ when he had actually ‗crawled a good 
distance out of the box.‘ The new Powell proposals would, in fact, aim to take away what 
money the regime had made by shutting down an oil-smuggling operation worth about 2 
billion USD a year. The revised embargo attempt appeared to be the dovish answer to an 
internal US power struggle about how to deal with Iraq.
132
 On 1 June 2001 the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1352 unanimously to ensure a 30-day 
extension of the Oil for Food (OFF) programme to allow a possible revision of the 
sanctions regime, rather than the usual six months. The United Nations Security Council 
adopted the resolution signalling a possible reform of the decade-old sanctions on Iraq.
133
 
Even then British officials said ‗it is very unlikely that London and Washington will give 
President Saddam Hussein control of his oil revenues again.‘134 However, the ‗smart 
sanctions‘ approach eventually failed due to lack of support from China, Russia and 
France. The attempts ended with no real results. At the end of the 30 days revision period, 
the Security Council deferred action yet again, by extending the program for another five 
months.
 135
 On 29 November 2001 the Security Council extended the programme for 
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another six months, the status quo being maintained this time however, with 9/11 
specifically in mind.
136
  
 
This Bush administration had  come to power thinking that something had to be done about 
Saddam. On 31 October 2000, Barkey who had worked for the State Department less than 
one year earlier had organised an International Institute for Strategic Studies and United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP) sponsored meeting in Paris between American, British, 
French, German, Italian, and Turkish former officials and think tankers. The whole point 
of the meeting he stressed was, ‗no matter who won the elections, Gore or Bush the US 
would have a conflict with Iraq of some sort.‘ The only perceived way to avoid this 
conflict was for the Europeans and Americans to start devising a method of forcing 
Saddam through all kinds of sanctions, smart sanctions and new initiatives. Barkey 
believed that the US was on a conflict course. Saddam was getting rid of the sanctions by 
slowly eroding them and the mood in the region had changed dramatically against the 
United States.
137
  
 
The Iraq policy debate remained unresolved when the 11 September attacks occurred.
138
 
Vice President Cheney agreed there was a lack of focus on the Middle East before the 9/11 
attacks. In a Camp David meeting on 15 September 2001, he acknowledged that the 
position and role of the US before the attacks were quite unknown in the region. However, 
he asserted that with the attacks less than a week old ‗an opportunity for US action has 
arisen with the Turks, Saudis all on their side.‘139 President Bush expressed his frustration 
of the pre-9/11 period where he had no clear plan or authority to change Saddam Hussein‘s 
behaviour. Three years after 9/11, Bush explained ‗I was not happy with our policy.‘ He 
also made clear the transformation in attitude to perceived or potential threats, ‗prior to 
September 11, however, a president could see a threat and contain it or deal with it in a 
variety of ways without fear of that threat materialising on your own soil.‘140 This all 
changed with 9/11. 
 
This chapter highlighted the urgency and consistent primacy of the Iraq issue in US 
national security debates even before the attacks of 9/11 in the George W. Bush and the 
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preceding administrations, starting primarily after Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait. 
Additionally, it stressed the strategy with which the US dealt with Iraq, based on extensive 
and intensive multilateral diplomacy largely led and dominated by the State Department‘s 
doves and Secretary Powell in the junior Bush‘s administration. The following chapter 
attempts to identify the major ideological factions that dominated the George W. Bush 
administration and the influence they had on shaping and making US Iraq policy and the 
effect they had on changing the nature of the US national security debate after 9/11. 
 
33 
 
Chapter 3:  
 
INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF THE BUSH FOREIGN 
POLICY: THE POWER OF IDEAS 
  
America must maintain our moral clarity. I‘ve often spoken to you about good 
and evil, and this has made some uncomfortable. But good and evil are present 
in this world, and between the two of them there can be no compromise. 
Murdering the innocent to advance an ideology is wrong every time, 
everywhere. Freeing people from oppression and despair is eternally right.  
George W. Bush, 15 January, 2009.
 1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding US foreign policy during the Bush administration requires comprehending 
the ideas of the major actors of the Bush presidency. The purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce and identify the key groups and respective ideologies that were central to foreign 
policy-making during the Bush administration. Conventional wisdom asserts that 
neoconservatives were the dominant faction during the Bush administration. This chapter, 
however, identifies three other groups and streams of thinking that contributed to the 
administration‘s foreign policy stance. One of the influential groups were the 
neoconservatives: a group of people that believed in the necessity of use of American 
power to achieve long term interests by changing the characters of regimes. They were, 
however, far from a uniform and unified faction. Rather, they held a range of disparate 
ideas and contributed a number of different approaches. The second element in the Bush 
administration was President George W. Bush himself. Bush was an idealist who believed 
American values were right for all peoples and who grounded his foreign policy thinking 
in his Christian beliefs. Centrally, he believed he had mission from God to confront evil. A 
third important group was a collection of assertive nationalists. They focused specifically 
on the maintenance of US dominance, security and global hegemony. A fourth group, 
which lost influence after the 9/11 attacks were Scowcroftian Realists. This group was 
broadly Realist and therefore similar to the nationalists in orientation, but by nature 
cautious to the application of US power and reluctant to extensive military engagements. 
This chapter discusses these various approaches and attempts to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the various motivations that led to the toppling of Saddam‘s regime in 
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2003. As will become evident, a firm grasp of the ideas of the neoconservatives is essential 
to understanding the Bush administration‘s foreign policy. It is not, however, sufficient to 
gain a complete picture of US foreign policy under the Bush administration which is an 
intricate reaction of views, objectives and agendas. 
 
3.1  THE NEOCONSERVATIVES 
The term ‗Neoconservatism‘ was not employed to refer to a particular foreign policy 
school until the 1990s. Until that time, adherents of what became to be known as 
neoconservatism were commonly referred to as ‗Reagan Democrats.‘ 2  This group, 
predominantly Democrats, were active and present in the office of Senator Henry (Scoop) 
Jackson (D-WA) who himself advocated an active anti-communist, anti-Soviet US foreign 
policy. Two prominent members of this group who started as interns with Jackson in 1969 
were Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, both were young protégés of influential policy 
analyst Albert Wohlstetter who had arranged their internships.  
 
In 1979 this group around Senator Jackson became extremely disenchanted with what they 
viewed as the Carter administration‘s weak stance on the Soviet Union, leading to the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Carter‘s dealing with the Iran hostage crisis. In 
response, many changed parties and found refuge in the administration of Ronald Reagan, 
where they would go on to hold a number of senior positions.
3
 Paul Wolfowitz became 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Richard Perle Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.  
 
The neoconservative school has its intellectual roots in the domestic politics of the mid 60s. 
It emerged as a reaction of a group of intellectuals to what they perceived as the excesses 
of liberalism and the effects it had on domestic behaviour. Neoconservatives felt that US 
culture had become weak. They believed the US was consumed with pleasure-seeking and 
materialism and that it would bring its demise.
4
 This intellectual reaction was led by Irving 
Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and Elvin Hall who were the first generation of 
neoconservatives. They responded negatively to the anti-war and counter-culture 
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movements as well as those of sexual liberation and Black Power, which they collectively 
faulted for contributing to undesirable social upheaval.
5
  
 
The foreign policy dimension of the neoconservative movement initially emerged in the 
late 60s and early 70s due to a growing disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the 
government‘s handling of and public response to the Vietnam War. The aftermath of the 
Vietnam War had created three movements in US foreign policy. The first was a desire 
from liberal Democrats to retreat from the world after the Vietnam defeat - a withdrawal to 
the borders of the US, effectively a return to isolationism. A second orientation typified 
Realists in the Nixon administration. They supported a selective engagement with the 
world through policy approaches like détente and rapprochement. The third was a 
disaffected group of both Democrats and Republicans, who desired that US strength be 
used vigorously to promote US values and influence world order. This group originally 
included the likes of Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle; they would emerge as leading 
neoconservative figures in the successive Republican administrations. They despised the 
Nixon‘s administration‘s accommodation of the Soviet Union and China. They rejected 
détente and rapprochement.
6
 Rather, they, coalesced around a bold vision for the US in the 
world. The central idea of neoconservative foreign policy was to reinstate morality to its 
practice. Not only would the US be standing up for its own founding principles and 
interests, spreading or attempting to spread American values abroad would also give the 
US a sense of purpose, and consequently improve moral health at home. The only way to 
keep US values strong was to give the US a mission. A sense of national solidarity could 
only be upheld if these US values were pursued abroad. Moral relativism had no place: 
‗tyranny is tyranny and it‘s an American obligation to wipe it out.‘ The objective was to 
create ‗national solidarity not based on ―nation-ness‖, in the sense of birth and language, 
but national solidarity based in ideals grounded in reason‘ as Sam Parker, policy analyst at 
USIP, said. It was a strong belief in the primacy of principles and the need to exert them 
that drove neoconservative thinking on foreign policy.
7
  
 
Neoconservatism was a departure from the traditional conservative tendency to support 
friendly regimes in matters of trade and anti-communism at the expense of existing 
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democratic movements.
8
 Realisim and neoconservatism represented opposing schools of 
foreign policy. Realists believe in preserving US geopolitical strategic interests, regardless 
of a state‘s style of governance. The premise of Realist belief was in the sustainability of 
US interests with the maintenance of regional stability and the prevailing balance of 
power.
9
  
 
Neoconservatives believe that national security is best attained by promoting freedom and 
democracy abroad through the support of pro-democracy movements, foreign aid and in 
certain cases military intervention. Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American 
Enterprise Institute, stated that central to neoconservatism, as opposed to traditional 
realism, is the concern to tie US foreign policy to greater democratisation and greater 
human rights concerns.
10
 Neoconservatism subscribes to the democratic peace theory, in 
which international peace is achieved through domestic democratisation.
11
 Richard Perle 
clarified the neoconservative view point:  
People who call themselves realists and take that to an extreme will say they 
don‘t care who is in power in some another country whether it is democratic or 
totalitarian as long as they don‘t bother us. Some of them think we should have 
left Saddam in place because he wasn‘t bothering us. I suppose the big 
difference is are you completely indifferent to the character of other regimes or 
do you believe there is a connection between the character of other regimes and 
the likelihood that conflicts will develop and we will be adversely affected. I 
think we are more likely to be adversely affected in a world full of 
dictatorships than a world full of democracies. So to the degree we can 
encourage democracy not by sending the army but by political means and 
economic means. To the degree which we can do that. That is action in our 
own self-interest. It makes the world safer for the United States and for others 
as well. Wars are started by dictators and so the fewer the dictators the better. 
And I suppose that is how I would differ [with Realists].
12
  
Neoconservatism is sceptical about any ideology or form of governance other than 
democracy. Evidence of this belief is their historical contempt for the evils of Nazism and 
Fascism, later Communism and more recently Islamic extremism, and the alleged peril it 
can bring to mankind and international peace. Another constant core of the 
neoconservative agenda is to defeat all US enemies and to achieve this they are not 
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sceptical of military engagement at all.
13
 To them this objective could be accomplished 
both by the advancement of US military superiority and the export of US ideals. It was a 
core belief of neoconservatives in the Reagan administration during the Cold War with 
regard to the Soviet Union.
14
 Richard Perle explained to the author: 
There are people who thought we should leave the Soviet Union in place 
because a balance of power had been achieved and they were not a threat to us. 
I believed that the Soviet Union presented a long-term threat and if we could 
defeat the Soviet Union that was worth doing, not by invading them but by a 
whole variety of tactics that Ronald Reagan used very successfully.
15
   
The third dimension of neoconservatism according to Rubin and one of its major 
differences with realism is its focus on long term, as opposed to short-term, interests. For 
neoconservatives the objective circled around the pursuit of democratic ideals for longer-
term and arguably more sustainable interests.
16
 In essence, neoconservatism, is the issue of 
pursuing long-term stability at the expense of short-term stability.
17
 Richard Perle clarified:  
I suppose that neconservatives believe that it is not enough to deal every day on 
a purely tactical basis. There are some longer-term strategic objectives we need 
to pay attention to. And one of those is the character of the rest of the world.
 18
   
The neoconservative position also asserts that multilateral institutions often damage US 
national interests, placing major obstacles on the US freedom of action. They argue that the 
US should not be reluctant in exercising its unique political power in dominating the 
international stage.
19
  
 
Neoconservatism has a total belief in American exceptionalism and the uniqueness of its 
purpose. As such the US is not comparable to any other living nation-state. Adam 
Garfinkle, speechwriter to Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, 
described neoconservatives as ‗secular messianists.‘ Neoconservatives see Americanism as 
a religion that hopes for utopia where everyone is democratic and capitalist and that 
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ensures peace. It is the ambition of bringing democracy to all, and end of days to bring 
about.
20
  
 
Walter Russell Mead contends that the neoconservatives cannot be categorised into one of 
his four major schools of thought, and nor are they a new fifth school, but rather an 
influencing factor to remodel all schools.
21
 Neoconservatism is similar to offensive realism 
as both have offensive militarism and the pursuit of stability at heart. What makes it 
different to Realism however is the higher standards and extended visions of stability it 
attempts to achieve. It is a proponent of muscular American action, righteousness of 
American power, bold gestures and by no means has belief in a muddle-through foreign 
policy.   
 
The neoconservatives had far reaching visions and bold predictions based on their 
suspicions and perceptions of a dangerous world. Iraq had already appeared as a serious 
source of threat on their radar as far back as the late 70s. When Wolfowitz was Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration, he had prepared a Limited 
Contingency Study in 1979 for then Defense Secretary Harold Brown. In this study he 
argued, ‗Iraq has become militarily pre-eminent in the Persian Gulf.‘ He warned of Iraq‘s 
radical anti-Western attitudes, its dependence on Soviet arms and its willingness to foment 
trouble in the region. Wolfowitz even predicted that Iraq may use its military might to 
invade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and advised that the US balance Iraq‘s power.22  
 
When George Bush senior took office in 1989, Paul Wolfowitz was appointed 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
certain administration officials searched for new foreign policy aims which would sustain  
high military spending. Plans were developed by Lewis ‗Scooter‘ Libby (Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning) and Zalmay Khalilzad (Assistant Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning) under the close supervision of Wolfowitz. 
Khalilzad, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning at the time and later 
prominent neoconservative in the Bush junior administration, described the transition and 
change of attitude as the Soviet Union collapsed thus:  
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When the Soviet Union disintegrated, to everyone‘s surprise, then the question 
became, what do we do now? At that time, I was in charge of policy and plans 
in the Department of Defense and it was the responsibility of my shop to come 
up with some alternative approaches for the US to pursue in terms of defining 
its role in the world, in this new era. We came up with the idea that we didn‘t 
want to go back to either a bipolar system or a multipolar system but to go to a 
system of cooperative security led by the United States as the world‘s 
preeminent power.
23
 
America had indeed emerged from the rivalry unrivalled, but found it initially difficult to 
rationalise maintaining its overwhelming military power in late 1991. Richard Cheney, 
who led the Defense Department, argued for sustained military spending even though 
Democrats were asking for investment in other sectors. The Defense Department initially 
asserted that the former Soviet Union was still a strong and threatening entity capable of 
damaging US interests and that it would be only a matter of time that it would re-emerge as 
a major challenger. When this prediction did not materialise, Defense Department 
strategists moved on to a second rationale, arguing that it was Soviet weakness which was 
a threat rather then its power. They argued the breakup of the Soviet Union would result in 
new wars and that Soviet weapons would fall into the hands of rogue states. This scenario 
again failed to materialise. Wolfowitz‘s office then devised a third rationale: the prevention 
of the rise of any other power able to compete with the US. This was defined in the first 
draft of the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992, referring at the time primarily to German 
and Japanese competition. This objective was met with considerable internal and 
international protest. As a result, they masked this goal and re-drafted the document, this 
time with the objective of preserving the primacy of US power to ‗safeguard the new 
international system.‘24 
 
The Defense Planning Guidance, essentially a neoconservative document in content, 
advised the US government to use force pre-emptively to counter the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, increase defence spending, maintain US military primacy and assemble 
alliances based on ad hoc situations rather than adhering to multilateral institutions.
25
 It 
also asserted other major US interests. It advised that the US maintain easy access to 
Persian Gulf oil, address potential threats from acts of terrorism and protect US society 
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from narcotics trafficking.
26
 The document, written under the direct supervision of 
Wolfowitz, came to be known as the ‗Wolfowitz Doctrine.‘  
 
The 1992 paper represented the neoconservative belief that the US had a great opportunity 
for global leadership after the end of the Cold War. As the pre-eminent power on the 
international stage, it justified US leadership not only for its own sake but for the sake of 
keeping international order. The neoconservatives aimed to challenge and defeat any rising 
threats and wanted to live up to what President George H. W. Bush described as a ‗New 
World Order.‘ To them, America had to preserve and reinforce its position to maintain its 
role as the benevolent global hegemon.
27
 The neoconservatives insisted the United States 
should bestride the globe like a colossus, acquiring the characteristics of a true empire, 
although not advocating its presence.
28
 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the vision embraced by administration 
officials garnered support from a variety of sources. Charles Krauthammer, 
neoconservative columnist and political commentator, asserted the post-Cold War era 
marked the emergence of ‗a unipolar world.‘ He advocated US leadership and disparaged 
multilateralism as an answer to world peace. It was the objective of neoconservatives to 
define the rules of a New World Order under US leadership. To them a new opportunity 
had arisen to maintain the unrivalled ascendency in the international system.
29
 With 
Saddam‘s occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and the decline of the Soviet Union, the Middle 
East had already emerged as the new focus for the neoconservatives. Krauthammer 
described the new era as ‗the era of weapons of mass destruction.‘ This became the 
beginning of the debate on how to tackle weapons of mass destruction and ‗Weapon 
States‘ such as Iraq. The new enemy came in the form of states like Iraq and Syria, and 
their region (the Middle East) replaced the Soviet Union as the centre of neoconservative 
attention.
30
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3.1.1  The 90s Gap and the Resurgence of Neoconservatism  
After the election of Bill Clinton, the neoconservatives found themselves deprived of their 
official roles. They remained in the margins, generally visible on the pages of publications 
such as The Weekly Standard and The National Interest as well as in certain think tanks. 
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) became a centre for neconservative thought and 
publication. In the pages of conservative publications and think tanks, neoconservatives 
advocated for a transformation of the Middle East, a forward leaning assertive and 
aggressive approach to contain and undermine rogue regimes. Throughout the 90s, 
however, they had little clout. Sam Parker explained that the foreign policy establishment 
during the Clinton administration was led by career professionals and practitioners, 
primarily pragmatists, not ideologues. They were focused on US national interests, 
preserving American power and dealing with problems as they came up.
31
  
 
James Goldgeier of the Council on Foreign Relations explained that there were hardly any 
publicly active foreign policy neoconservatives left by the mid 90s. Goldgeier stressed that 
they re-grouped in the late 90s with Iraq and Saddam Hussein as a major focus.
32
 The late 
1990‘s saw a new orientation for US foreign policy, this time with the neoconservatives 
pushing for root-level regime change in Iraq. They suggested that the US use substantial 
military force to sustain attacks on elite Iraqi military units to prove that the United States 
was serious in order to reverse the slow collapse of the international coalition imposing 
sanctions on Iraq. This would be part of an overall political strategy that set as its goal not 
merely the containment of Saddam but the liberation of Iraq and the overthrow of his 
regime.33 
 
Robert Kagan, neoconservative foreign policy commentator and founding member, for 
instance, explained that the primary objective of founding ‗The Project for the New 
American Century‘ (PNAC) in 1997 was to ‗fight against isolationist tendencies‘ in the 
mid 1990s. The PNAC advocated US global leadership and a return to ‗military strength 
and moral clarity.‘ To this end, in September 2000, the PNAC issued a report entitled 
‗Rebuilding America‘s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century.‘ 
This report recommended increased military spending, pre-emption, and unilateralism. It 
was essentially a repetition of the draft Defense Policy Guidance produced by Wolfowitz, 
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‗Scooter‘ Libby and Khalilzad. It went as far to say, ‗The process of transformation even if 
it brings revolutionary change is likely to be a long one absent some catastrophic and 
catalysing event like a new Pearl Harbor.‘34 That change incidentally came on 11 
September 2001.   
  
The neoconservative goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein‘s regime, however, long pre-
dated the election of George W. Bush in 2000. Influential neoconservatives like Wolfowitz 
and Khalilzad criticised President Clinton for the way he dealt with the problem of Iraq. To 
them Clinton‘s policy towards Iraq was inconsistent with his own view that it concerned 
‗the security of the 21st century.‘ Both Wolfowitz and Khalilzad insisted that if the US was 
‗serious‘ about dismantling Iraq‘s weapons of mass destruction, and preventing it from 
building more, that it would have to ‗confront him sooner or later and sooner would be 
better.‘35  
The neoconservatives developed strong links with the Likud Party in Israel. In 1996 they 
recommended a revision of Israeli strategy to then Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, in the report ‗A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.‘36 One 
of the major suggestions of the report was for Israel to ‗shape its strategic environment‘ by 
removing Saddam from power.
37
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 1998 the Project 
for the New American Century and the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, both 
with largely neoconservative signatories, sent an open letter to President Clinton 
emphasising that the containment of Iraq was eroding and regime change should be 
pursued.  
The neoconservatives argued that show of strength and the projection of American power 
was necessary for the maintenance of international security and world order. For this 
reason, as opposed to the Cold War containment policy, the neoconservatives asked that 
US power and foreign policy be aimed at regime change in all parts of the world where 
tyrannical governments had acquired the resources to threaten the US, its allies and 
surrounding neighbours. The regimes in Baghdad, Belgrade and Pyongyang were on the 
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neoconservatives‘ list of targets. 38  Their objective was to install regimes that held to 
American values, principally democratic rule.
39
 William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued 
that the US should promote itself through ‗honour and greatness in the service of liberal 
principles.‘ 40  For neoconservatives there was an enthusiasm for innovation, for 
interventionism, for utopias.
41
 In Present Dangers, Kagan and Kristol wrote of establishing 
the ‗standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to 
its own advantage.‘42 They decried a narrow definition of America‘s ‗vital interests‘ and 
argued that America‘s moral purposes and national interests were identical.43  
 
The neoconservative prime objective, however, was to find a comprehensive solution to 
the Middle East.
44
 Robert Kagan argued that democracy should be supported in the Middle 
East. He asserted that regimes of the region should be held to higher standards of 
democracy even if it means that the US has to risk instability in some places. According to 
Kagan, in the context of a contemporary post-Cold War order there were less threats to US 
national interests compared to the height of the Cold War. Neoconservatives believed that 
threats to US security, oil supplies and export markets had declined and thus the US has a 
freer hand in promoting democracy abroad.
45
 Eighty percent of Present Dangers dealt with 
the Middle East and the need for a strong military.
46
 In another neoconservative book 
authored by Richard Perle and David Frum, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, 
Islamic-inspired terrorism was treated as the sole foreign policy challenge to the United 
States. Scholars at the Project for the New American Century poured most of their energies 
into the Middle East and Members of Americans for Victory over Terrorism did so 
exclusively.
47
  
 
Halper and Clarke argue that while the neoconservatives‘ globalist and idealist trappings 
provided a discourse that mobilised political sentiment and patriotic emotion, they were 
little more than window dressing. In actual practice their focus was narrow, in fact distilled: 
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the Middle East and military power, most of all the use of military power in the Middle 
East.
48
 They argue that when attention turns elsewhere, for example, to a possible military 
deployment like Liberia, the neoconservatives‘ unanimity dissolves.49  Joshua Marshall, 
argues that neoconservatism has never had a clear and explicit theory for foreign policy as 
it has been inconsistent championing democracies and democratic movements in regions 
were US interests were at stake, but neglecting regions with dissident democratic 
movements and favouring stability and practicality over its ideology. Neoconservatism is 
by no means synonymous with democratic imperialism, judging from its inconsistent 
behaviour.
50
 It is worth noting that the US has been inconsistent with democracy 
promotion, supportive only to the level where favourable outcomes are gained, as was the 
case in the failed coup attempt against Hugo Chavez the president of Venezuela.
51
 Michael 
Rubin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), however, disagrees: 
‗too often neoconservatism is discussed only in the context of the Middle East, if you talk 
about neoconservative policy toward India, toward Taiwan and toward South Korea is 
remarkably consistent.‘52  
 
Contemporary neoconservatives unite around four common themes. The first is linking 
American ideals to US interests.
53
 The second is the centrality of military power in 
determining relationships between states. Thirdly, they argue that the Middle East has 
become the principal theatre for American overseas interests.
54
 Fourthly they possess an 
expansive view of US power capabilities.
55
   
 
3.1.2  The Neoconservatives Post 9/11 
This section explains how the influence of the neoconservatives in foreign policy-making 
increased after the 9/11 attacks. In doing so, it clarifies the significance of this group 
during this period. 
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When George W. Bush came to office, neoconservatives saw an opportunity for change. In 
a sign of what was to come Charles Krauthammer stated in June 2001, ‗An 
unprecedentedly dominant United States…is in the unique position of being able to fashion 
its own foreign policy. After a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy, the first task of the 
new [Bush] administration is precisely to reassert American freedom of action.‘ 56 
Krauthammer stated, ‗After eight years during which foreign policy success was largely 
measured by the number of treaties the president could sign and the number of summits he 
could attend, we now have an administration willing to assert American freedom of action 
and the primacy of American national interests.‘57 Krauthammer was critical of the Clinton 
administration attitude to international treaties and agreements. He described the Chemical 
and Biological Weapons treaties signed by the Clinton administration as useless, but 
nevertheless signed to build good will for future needs. In 1997 the Senate had passed a 
Chemical Weapons Convention Krauthammer argues largely because of the argument that 
everyone else had signed it, and failure to ratify would leave the US isolated and the 
Koyoto treaty was signed because the rest of the world supported it.58 
Neoconservatives were also appointed to senior positions in the George W. Bush 
administration. Richard Perle was made Chairman of the Defense Policy Board at the 
Pentagon. In his position, Perle directed the Pentagon on defence and military planning 
issues. The leading neoconservative in the administration, however, was Paul Wolfowitz, 
in the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense, with Douglas Feith in the number three job. 
Although neconservativism is built around the idea that having a ‗good offence is a good 
defence‘ and a common belief in the universal applicability of US ideals 59 , they are 
frequently erroneously described as a monolithic group. There is, however, no one single 
neoconservative viewpoint
60
 as it includes different strands of thinking.
61
 In an interview, 
Adam Garfinkle stressed, ‗The idea that this one homogenous group that all has the same 
view of everything this is an exaggeration, this is not true.‘62 Indeed, the neoconservatives 
present during in the Bush years – both inside and outside the administration – can be best 
characterised by dividing them into two subgroups. 
                                                 
56
 Charles Krauthammer. ‗The New Unilateralism‘, The Washington Post, (2001, June 8). p. A29.   
57
 ibid.    
58
 Charles Krauthammer, ‗The Unipolar Moment Revisited: America, The Benevolent Empire,‘ The National 
Interest Vol. 70 (Winter 2002): p. 15.     
59
 Sam Parker, Interview with Author, 27 June 2008, Washington, D.C.     
60
 Henri Barkey, Interview with Author, 21 August 2008, Washington, D.C. 
61
 Phebe Marr, Interview with Author, 19 June 2008, Washington, D.C.            
62
 Adam Garfinkle, Interview with Author, 7 August 2008, Washington, D.C.  
46 
 
 
The first group can be described as ‗Reagan Democrats/Daniel Patrick Moynihan style 
centrists.‘ The leading member of this group was Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense 
Policy Board Advisory Committee. This is a subgroup of the second generation of 
neoconservatives. These were pragmatically inclined foreign policy professionals and 
activists, advocating use of American power. They were motivated by Reagan‘s rhetoric, 
to use American power to secure US interests.
63
  Richard Perle himself better described his 
position: 
I don‘t think there is a single answer. People who call themselves 
neoconservatives hold different views on these things. For example I am 
thought of as a neoconservative, but I think of myself as pragmatic in these 
regards, sort of looking at each situation case by case and making some 
judgment about what is in the best interest of the United States which is what 
you expect an American to do.
64
 
This group went on to add to their ranks the likes of Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, I. Lewis ‗Scooter‘ Libby Jr., Chief of Staff to the vice president, and 
Robert Kagan (a prolific writer for several conservative publications such as The Weekly 
Standard and Commentary), Michael Rubin, of the Office of Special Plans and later 
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Danielle Pletka  of the AEI, 
and academics like Bernard Lewis, and Fuad Ajami among others.
65
 According to Carole 
O‘Leary, these neoconservatives wanted to remake the Middle East and to put an end to 
Arab tyranny characterised by the totalitarian Arab regimes. In their view, this would 
benefit both the US and Israel. The neoconservatives perceived Arab totalitarianism as 
equivalent to communism. Demolition of these totalitarian regimes would eventually lead 
to a stable Middle East at peace with itself, and no threat to US, Israel and Western 
interests.
66
 Regarding their position on Israel these neoconservatives believe that by 
protecting Israel they protect freedom. They secure democracy in a part of the world which 
is alien to the concept. To this group, the protection of Israel meant the protection of 
democracy, and anything that threatened democracy was a threat to the US and its 
interests. Norman Podhoretz argues that many believe the neoconservatives‘ defence of 
Israel is mainly because these intellectuals are mostly of Jewish birth. Rather, their support 
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of Israel was mostly because Israel was anti-communist during the Cold War.
67
 Irving 
Kristol argues: 
The United States will feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation 
against undemocratic forces…that is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel 
today.
68
 
The second subgroup can be called ‗Straussian/Nietzchean conservatives.‘ These students 
of Leo Strauss, also second generation neoconservatives, included the likes of Allan 
Bloom, Harvey Mansfield, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and later William 
Kristol. The Straussians, of which Wolfowitz is a perfect example, have almost a religious 
belief in natural rights – a belief in the universal sameness of humanity and God-given 
inalienable rights. Having a religious zeal or commitment to these rights provided a 
substitute for the surety that revelation gives.
69
 Wolfowitz was a romantic Wilsonian who 
believed in the spread of democracy, as well as in the idea that there was nothing innate in 
Islam that would impede Muslims from embracing democracy. His goal was to transform 
the Middle East region through regime change. Wolfowitz believed that democracy is 
transformative, and that Iraq deserved better. He believed that Iraq could be transformed 
like Indonesia.
70
 Wolfowitz believed democracy was a universal idea, deserving to be 
enjoyed by all peoples. He had influenced democratic change in the Philippines and South 
Korea and thus believed any democratic change to be in US interests. He once stated, ‗I 
think democracy is a universal idea…and I think letting people rule themselves happens to 
be something that serves American‘s and America‘s interests.‘71 Henri Barkey stressed that 
Wolfowitz  genuinely believed in democracy and was passionate about giving democracy 
to the Middle East.
72
 A former senior Congressional staffer and associate of Wolfowitz 
explained to the author that, for Wolfowitz it was less ideological and more of a 
humanitarian operation.
73
 Wolfowitz and William Kristol were conservative ideologues, 
idealists, and nation-builders.
74
  
The neoconservatives generally were not particularly influential in the first nine months of 
the Bush administration. It was only after 9/11 that they gained greater influence.
75
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Previously, the foreign policy portfolio was run through the State Department by Colin 
Powell and career diplomats. In response to the attacks, the State Department‘s control 
over foreign policy shifted dramatically. Early after the terrorist attacks the 
neoconservatives started advancing their case. Richard Perle called David Frum, 
speechwriter to President Bush, at the White House on 11 September 2001 and pressed that 
the failure to impose a penalty on states harbouring terrorists meant that terrorists would be 
able to operate far more effectively as a result. Perle stated that if global terrorism is to be 
taken ‗seriously‘, the US had to consider action against the states harbouring them.76 On 19 
September 2001, Perle chaired a Defense Policy Board meeting that concentrated 
predominantly on Iraq.
77
 
Shapiro argues that disintegration of the ‗criminal justice approach to terrorism‘ after 9/11 
was fully exploited by the neoconservatives to implement their long articulated plans and 
perceptions of how to deal with the world.
78
 Halper and Clarke assert that the Iraqi issue 
had been discussed for many years among the architects of the war. But it was only with 
9/11 and the political context it provided that it turned into operational policy. They stress 
that the Iraq war was the point in which neoconservative ideology became fully 
operational.
79
 Republican Party advisors, were predominantly realists and idealists 
(neconservatives).
80
 But it was only with 9/11 that things started to change towards the 
idealists‘ advantage.  
In late November 2001 at the time of the Afghan war, Paul Wolfowitz contacted the 
director of the American Enterprise Institute, asking for ideas and a strategy to deal with 
the 9/11 crisis.
81
 The American Enterprise Institute formed a group named ‗Bletchley II‘ 
made up of twelve members, mainly neoconservatives.
82
 The ensuing report was named by 
AEI director DeMuth ‗Delta of Terrorism.‘ The group concluded that this was not an 
isolated incident requiring a criminal preventive response, but rather this was a war with 
Islam, most probably a two-generation war with radical Islam. To them Iraq was an easy 
target, weak and vulnerable. The group also concluded that Baathism was an Arab form of 
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fascism, and that the only way to transform the region was to get rid of Saddam‘s regime 
first then address the question of radical Islam.
83
 Zalmay Khalilzad explained how 9/11 
allowed the rethinking of the situation:  
Very few people thought at that time [after the end of the Cold War] that 9/11 
would happen and yet again the world would change, and we had to then 
develop approaches for how do you deal with the problems of the Middle East, 
because the dysfunctionality of that region, the challenges of that region, 
replaced, in a sense, the Soviet challenge – they were different challenges but 
replaced it as the most important geopolitical issues facing the world. And very 
quickly, in response to the 9/11 attack we had to deal with the issue of 
Afghanistan because that‘s where al-Qaeda was present, and had cooperated 
and supported the Taliban, the Taliban supported it, and then with the longer-
term strategy of how you make the Middle East region a more functional 
region of the world.
84
 
Neoconservatives like Robert Kagan and William Kristol pressed for US assertiveness in 
the international system. They claimed, ‗It is past time for the United States to step up and 
accept the real responsibilities and requirements of global leadership.‘ 85  Charles 
Krauthammer advocated a ‗new unilateralism‘ that defined American interests far beyond 
a narrow based realism. It focused on two major global elements: first, extending peace by 
advancing democracy, and second, preserving the peace by acting as a global 
balancer.
86
  Daniel Pipes, Director of the Middle East Forum, defending the 
neoconservative point of view with relation to Iraq explained: 
In this context of Iraq policy it is a robust interpretation of America‘s role in 
the world, having to do with the sense that the US is an exceptional country, 
has had an exceptional historical role, has a message, a model that others can 
learn from. This effort to spread the American way such as: democracy, human 
rights, capitalism are to be engaged in with energy, it is a good investment to 
make these efforts. As opposed to the realist model, is leave them alone and we 
are not particularly special! It is based on a great appreciation of the US…And 
it is truly unique…I am sympathetic to the approach…The US has worked 
things out, we‘ve got certain successes and certain understandings that others 
can learn from.
87
 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Paul Wolfowitz affirmed that the US would create a new 
order in the Middle East with democracy promotion as its premise.
88
 Though democracy 
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promotion has been credited to neoconservatives primarily, it does not seem to be 
restricted to that group. Many officials within administration circles believed in 
democracy. A National Security Council Official, interviewed by the author, asserted ‗I 
think there is almost a core American belief that where democracy is we have friends and 
allies and generally there is peace, rightly or wrongly, so I‘m not sure that is a 
neoconservative viewpoint.‘89 
 
The events of 9/11 had indeed changed the presidency. Phebe Marr explained that it 
brought different calculations to bear. It also narrowed policy circles to a very small group, 
close to the president.
90
 However, when George W. Bush took office the neoconservatives 
were already in relatively important positions. 9/11 had only affirmed that their 
assumptions were right and that it was clear that there was something wrong with the 
Middle East and its culture.
91
 Halper and Clarke assert that the neoconservative agenda of 
a new world order, made operational after 9/11, was merely the PNAC‘s 1997 statement of 
principles.
92
 The statement‘s chief objective was to shape a new century favourable to 
American principles and interests. Even Joseph Biden, the ranking Democratic member of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, said in July 2003 in response to the 
influence neoconservatives were playing: ‗They seem to have captured the heart and mind 
of the president, and they‘re controlling the foreign policy agenda.‘93  
 
The State Department was suspicious of the neoconservatives‘ new role and Richard Perle 
in particular. Lawrence Wilkerson, explained their view of neoconservative actions and 
role at the time: 
It was a multifaceted, duplicitous, devious and omnipresent. Richard Perle 
acted as a semi-official member of the administration and went all over the 
world talking about bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East and 
Saddam Hussein removed, urging the French, Germans, Danes and Dutch to 
participate informally. At one point Secretary Powell, asked me to put together 
a dossier tracking Richard Perle. I had my staff put together a host of European 
papers to track his remarks. The secretary was concerned that Perle in that 
semi-official government capacity was building momentum for war with 
Saddam Hussein. From that perspective he was beating the war drum. Others 
like Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, John Hannah, John Bolton were 
undermining what official Washington was trying to do in the way of 
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diplomacy with the UN or the then to be collation. Bolton was doing it with 
respect to the entire Axis of Evil at the State Department. Generally speaking, 
neoconservatives at State, Pentagon, and vice president‘s Office were working 
to either undermining official diplomatic action or to further the move towards 
war.
94
 
Without the events of 9/11 and without the strong intellectual presence of neoconservatives 
in the administration, it would have been highly improbable that the US administration 
would have jumped into an unprovoked Iraq war.
95
  
The neoconservatives defend their position. According to Kagan the US has played the role 
of the benign hegemon and has held no imperial aspiration but rather the desire restore 
world order and provide leadership in favour of all mankind.
96
 Kristol and Kagan turn to 
Theodore Roosevelt for justification, concurring his view that ‗the defenders of civilisation 
must exercise their power against civilisations opponents.‘ They feel that the US represents 
civilisation and the opponents of the West are barbaric. They urge the US to stand against 
the forces of evil, the proponents of backwardness and opponents of liberal values.
97
 The 
neoconservative movement, according to Chalmers Johnson, American author and 
academic, was a combination of Theodore Roosevelt‘s military imperialism and Woodrow 
Wilson‘s idealistic imperialism.98 
 
3.2  GEORGE W. BUSH: THE PRESIDENT  
The second contributing ideological element was the president himself. President George 
W. Bush, the 43
rd
 president of the United States, came into office on the 20 January 2001 
following a highly controversial election the previous year. After a Supreme Court 
decision to stop the recount in Florida and despite having lost the nationwide popular 
contest by more than half a million votes, he eventually won 271 electoral votes to legalise 
his office. This made him the fourth president elected in US history without a plurality of 
the popular vote and the first since Benjamin Harrison in 1888. When President Bush came 
to power, his initial eight months saw no major foreign policy initiatives but rather an 
emphasis on domestic issues. His election platform was one of a ‗humble‘ foreign policy. 
However, Bush like all aspiring presidents had a foreign policy agenda. During his 
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presidential campaign Bush argued for a clear foreign policy direction restricted to three 
major objectives.  
 
Firstly, Bush wanted to end what he viewed as ‗unclear military missions‘ on the world 
stage. During his election campaign he stressed that the US should end nation building 
activities around the world. He disapproved of nation building and the use of the US 
military to this end.
99
 Bush did not want to exhaust the US military to open-ended duties 
like that in Bosnia and Kosovo.
100
 Essentially Bush was advocating a non-nation-building 
policy. He seemed to see US foreign policy as without direction under Clinton, a sort of ad 
hoc tool for solving crises.  
 
Bush‘s second foreign policy objective would take the US a step further towards 
unilateralism. His objective was to further US homeland security through the restructuring 
and reviving of the national missile defence system. He argued that if elected, he would not 
be restricted by treaties that were created in circumstances and periods he viewed as not 
relevant to the day. He was referring to the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, which was 
signed in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting ABM systems. 
Bush viewed the treaty as not compatible with US standing in the 21
st
 century.
101
 Bush also 
opposed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT), which was signed by the 
Clinton administration. He argued the CNTBT ‗offers only words and false hopes and high 
intentions—with no guarantees whatever.‘102 On 13 October 1999, the US Senate, who 
must ratify international treaties for them to become valid and binding, voted not to give its 
consent to ratify.  
 
Third and finally, he wanted major reforms in the US military. As a presidential candidate 
he stated he wanted an army that was swift and mobile, upgraded for the 21
st
 century, 
ready to defend against technological advances in ballistic and cruise missiles and weapons 
of mass destruction. He also wanted major reforms in the military structure. This was a 
vision shared by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.  
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Many in the Bush administration believed that the Clinton administration had stopped 
viewing international agreements as a means to achieving American interests. It had 
instead transformed them into ends in and of themselves by pursuing what Rice called 
‗symbolic agreements of questionable value.‘ Bush and his advisers rejected the notion, 
popular with many in the Clinton administration and in Europe, that committing good 
words to paper would create international norms capable of shaping state behaviour.
103
  
 
Bush‘s first important foreign policy action was to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 
2001. On 13 December 2001 the US gave the six-month notification as stipulated by a 
clause in the treaty that it would no longer comply with its requirements. Douglas Feith has 
indicated that before 9/11 their primary focus was predominantly on a ‗new strategic 
framework for US relations with Russia‘ and the process of an amicable annulment from 
the ABM treaty.
104
 The Bush administration continued the Clinton policy of not sending 
the Koyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. The Bush administration perceived that 
its implementation would primarily benefit industrialising nations, but not the US. On 6 
May 2002 the Bush administration also reversed the already reluctantly signed 
International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty.
 105
 Clinton had signed the ICC treaty on 31 
December 2000; however, he had made clear that he would not recommend that the next 
president submit the treaty to the Senate for its ratification ‗until our fundamental concerns 
are satisfied.‘ The US wanted prosecutorial exemption and immunity of US officials and 
nationals by the ICC. Although President Clinton stressed that the treaty had ‗significant 
flaws‘, he stated, ‗With signature . . . we will be in a position to influence the evolution of 
the court‘ and that the United States signed the treaty ‗to reaffirm [its] strong support for 
international accountability.‘ 106  The Bush administration felt, as had the Clinton 
administration, that it might lead to politically motivated acts of prosecution of military 
personnel as well as allowing the potential violation of its sovereignty.
107
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The US under the Bush administration disengaged from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
feeling the Clinton administration had invested far too much effort into a cause that the 
conflicting parties were not keen on resolving themselves. The Bush administration even 
refused to send a special envoy to Taba (Egypt) in January 2001 in order to attempt a 
resolution to the ongoing crises. Three months into his presidency Bush still had not 
appointed a National Security Council director for the Middle East. Secretary of State 
Powell even argued that ‗in the end, we cannot want peace more than the parties 
themselves.‘ 108  However, with escalating violence in June 2001, President Bush sent 
George Tenet (Director of CIA) to the Middle East with reduced powers held by previous 
US envoy Dennis Ross. He also eliminated the post of Special Middle East envoy.
109
  
 
The Bush administration also renounced President Clinton‘s attempt to reach an agreement 
with the North Koreans on their missile programme. They rejected an invitation to assist in 
ending the Colombian Civil War. All their policies suggested a clear disentanglement and 
disengagement from international events and the evolving shift towards unilateralism. 
Bush wanted to focus on domestic reforms. In fact, what foreign policy initiatives he did 
take on before 9/11, frequently were motivated by domestic concerns. For instance, 
President Bush made his first international visit to Mexico City. The emphasis on US-
Mexican relations reflected domestic political concerns, namely his previous position as 
governor of the State of Texas and secondly his concern for the large Mexican immigration 
to the US.
110
 The only international event the Bush administration engaged actively before 
9/11 was the collision between a Chinese jet fighter and a US reconnaissance aircraft near 
the coastline of China in March 2001. In sum, this crisis was also settled through 
diplomacy, mainly through the negotiation skills of Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
 
3.2.1  The President’s Faith: A Neo-Reaganite War on Evil  
Neoconservative columnist John Podhoretz argues that Ronald Reagan was a 
neoconservative. Like other neoconservatives, he too had started his political life as a 
member of the Democratic Party  and only at the age of 51 did he become a Republican.
111
 
Bush was attracted to Reagan‘s beliefs and ideas. On one occasion, Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) told Brent Scowcroft that President Bush has told him that he aspires to Ronald 
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Reagan and not to his father President Bush senior.
112
 Bush, however, was not a 
neoconservative, but he had neoconservative tendencies due to his pre-occupation with 
democracy.
113
  
 
Bush, had come to office envisioning a fusion of idealism and realism, one he phrased as 
‗American Internationalism.‘ It was based on ‗Idealism, without illusions. Confidence, 
without conceit. Realism, in the service of American ideals.‘114 Robert Kagan argued in 
1999 that Bush‘s calls for American Internationalism were a strong and clear articulation 
of a policy of American global leadership not articulated by a major political figure since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a call for renewed American strength, confidence, 
and leadership and a return to the Ronald Reagan style of leadership.
115
  
 
Bush believed he had a personal mission, a duty to perform. Asserting this to Andrew Card, 
White House Chief of Staff, ‗I‘m here for a reason, and this is going to be how we‘re going 
to be judged.‘116 Bush had a new vision for reordering the world to reduce suffering and 
promote peace internationally. Bush believed that the US had a unique position as a 
worldly leader to provide leadership and action for the sake of humanity.
117
 President Bush 
wanted to promote democracy and human rights, and defend women‘s rights in the Muslim 
world. He wanted to reform these societies which perceived the US and the West as the 
enemy.
118
 Bush may have had an inward looking agenda, a clear focus on domestic politics 
before 9/11. Bush had always portrayed himself as a ‗compassionate conservative‘ with a 
clear domestic agenda to tackle: patients‘ bill of rights, education reform, tort reform, tax 
cuts, medicare reform, and support for faith based programs. This appears to have come 
mostly from the influence of Karl Rove, Deputy White House Chief of Staff, who helped 
Bush translate his resentment of the political elite who he blamed for the 1960s social 
obsession of self that had ended in a rejection of community and volunteerism.
119
 This 
aspect of Bush‘s beliefs paralleled to a large extent the neoconservative disgust for 
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counter-culture and its rejection of selfish individualism. It also helped Bush shape his 
views and his role as the leader of the free world and his views on US foreign policy post 
9/11. It became his duty to help those who could not help themselves.  
 
Bush‘s faith was an influential factor in developing his perceptions of the world. Garfinkle 
described Bush‘s religiosity as unusual as it had no theological content. It was a form of 
Methodist self-help with God giving the gift of freedom to man, and humans having the 
ability to do good. According to Garfinkle, Bush had his own ideas on religiosity and 
essentially believed there was no distinction between the Declaration of Independence and 
Christianity. Bush was also an admirer and reader of Lincoln due to his use of force for 
moral purposes.
120
 Bush‘s views were also highly influenced by his speechwriter Michael 
Gerson, a born-again Christian and idealist, and Natan Sharansky former Russian dissident, 
advocating a moral foreign policy based on belief in the universality of freedom and 
human rights.
121
 Bush even denied categorically any consultation with his father (Bush 
senior) as regards his decision to invade Iraq and stressed his father would be ‗wrong 
father to appeal to in terms of strength. There is a higher father that I appeal to.‘122 
Moreover, for Bush, as a reformed alcoholic, he had reason to believe in transformation. It 
was possible for people on a wayward path to become stable and prosperous and so could 
Iraq.
123
 Jervis describes the very belief in democracy as the ‗natural order‘ for all mankind 
as a ‗faith-based foreign policy.‘124 Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near 
East and South Asia during the Bush administration, explained that attacks on 9/11 gave 
Bush a direction as president he had been missing. Pillar described this as more of 
‗psychological need‘ as it is not easy to explain things mainly in terms of rationale as 
opposed to driving beliefs.
 125
 President Bush was open about his religious convictions, he 
noted: 
…in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom 
and fear are at war. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at 
war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.
126
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Bush‘s religiosity helped outline his new strategy through a clear definition of ‗evil.‘ This 
time evil had a new definition, it was no longer about retaliation for 9/11 and punishing its 
perpetrator al-Qaeda, and the Taliban regime which had harboured it. The new principal 
objective was to prevent the next attack through combating possible threats and potential 
dangers. The Bush administration decided after 9/11 on a new basis for its interactions 
with hostile powers. Michael Gerson, President Bush‘s chief speechwriter, thought the old 
phrase ‗rogue state‘ previously used to describe hostile states was no longer valid, as it 
understated the potential threat states of such nature posed to US interests. So the phrase 
‗Axis of Evil‘ was deemed to hit the right tone.127 On 29 January 2002 Bush delivered his 
famous State of the Union address, where he had declared Iraq, Iran and North Korea 
formed an ‗Axis of Evil.‘128 No longer would the US wait for its enemies to strike, it would 
strike first. Bush‘s foreign policy philosophy was based on the United States aggressively 
going abroad in search of evil to destroy. This logic was behind the Iraq war, and it 
animated the administration‘s efforts to deal with other rogue states.129  
 
Bush asserted in late 2001, ‗We wage a war to save civilisation itself. We did not seek it, 
but we must fight it and we will prevail.‘130 The mission that Bush envisioned went well 
beyond defending America‘s national interests. It was more fundamentally a struggle 
between good and evil that touched all the world‘s peoples. The notion of evil had always 
figured prominently in Bush‘s thinking, as it had in the thinking of the president he often 
sought to emulate, Ronald Reagan.
131
 Jervis stresses that no other US administration since 
Regean‘s has been willing to sacrifice stability for the sake of democracy. As such the 
Bush administration does show resemblance to that of Ronald Reagan in refusing détente 
with the Soviet Union and also emphasising human rights issues in their discussions with 
the Soviet regime.
132
 For years the US had sacrificed democracy at the expense of 
autocratic stability, hence favouring various economic and security interests. For this 
reason, Bush can be understood as having promoted a neo-Reaganite foreign policy, where 
the promotion of democracy became an overriding objective.
133
 Bush said, ‗My 
administration has a job to do and we‘re going to do it. We will rid the world of the evil-
doers.‘ In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Bush was adamant about his new role and his 
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mission. This was clearly reflected in his National Cathedral speech on 14 September. He 
affirmed, ‗But our responsibility to history is already clear: To answer these attacks and rid 
the world of evil.‘134 When President Bush said ‗You‘re either with us or against us‘ he 
was referring to two worlds one that was ‗good‘ and the other that was ‗evil.‘ To make his 
argument the president argued:  
Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would 
splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil.
135
  
Bush‘s speech echoed Reagan‘s declaration in 1983 that the Soviet Union was an ‗evil 
Empire.‘136 In addition to drawing on the ideas of Reagan, Bush drew liberally on the ideas 
of other US presidents. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on 11 November 2003, 
Bush compared his policies to those of Truman in thwarting communism.
137
 He told an 
audience at the Heritage Foundation: ‗The will and resolve of America are being tested in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. We are not only containing the terrorist threat, we are turning it 
back.‘138  
Bush‘s repeated statements that the spread of freedom, democracy and free enterprise 
would make the world ‗not just safer but better‘ paralleled Woodrow Wilson‘s notion that 
the values of powerful states were universal values and they would benefit mankind as a 
whole.
139
 The Reagan administration‘s attempts at bringing democracy to Latin America 
through its anticommunism are comparable to Bush‘s attempts in the Middle East and its 
War on Terror.
140
 On the 1 May 2003 Bush gave a speech on board the USS Abraham 
Lincoln, drawing his speech from previous presidents. He referred to Franklin Roosevelt‘s 
Four Freedoms, the Truman Doctrine and Reagan‘s challenge of the evil empire.141  
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3.2.2  Having ‘The Vision Thing’  
Unlike his father George W. Bush had a vision. Before arriving at the White House Bush 
had already stipulated guiding principles for his foreign policy. Bush asserted that the 
United States had a ‗great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into 
generations of democratic peace.‘142 The president had a freedom advancing agenda, he 
had described his vision in 1999.  Bush wanted to use US global leadership to ‗extend the 
peace.‘143 President Bush had always had a personal sense of mission as the president of 
the United States. On one occasion he told Bob Woodward, ‗I will seize the opportunity to 
achieve big goals.‘ He continued, ‗there is nothing bigger than to achieve world peace.‘144  
 
As a candidate George W. Bush told prominent Texas author and Bush family friend 
Mickey Herskowitz, ‗My father had all this political capital built up when he drove the 
Iraqis out of [Kuwait] and he wasted it. If I have a chance to invade Iraq, if I had that much 
capital, I‘m not going to waste it. I‘m going to get everything passed I want to get passed 
and I‘m going to have a successful presidency.‘ Bush felt his father had made a mistake in 
not invading Iraq. To him his father had not exploited his political capital and high ratings. 
This was where the differences emerged. Bush senior was prudent while his son saw 
opportunity.
145
 
 
At the West Point Military Academy graduation ceremony on 1 June 2002. Bush stressed, 
‗Our war on terror is only begun‘ in Afghanistan. He explained that US goals went well 
beyond the borders of the US and that its ‗cause has always been larger than our nation‘s 
defence.‘ It was founded in Bush‘s belief that the war to be fought would bring a just peace 
that ‗favours human liberty.‘ And to make the world, as Rice put it, ‗safer and better.‘  
 
An important flaw in the theory that neoconservatives dictated policy is that it grossly 
underestimates George W. Bush.  Bush was not the front man in someone else‘s revolution. 
As Daalder and Lindsay rightly argue, Bush may have entered the Oval Office not 
knowing which general ran Pakistan, but during his time in office ‗he was the puppeteer, 
not the puppet.‘146 He actively solicited the counsel of his advisers, and tolerated if not 
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encouraged vigorous disagreement among them.
147
 Bush wrote in his campaign 
autobiography that he had ‗to outline a clear vision and agenda.‘ His belief in the need for 
clear objectives was hardly surprising for a man whose father‘s re-election campaign had 
failed over ‗the vision thing.‘ The younger Bush pushed this point further live on CNN in 
his first major foreign policy address as a candidate: ‗Unless a president sets his own 
priorities, his priorities will be set by others—by adversaries, or the crisis of the 
moment.‘148  
 
Many people believe that Bush came to office with no knowledge of the world. Former 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Philip Wilcox argues that Bush was an empty 
vessel, very susceptible to the influence of neoconservatives.
149
 Bush also knew he lacked 
foreign affairs experience, his challenge of leadership, was thus ‗to build a strong team of 
effective people to implement my agenda.‘ He saw his reliance on others as a sign of 
strength. He repeatedly reminded voters, ‗I‘ve assembled a team of very strong, smart 
people. And I look forward to hearing their advice.‘ He used his advisers‘ foreign policy 
qualifications to deflect questions about his own.
150
 President Bush, however, was also 
known for being determined and persistent, and not receptive to information that did not 
necessarily agree to his point of view. Colin Powell has said of the president, ‗He knows 
kind of what he wants to do and what he wants to hear is how to get it done.‘151   
 
The most explicit example was President Bush‘s resolution to accomplish his vision for 
Iraq regardless of the difficult circumstances. On 29 October 2003 he stressed that US 
success in Iraq was inevitable. He insisted that he would not be distracted by negative 
portrayals by the media. He adamantly stated: ‗Success in Iraq will change the world.‘ He 
even went as far to say that he ‗may not succeed by the time of the election. So be it.‘152 
Even though President Bush came into office after a controversial election, he was an 
assertive leader. He did not approve of half-measures in his dealings with his authority and 
rule. President Kennedy had avoided dealing with controversial issues such as the Civil 
Rights movement, and would only deal with them in his second term in office.
153
 Bush was 
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adamant that his administration would set the tone for following US administration; he 
would pursue his agenda with determination no matter how isolated they may become in 
pursuing his goals.
154
  
 
3.3  THE ASSERTIVE NATIONALISTS  
The third group of Bush administration insiders was the assertive nationalists. Adam 
Garfinkle described them as ‗national-interest realists.‘155  This group believed that US 
military primacy had to be maintained and US threats neutralised and defeated. The two 
prominent members of this group were Vice President Richard Cheney and Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Both were very conscious of threats to US interests and 
national security. In 1998, Rumsfeld had led the Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States. His final report in July 1998 claimed grave and serious 
threats emanating from hostile states on the verge of developing missile technology. 
Cheney and Rumsfeld desired more military engagement and were persuaded that US 
military capabilities could achieve greater political purposes and was usable on a whole 
variety of contingencies.
156
 To them US national security should not be restricted simply to 
the protection of American power but had to include pre-emptive action, making it clear 
that no such attack would be countenanced again. They also had no interest in nation 
building.
157
 It was an assertive stance to defend US national security and satisfy American 
interests with no interest in democracy promotion.
158
 Cheney and Rumsfeld were not 
neoconservatives. They were instead assertive nationalist traditional hard-line 
conservatives, willing to use American military power to defeat threats to US security but 
reluctant as a general rule to use American primacy to remake the world in its image.
159
  
 
Rumsfeld had initially defined his mission to create a US military ready for the 21
st
 century. 
Rumsfeld wanted to develop a smaller, leaner lethal force, using new technology to its 
maximum.
160
 According to Pillar, the war for Cheney and Rumsfeld was about projecting 
US power. Both were less concerned about remaking the politics of the Middle East but 
more about focused on asserting American power. To them the US was the sole 
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superpower and thus had to assert its might. Pillar described their attitudes as a ‗we use it 
or lose it‘ mentality. 161  Tommy Franks, US CENTCOM 162  commander, describes 
Rumsfeld as a ‗New Frontier cold warrior‘ willing to ‗pay any price, bear any burden‘ to 
confront any adversary to assure America‘s survival. Rumsfeld had whole heartedly agreed 
with Bush‘s ‗either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists‘ concept and as a result 
his major focus was winning the global war on terror.
163
          
 
Rumsfeld emphasised from his experience as US presidential envoy to the Middle East that 
the US could not and should not stay the conventional course of defence, but rather take up 
a new offensive position and pre-empt US adversaries. Rumsfeld believed that terrorists 
could not be stopped as they had the advantage in their ability to change tactics. These 
fundamental beliefs of the assertive nationalists had important consequences for the 
practice of American foreign policy post 9/11. In addition to the preference for pre-
emption, Rumsfeld and Cheney believed in unilateralism. Unilateralism was appealing 
because it was often easier and more efficient, at least in the short term, than 
multilateralism. Clinton‘s efforts as regards the task of coordinating the views of all NATO 
members in the Kosovo war, were perceived by Bush advisers as greatly complicating the 
war effort, as opposed to the Afghanistan war, where Pentagon planners did not have to 
subject any of their decisions to foreign approval. This group had not flatly ruled out 
working with others. Rather, their preferred form of multilateralism was building ad hoc 
coalitions of the willing. This was clearly reflected in Donald Rumsfeld‘s statement that 
the mission defines the coalition rather it being the other way round.
164
  
 
3.4  THE DEFENSIVE REALISTS 
The fourth group involved in the Bush administration was the defensive realists. These 
were a group that believed that ‗America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy‘, 
as US President John Quincy Adams had once advised. David Mack, former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State, has stated their view thus: ‗the most we can do for the rest of 
the world is wish them well and be a good example.‘165 Powell was the leading figure of 
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this group, followed by his deputy and close friend Richard Armitage, as well as Richard 
Haass Director of Policy Planning at the State Department and Peter Rodman (Assistant 
Secretary of Defense), and many other career diplomats and Arabists at the State 
Department. This group was leading and winning the US foreign policy debate before the 
attacks on 9/11. However their influence declined considerably after the attacks. 
Consequently, this led to enormous tensions between different US departments, especially 
between the Departments of State and Defense. Powell was concerned about the way the 
administration‘s policy was going forward. Goldgier claimed that Powell was less 
ideological and ‗hates ideology‘, hated Wolfowitz as he ‗sees him as an ideologue.‘ Powell 
was more of a practical official and opposed to much of the administration policy.
166
  
 
Wilkerson, who was a close observer of events in the State Department as Colin Powell‘s 
Chief of Staff insisted that Powell and Armitage were not totally against the war in Iraq. 
Both had understood that 16 Security Council resolutions had been defied by Saddam, 
including the sanctions regime, and the US air force was still involved in patrolling the two 
No-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. The opinion was that if it became necessary to 
use force to topple Saddam Hussein ‗Powell and Armitage were not necessarily opposed to 
it‘ as long as it was done ‗smartly and wisely.‘ Powell had told the president that the timing 
was poor. Powell thought that before engaging Iraq in a military conflict, ‗Afghanistan 
should be wrapped up.‘ Powell and Armitage both thought Saddam was already contained 
and, if force had to be used, it could wait. They preferred to continue with the containment 
policy and a year long inspections regime. They thought that the best approach was to do it 
later when all other possibilities were exhausted.
167
 However, once the president made 
clear he was going to war, Wilkerson insisted that Powell and Armitage were good soldiers 
and followed Bush.
168
  
 
Garfinkle defines this group as ‗conservative realists‘ who are humble and passive, more 
sceptical about and distrust ‗grand abstractions‘ and ‗grand social engineering enterprises.‘ 
This group distrusted grand abstractions but after 9/11 the president stopped ‗listening to 
them.‘169 Wilkerson confirmed this view. He stated that the neoconservatives and assertive 
nationalists like Cheney and Rumsfeld worked to marginalise Powell. They wanted to 
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undermine him particularly with regard to US policy towards the ‗Axis of Evil‘, Iran, Iraq 
and North Korea.
170
 
 
Powell remembered very vividly what had happened in the Gulf War in 1991 when he had 
been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The question for him was not how to get in, but 
how to get out. As a result his worry was not the war but what would happen after the war. 
Powell was worried about the US responsibility for 26 million Iraqis. Powell indeed 
believed that getting rid of Saddam was good, but it was not urgent. Powell had told the 
president that without exhausting diplomacy the US would not get the coalition of 1991 
and as a result make things expensive by not being able to spread responsibilities. Powell 
advised the president that the US should go to UN, even if it did not get final authorisation 
as it would help create a much broader coalition and consequently spread the risk. At the 
time, however, Powell had thought the US could get a second resolution and did not 
anticipate the French intention to veto the resolution.
171
      
 
Walter Russell Mead describes Colin Powell as a Hamiltonian. Hamiltonians, according to 
Mead, value international alliances and organisations. However, they do not think these 
organisations should have power over the United States, to veto a desired US course of 
action or for that matter be able to compel the US to do something it does not want to 
do.
172
 Colin Powell wanted the US to act as a global citizen and equal to the rest in 
obligations and rights. Tommy Franks believed Powell was interested in US leadership to 
create international networks to ease tensions in the Middle East, to fight Aids and drugs, 
lower trade barriers, promote human rights and combat global terrorism. He had put great 
faith in international organisations and partnerships like the UN and NATO.
173
  President 
Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice tended to see the world differently from Powell. Feith 
describes Powell was a here and now man, a crises manager. Powell disagreed with the rest 
of the Principals who were more inclined to see in US leadership the possibility to change 
the world landscape and make difficult goals achievable.
174
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3.5  MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: THE VULCANS  
As explained above, the Bush administration contained several different views, President 
Bush was a humanitarian idealist, Cheney and Rumsfeld had a unilateralist approach and 
Powell a multilateral approach: meanwhile there were also divisions within the 
neoconservative elites. John Bolton wanted an offensive realist stance while Paul 
Wolfowitz wanted an offensive idealist strategy.
175
 This group, when gathered during the 
presidential campaign, was described as the ‗Vulcans‘, the name of the Roman God of fire, 
a nickname first used by Condoleezza Rice to describe and capture this combination of 
Bush foreign policy elites. It comprised a mixed group of both realists and idealists and sat 
well with the Bush administration objective. This combination eventually led to the 
marriage of Wilsonian idealism to realist means in achieving idealistic outcomes.
176
 Bush 
had already stated as mentioned earlier his view of a distinctly ‗American Internationalism‘ 
during the election campaign. His administration‘s foreign policy he had affirmed would 
be one of ‗Idealism, without illusions‘ and ‗Realism, in the service of American ideals.‘177 
This had opened his camp to adherents of several major schools of thought, especially the 
assertive nationalists and neoconservatives. In early 2001, the administration had already 
represented a more militarised foreign policy but not a neoconservative agenda. It was 
more of a ‗narrow interests-based realism‘ married to traditional pragmatism.178 What the 
events of 9/11 did was allow a metamorphosis and then amalgamation of existing 
inclinations among the senior members of the administration. Walter Russell Mead sees 
this as an amalgamation of the Jacksonian School (unilateral use of supreme military 
power) and the Wilsonian School (democracy promotion). The members of the Bush 
administration who were of the Jacksonian assertive nationalism tendency saw the 
proliferation of WMD as a major threat to US interests that was necessary to be dealt with. 
However, the Bush officials of a Wilsonian tendency saw a great opportunity in removing 
an oppressive regime and replacing it with a democratic representative one, eventually 
helping to advance democracy in the Middle East in its entirety.
179
 As a consequence, an 
alliance was created with similar or common objectives, which brought together what 
Joseph Nye describes as a coalition of the neoconservative ‗Wilsonians of the right‘ (also 
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called as neo-Wilsonians) and ‗Jacksonian unilateralists.‘ These two groups managed to 
influence President Bush who had already asked for clarity in foreign policy.
180
  
 
The nature of the terrorist attacks committed on 9/11 created a paradigm shift in US 
thinking, a new approach was needed, and for this a message had to be delivered in order 
to regain US credibility in the international system and to sustain its standing as the sole 
superpower of the 21
st
 century. With its sense of patriotism heightened the American 
public could not and would not want a mild response to this act of terror. Cheney and 
Rumsfeld had found that many of their deeply held beliefs about American exceptionalism 
and unilateralism paralleled neoconservative thought. This was decisive in their support for 
the underlying neoconservative ideological thrust.
181
 Although neoconservatives and 
assertive nationalists differed on whether the United States should actively spread its 
values abroad, they shared a deep scepticism of traditional Wilsonianism‘s commitment to 
the rule of law and its belief in the relevance of international institutions. They placed their 
faith not in diplomacy and treaties, but in power and resolve. Agreement on this key point 
allowed neoconservatives and assertive nationalists to form a marriage of convenience in 
overthrowing the Cold War approach to foreign policy even as they disagreed about what 
kind of commitment the United States should make to rebuilding Iraq and remaking the 
rest of the world.
182
  
 
At the third intersection was President Bush himself. The broadness of Bush‘s strategy at 
defeating everything evil – states and terrorist organisations alike – helped nurture the 
Bush administration‘s response to 9/11.183 This belief coincided with the neoconservative 
notion that the human condition is defined as a choice between good and evil and that the 
true measure of political character is to be found in the willingness by the former to 
confront the latter.
184
 This was the major element in the meeting of minds between the 
president and the neoconservatives. 
 
Gone was the talk of the soft isolationist many had believed during the election campaign, 
Bush‘s response to 11 September according to an observer ‗represents a reversal of, or at 
least a dramatic departure from, the position he himself took during the 2000 election 
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campaign.‘ According to Daalder and Lindsay Bush had become a crusading 
internationalist who had embraced Woodrow Wilson‘s vision of a democratic world and 
who was willing to use America‘s military might to make it happen. Daalder and Lindsay 
assert that such stories of human transformation have tremendous appeal as they attest to 
an abiding belief that a day as horrifying as September 11 changes a country and its 
leaders.
185
 This may be true only to an extent, since Bush already had come to office as an 
assertive leader detesting half-measures. Indeed the attacks had changed Bush‘s priorities 
but they certainly had not planted seeds of beliefs he had not previously held and revered.   
 
Barnet rightly argues that after 9/11 the Bush administration identified a gap in the global 
community, with two major camps: one as the ‗Functioning Core‘ the other is the ‗Non-
Integrating Gap.‘ The latter group of nations were suffering from a ‗disconnectedness‘ 
from the globalising world, from its markets prosperity and dependence. Hence, creating a 
world where grievances and poverty were giving birth to terrorists issuing from the Gap.
186
 
The US administration was trying to promote democracy and free markets to reduce 
poverty and grievances in the Third World. They believed this chronic suffering was 
leading peoples of the Third World periphery to endanger the interests and security of the 
democratised First World. Hence, a key component of the agenda became the integration 
of these states.
187
 There was no other way to achieve this is unless there was a strategic 
programme for the promotion of democracy. The Bush administration in this respect was 
unique in its marriage of democratic idealism with pre-emptive power.
188
  
 
The neoconservative role in Iraq decisions is largely exaggerated. Top tier Bush 
administration officials were not neoconservative. President Bush was certainly not a 
neoconservative. As regards Cheney and Rumsfeld they were pragmatists while Rice and 
Powell were realists. Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation insisted that the 
neoconservative role was largely blown out of proportion by the media which had 
subsequently made neoconservatism a code word for Jewish influence in Washington.
189
 A 
National Security Council official also affirmed to the author that the neoconservative role 
has been exaggerated as most of the senior people making decisions were not 
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neoconservatives including Rice, Powell and Rumsfeld.
190
 Daalder and Lindsey are right 
when they argue that neoconservatives were more prominent and obvious outside the 
administration, particularly on the pages of Commentary and The Weekly Standard and in 
the television studios of Fox News, than they were inside it.
191
 Neoconservatives were only 
one of the main schools that encouraged the war on Iraq. Garfinkle argues, ‗the idea that 
they did it all by themselves or that the war was based on the democratisation of Iraq or the 
Middle East this simply is wrong‘ as it does not fit the facts. According to Garfinkle the 
neoconservatives did not start the Iraq war but rather offered a theory at a critical time to 
the president, one that jibed with the views of Cheney and Rumsfeld, the muscular 
national-interest conservatives.
 192  
As Richard Kessler, a senior Congressional staffer 
explained, the neoconservative role was not exaggerated as regards shaping policy.
193
 
However, it had been largely exaggerated when assumed it was alone driving and making 
policy. Garfinkle asserted that it was only after the war, and after the second presidential 
inauguration the forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East advanced and the 
neoconservatives influence peaked as the WMD rationale had disappeared.
194
  
 
Bush himself was an idealist. As a president, the protection of US national security also 
played largely in his thinking. Thus, his policies were also affected by the American 
nationalists because of the dominance of Cheney and Rumsfeld in his administration. 
Spiritually he was influenced by Christian belief, in a God given universal human 
sameness. As a Christian, Bush was impressed by neoconservative notion of the universal 
ideal.
195
 With the neoconservatives he shared freedom as a universal value. Together Bush 
and the neoconservatives pursued a missionary role. They believed that with both 
American power and a sense of moral obligation the US could and should transform the 
world.
196
 Cheney led the national-interest conservative camp and Wolfowitz led the 
neoconservative faction within the administration.
197
 President Bush shared common 
ground with both groups.  
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3.6  THE BUSH DOCTRINE 
Accordingly the Bush Doctrine was the doctrine of the Bush administration as a whole. It 
accumulated and unified the views and objectives of the different factions of the 
administration. The administration articulated and pulled the main strands of the emerging 
Bush Doctrine into the National Security Strategy of September 2002, which was echoed 
in the second February 2006 version.  
 
According to Nye, the Bush Doctrine depends on three pillars. Firstly, the Bush 
administration wanted to: undermine the influence and render the role of international 
institutions ineffective, thus, empowering US unilateralism.
198
 This according to Jervis is a 
result of the difficulty to obtain consensus and also the tendency of other states to leave the 
dominant power to carry the full burden of maintaining global order.
199
 The second pillar 
according to Nye was to embrace and adopt a new doctrine of pre-emptive war, hence 
expanding pre-emption to a new unprecedented level.
200
 This came from belief that the 
international system was plagued with threats from terrorists and rogue states, and without 
US intervention and preventive war the world will grow more dangerous.
201
 Third, the 
Bush doctrine declares democracy as the final solution to the grievances and oppression of 
the people of the Middle East.
202
 The reason for this is that freedom, democracy and free 
enterprise open the path to a better and safer world.
203
 Jervis adds a fourth element in 
explaining the Bush Doctrine. The fourth and final element of the doctrine is based on an 
accumulation of the previous three pillars: US hegemony. The administration believed that 
international norms and customs do not necessary have to be followed by the dominant 
state. The reason for this is that dominant powers behave differently from other states 
otherwise the international order will be in jeopardy.
204
 Additionally, Ian Shapiro includes 
three other aspects of the Bush doctrine as major US foreign policy departures as a result 
of the events on 9/11. Shapiro includes: the US recognition for global American military 
engagement if necessary, absence of neutrality on the war on terror and finally, the 
uncertain longevity of that war.
205
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The doctrine called for new thinking to match new threats. The old Cold War doctrines of 
deterrence and containment were no longer a sufficient basis for defending America. The 
Bush Doctrine, Ehteshami argues combines two themes, one, a war on terrorism counter-
terrorist strategy and the other a counter-proliferation pre-emption strategy these together 
combined aim to define a new theme: a counter-terrorism anti-proliferation pre-emption 
strategy.
206 ‗Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means 
nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.‘ 
Containment was no longer deemed possible when ‗unbalanced dictators with weapons of 
mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to 
terrorist allies.‘207 Bush stated:  
 
For much of the last century, America‘s defence relied on the Cold War 
doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still 
apply. But new threats also require new thinking.
208
 
The Bush Doctrine was essentially claiming responsibility to exploit the opportunity for a 
transformation of international politics. The doctrine was an acknowledgment of a 
perception that new emerging threats could only be defeated using new strategies and 
methods.  
 
This study contends that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was influenced by four major groups 
within the administration: the assertive nationalists (offensive realists), the 
neoconservatives (idealist strand and realist strand), the president and finally the cautious 
nationalists (defensive realists). The first three major groups were in harmony as regards 
their perception of urgency as regards the nature of Iraq‘s perceived threat and willingness 
to de-throne Saddam‘s regime. External groups, however, outside the administration 
played a highly significant role as well.  
 
Major external groups were highly influential in providing the intellectual rationale or at 
least little opposition for the invasion.  The first was the US media. The media played a 
highly important role in making the invasion of Iraq possible. They followed the 
administrations line in supporting the war on terror. This happened mainly due to the 
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media‘s awareness of the strengthened sentiments of patriotism among the US public and 
their heightened fear from threats of WMD and further terrorist attacks. They were 
responding to their viewers‘ needs and perceptions. Secondly the smooth and relatively 
easy nature of the Afghanistan military operation was a factor. The negative attitude the 
media showed at the outset of the Afghan campaign, echoing messages of quagmires was 
not an embarrassment they were willing to afford for the Iraq invasion. The Afghanistan 
operation went smoothly and quickly as opposed to the messages they were initially 
broadcasting at the inception of the kinetic action. Thirdly the media later became impartial 
as they were embedded with the actual military invasion, removing a sense of detachment 
and impartiality.  
 
The second external group which played a significant role in the drum beat leading up to 
the war were the liberal hawks. This included people like David Brooks of The New York 
Times, Jim Hoagland of The Washington Post, Judi Miller of The New York Times, 
Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, George Packer of The New Yorker, Christopher 
Hitchens, and Peter Galbraith among others. All participated in making the case for war 
possible. All were liberal hawks who saw in the removal of Saddam a humanitarian 
intervention and a moral obligation to remove evil. To them it was another case of 
necessity to remove a brutal regime liberating a people from oppression and tyranny. To 
them the invasion of Iraq was similar in its objectives to the 1995 war in Bosnia and the 
Kosovo war of 1999.
209
       
 
These various influences and opinions helped motivate the invasion of Iraq. The chapter 
that follows attempts to narrate the actual decision making process, and puts forward the 
publicly declared and underlying reasons and purposes used to advance the decision to 
invade Iraq.  
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Chapter 4:  
 
INVADING IRAQ: ONE DECISION, VARIOUS REASONS  
 
 
Prior to September the 11th, we were discussing smart sanctions. We were 
trying to fashion a sanction regime that would make it more likely to be able to 
contain somebody like Saddam Hussein. After September the 11th, the doctrine 
of containment just doesn‘t hold any water, as far as I‘m concerned…My 
vision shifted dramatically after September the 11th, because I now realise the 
stakes. I realise the world has changed.  
 
George W. Bush, 31 January, 2003.
 1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter illustrates the core debates and discussions that eventually led to the decision 
to topple Saddam Hussein. It contends that the objective of removing Saddam Hussein 
from power was almost unanimously accepted in Washington. An understanding had been 
reached that Saddam would neither fall in a military coup from inside the regime, nor was 
the Iraqi opposition sophisticated or strong enough to achieve this goal through its own 
means. Direct US military intervention became the answer to achieve this political 
objective as several coup attempts against the regime, encouraged and assisted by the US, 
had failed. The CIA‘s Iraq Operation Group had confirmed this assertion in a meeting with 
the vice president in January 2002. The chapter also discusses the various reasons adopted 
by the different factions in pursuit of this goal. The US goal of toppling Saddam‘s regime, 
was motivated by the different ideas and expectations to what regime change could achieve.       
 
4.1  DECISION FOR WAR: A CREEPING EVOLUTION  
There was an evolution in the decision to invade Iraq. Threat tolerance and risk acceptance 
had disappeared since conventional thinking had changed as a result of the attacks of 9/11. 
US policy had elevated actions of terrorist organisations (non-state actors) from acts of 
criminal activity, to acts of war. As a result, the distinction between these terrorist groups 
and their sponsors (state actors) that had hitherto been considered when pursuing terrorist 
organisations was removed. When the president on the evening of 9/11 addressed the 
nation and spoke about a war against terrorism, it was a profound shift. Detectives, judges, 
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and jails had been deployed in the past. Intelligence agencies and military forces had not 
been involved. This all changed on 9/11. The use of military Special Operations (SO) 
forces in Afghanistan showed that the United States was prepared to use military force.
2
 
The attacks on 9/11 brought a paradigm shift, Wolfowitz explained that the threat against 
the United States was ‗not going to stop if a few criminals are taken care of.‘3  
 
Donald Rumsfeld was the first person to float the idea of attacking Saddam Hussein at 
2:40pm in the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The next day when Bush‘s war cabinet 
came together, Rumsfeld again raised the possibility of exploiting the opportunity and 
launching an attack on Iraq.
4
 Colin Powell insisted in the 12 September National Security 
Council (NSC) meeting that any action required public support and therefore any action 
against Iraq before defeating al-Qaeda would not enjoy public as well as international 
support.
5
 On 13 September 2001 President Bush in another NSC meeting raised a question 
about Iraq and its possible involvement in the 9/11 attack. Iraq had already been discussed 
as a serious threat by the administration in the previous months. Iraq had managed to 
frustrate the inspections regime, breach sanctions, and had been shooting constantly at US 
and UK planes patrolling the northern and southern No-fly zones.
6
 At the 13 September 
NSC meeting, however, President Bush stressed that any military action against Iraq would 
have to bring about regime change.
7
 On 13 September Rumsfeld had also sent a short 
memo to his Pentagon staff known internally as a ‗snowflake‘, asking for the previous Iraq 
plan to be revisited and even asking for a scheme to seize Iraq‘s southern oil fields if 
necessary. The idea was to show to the world that an attack on the US would have serious 
consequences, and that merely an affiliation with a terrorist group would be fatal.
8
 
Rumsfeld mentioned Iraq as a major threat to the US and the region in that 13 September 
NSC meeting. He stated that Saddam supported terrorism (acts of random killing of 
innocent civilians) and that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that it could 
provide to terrorists to use against the US. Rumsfeld asserted that inflicting costly damage 
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on Iraq might also make terrorist supporting regimes rethink their policies.
9
 Saddam‘s 
terrorist activities included among many other things a cash reward of 25,000 USD to 
families of Palestinian suicide bombers.
10
   
 
The mention of a possible attack on Iraq came again at the Camp David meeting of 15-16 
September 2001. Rumsfeld outlined his opinions on the nature of this new threat but left it 
to Wolfowitz to expand on the necessity of confronting Saddam Hussein. However, the 
president chose to defer Iraq and focus on Afghanistan.
11
 Even after the 9/11 attacks and 
Bush‘s decision to leave Iraq and commence military action in Afghanistan, some 
members of the war cabinet, specifically Cheney and Rumsfeld, managed to keep the 
invasion of Iraq on the agenda.
12
 Condoleezza Rice had devised a three-option proposal to 
confront the new threat prepared for the NSC meeting in Camp David. Option three was to 
consider eliminating the Iraq threat in addition to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. When the 
Deputies‘ Committee had met to discuss Rice‘s proposal on 13 September, Paul Wolfowitz 
was unhappy with the options put forward by Rice. He suggested that US military action 
should not be designed to punish the 9/11 perpetrators but rather to attack those who could 
launch the next 9/11.
13
 This was a departure in US strategy as previous retaliatory attacks 
were punitive rather than preventative. Colin Powell thought there was a clear fixation on 
the Iraq issue, and the toppling of its regime. To Powell, Cheney was in a fever, no longer 
a cool detached thinker as he was during the First Gulf War. Cheney, Wolfowitz, Libby 
and Feith, were always looking for a link between Saddam and the 9/11 attacks.
14
    
 
Paul Wolfowitz, in a 13 September press briefing, made it known that the newly declared 
war on terror would be a campaign and ‗not a single action.‘ He also stressed that the 
administration would pursue the perpetrators and the ‗people who support them until this 
stops.‘ The new approach would not simply be a matter of capturing people and holding 
them accountable. The new policy would involve removing the sanctuaries, removing the 
support systems, ‗ending states who sponsor terrorism‘, Wolfowitz stressed. The strategy 
would be to sustain a broad and long-term campaign.
15
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Bush told Bob Woodward, a respected journalist at The Washington Post, that the US 
objective was to ‗rout out terror wherever it may exist‘ and it did not matter how long this 
would take. The new Bush Doctrine was effectively, ‗if you harbour them, feed them, 
you‘re just as guilty‘, and you will be held to account. It was a dramatic departure from 
previous reactions. It was a war to be fought on many fronts, including the intelligence, 
financial, diplomatical, as well as military fronts.
16
 In a memo dated 20 September 2001, 
Rumsfeld made clear to the president that Iraq should be a major consideration in the new 
war on terror. The reason was the nexus between Baghdad‘s alleged sponsoring of 
terrorism and its WMD development ambitions:  
The president has stressed that we are not defining our fight narrowly and are 
not focused only on those directly responsible for the September 11 
attacks….It would drive this point home if the initial military strikes hit 
[targets] in addition to al-Qaeda. That is one of the reasons why I still favour 
and early focus on Iraq as well.
17
  
On 21 November 2001 President Bush made his intention known for an invasion of Iraq 
and the removal of Saddam Hussein. After a NSC meeting he asked Rumsfeld ‗what kind 
of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?‘18 Bush 
asked Rumsfeld to update him on plans for future military action in the region. He told 
Rumsfeld, ‗Let‘s get started on this‘, ‗And get Tommy Franks looking at what it would 
take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to.‘ 19  Franks says 
Rumsfeld had asked him for an update of the Iraq war plan on 27 November 2001.
20
 It was 
obvious that President Bush wanted to develop his Iraq policy within the new 
understanding of the potential dangers that state supporters of terrorism can bring.
21
 A 
special Pentagon intelligence unit was established by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, headed by 
Feith, to gather intelligence in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and to find Iraq‘s links to the 
attack.
22
 This unit, established a few weeks after 9/11, was named the Policy Counter 
Terrorism Evaluation Group.
23
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On 29 September 2001, Rumsfeld had already asked General Myers, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, to prepare a military plan for Iraq. The plan requested from CENTCOM 
was to be two-fold. One, it would find the WMD and then destroy them. The second 
priority was regime change with the stipulation that it would take a few months and no 
more than 250,000 troops.
24
 On 24 January 2003, General Franks delivered his final 
version of the Iraq invasion named the 5-11-16-125-day Hybrid Plan.
25
 
 
In early 2002, Deputies meetings were held twice a week to discuss Iraq policy 
specifically.
26
 By January 2002 the US had emerged victorious from its military operations 
in Afghanistan, having apparently achieved its objective of defeating al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban. In his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush expressed this sentiment.
27
 
The now infamous address served two purposes. Firstly, it was a clear, bold and strong 
message to the world; no president since Reagan had been so aggressive. Secondly, it 
helped distract people from the actual Iraq war which was being planned.
28
 The main 
concerns he reiterated in his 28 January 2003 State of the Union address were the Iraqi 
governments‘ behaviour towards  UN inspectors, the unaccounted WMD in Iraq, and the 
regime‘s attempts to purchase uranium from Africa.29   
 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, on 6 February 2002 gave testimony before a House 
Committee, following President Bush‘s State of the Union address. He stated that they had 
not ruled out other options with respect to Iraq. ‗We still believe strongly in regime change 
in Iraq‘ Powell stressed. He also confirmed the United States‘ desire for an Iraq that was 
democratic, representative, at peace with its neighbours and prepared to rejoin the family 
of nations.
30
 On a second hearing in the Senate on 12 February, Powell asserted that with 
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respect to Iraq it has ‗long been, for several years now‘, the policy of the United States that 
regime change would be in the best interests of the region and the Iraqi people.
31
  
 
In the spring of 2002 Bush publicly declared his objective of regime change in Iraq after a 
meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
32
 ‗I explained to the prime minister that, 
you know, that the policy of my government is the removal of Saddam, and that all options 
are on the table‘, Bush said on 6 April 2002.33 On 26 May 2002 at a Press Conference with 
President Chirac, Bush stated: ‗Let me start with the Iraqi regime. The stated policy of my 
government is that we have a regime change. And as I told President Chirac, I have no war 
plans on my desk. And I will continue to consult closely with him. We do view Saddam 
Hussein as a serious, significant - serious threat to stability and peace.‘34 
 
On 14 August 2002 the NSC Principals met without the president and agreed that a UN 
cover was needed if the war with Iraq was to become reality. However, they also agreed 
that, once they took the issue to the UN, it would become an endless process of debate, 
discussion and compromise.
35
 On 9 August Rice had presented a paper entitled ‗Liberation 
Strategy for Iraq‘ for the Principals Committee meeting. This stipulated that the US 
‗create‘ a unified and democratic Iraq, strategic partner to America and a model of ‗good 
governance.‘ Rumsfeld saw it as promising democracy to Iraq, something the US could not 
guarantee and beyond the objective of regime change in Iraq.
36
 In the 14 August 2002 
meeting Rice submitted a revised edition of the 9 August paper for regime change in Iraq 
as a result of Rumsfeld‘s dissatisfaction with the promise of democracy for Iraq. It was 
titled ‗Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy.‘ This time the tone was more sober. The 
objective would be to maintain Iraq‘s unity, territorial integrity; and liberate the Iraqi 
people from tyranny and ‗assist them in creating a society based on moderation, pluralism 
and democracy.‘37  
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Feith argues that there was ‗no actual meeting of the minds‘ on how to formulate US 
objectives for the post-Saddam Iraqi government. This version, however, was approved by 
the Principals and later in the month by the president.
38
 However, in another modification 
to Rice‘s 14 August ‗Goals, Objectives and Strategy‘ paper, on 29 October another version 
was presented due to the Pentagon‘s and Rumsfeld‘s reservations about the paper. It 
replaced US goals in Iraq from a ‗society based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy‘ 
to one that ‗encourages the building of democratic intuitions.‘ The new version also 
replaced ‗establish a broad-based democratic government‘ with ‗establishes an interim 
administration in Iraq that prepares for the transition to an elected Iraqi government as 
quickly as practicable.‘39 This was mostly a result of Rumsfeld‘s lack of interest in nation 
building which led to the constant diluting of US objectives in Iraq, discussed at greater 
length in the next chapter.   
 
In the summer of 2002 the Office of Special Plans (OSP) was established at the Pentagon 
by Douglas Feith. Until that date only two civilian staffers were working full time on Iraq. 
This office was designed to focus on Iraq, with extra staff to deal with the overwhelming 
material related to Iraq. Ali Allawi argues that the OSP had a substantial role in gathering 
evidence against Saddam‘s regime. It relied heavily on Iraqi opposition groups to collect 
material rather than on the CIA and the Defense Department‘s very own Defense 
Intelligence Agency.
40
 In terms of intelligence, Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer 
for the Near East at the CIA, stated that ‗nobody asked me for any input.‘ The policy 
makers had not asked for intelligence input which could impact on decision making or 
have strategic ramifications in relation to Iraq in the run-up to the war. According to Pillar 
they had ‗no role.‘ And according to Pillar the Office of Special Plans was only an 
extension of a speech writing office with the single purpose of providing scary material to 
be used in speeches, especially in relation to links between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
41
  
 
Michael Rubin, who worked at the OSP refutes this claim. He said the OSP did not have 
any intelligence gathering duties and that it was a corollary to the State Department‘s 
Office of North Gulf Affairs.  As such it would meet with the exact same Iraqis whom the 
State Department met. He asserted that often Iraqis would come from Detroit or Dearborn 
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or London or Kurdistan and do the rounds: go to State Department, the Pentagon, the NSC, 
and perhaps the CIA in order to meet officials working the Iraqi issue in each of those.
42
 
Douglas Feith, also states that the name ‗Office of Special Plans‘ was only an effort to 
avoid undermining the US diplomatic efforts at the time and was no more than the office of 
the Northern Gulf affairs.
43
  
 
Rumsfeld sent a memo to President Bush on 5 October 2002, stating that a new UN 
resolution was not a requisite for a military confrontation with Iraq. In it he cited article 51 
of the UN charter as regards self-defence and Saddam‘s breaches of the multiple UNSCR 
that had been the basis for the 1991 ceasefire with Iraq.
44
 Moreover, the White House 
claimed that the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 provided full authority to the administration to 
use military force in Iraq to topple the regime.
45
 On 17 March 2003, President Bush met 
with a group of members from Congress and told them that they would not be able to get a 
second UN resolution authorising military action because of the French position, and 
referred to the congressionally mandated 1998 Iraq Liberation act.
46
 Bush had already 
gained congressional support. On 10 and 11 October 2002, both the House and Senate 
voted overwhelmingly to give full backing to President Bush if he took the decision to 
attack Iraq unilaterally.
47
 To achieve this the president had already invited eighteen key 
Senate and House leaders on 4 September 2002 to mandate congressional support and 
authority for the war. Bush reminded the members of Congress present that Congress had 
passed a law in 1998 for regime change in Iraq. The president stated that his administration 
had embraced that policy even more in light of the events of 9/11.
48
     
 
The Iraqi opposition was also further revived, following from the last Iraqi opposition 
conference in October 1999 in New York. A meeting was held at the State Department in 
August 2002 with six major Iraqi opposition groups. The groups invited were deemed as 
the Iraqi democratic opposition, as listed in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. After 
considerable delay a US-sponsored opposition conference was held in London from 13-16 
December 2002. The meeting resulted in the election of a leadership council of 65 
members and a final political statement. A decision was reached to meet again in Iraqi 
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Kurdistan within a few weeks.
49
 The next meeting followed in 24-28 February 2003 in 
Iraqi Kurdistan where a six-member leadership council was elected, serving as the Iraqi 
point of contact after Saddam‘s overthrow.  
 
Diplomacy was also revived, President Bush wanted Saddam to prove to the international 
community that he no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that he should let 
the inspectors return.
50
 He made this diplomatic gesture in a speech to the UN General 
Assembly on 12 September 2002. Iraq responded positively allowing the return of 
inspectors under UNSCR 1441. On 18 December 2002 at a NSC meeting President Bush 
discussed the 7 December 2002 Iraqi declaration of WMD. Powell explained that members 
of the UN Security Council, as well as Hans Blix, Head of the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), saw gaps in the declaration. Powell 
described it as a material breach. President Bush asked Powell if that meant Saddam was 
not cooperating, to which Powell replied ‗that‘s right.‘ President Bush responded ‗that‘s a 
significant statement.‘ He then stated ‗it means it‘s the beginning of the end for the guy.‘51 
Feith argues that President Bush made up his mind on the necessity of using power to 
overthrow Saddam when the UN inspectors had declared the Iraqi cooperation as 
insufficient in December 2002.
52
 In January 2003 Condoleezza Rice established that Iraq 
was not trustworthy, indicating that 12 chemical war heads discovered by inspectors were 
not mentioned in the declaratory report. She continued ‗Iraq is proving not that it is a 
nation bent on disarmament, but it is a nation with something to hide.‘53   
 
Bush was not comfortable with the continuation of Hans Blix‘s inspections, as it would be 
difficult to maintain the military presence in the Gulf. Bush was worried it could drag on 
for a year. The president was concerned that Saddam would ‗play games with the 
inspectors.‘54 Condoleezza Rice, however, told Bush that if he were to carry out coercive 
diplomacy, he would have ‗to live with that decision.‘55 Bush felt Saddam was getting 
more confident in early January 2003. Bush told Rice that they were probably going to 
have take military action.
56
 In Rice‘s mind, this was the period the president decided the 
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United States would go to war with Iraq.
57
 Military planning had been underway for more 
than a year even as Bush sought a diplomatic solution through the United Nations. He 
would continue those efforts, at least publicly, for 10 more weeks, but he had reached a 
point of no return.
58
 In his 27 January 2003 examination report on the content of Iraq‘s 
voluminous 12,000 page declaration report, Hans Blix stated that it ‗regrettably‘ does not 
provide sufficient information to ‗eliminate the questions or reduce their number.‘ Blix 
also stated that, although Iraq was cooperating on some fronts, it had not seemed to come 
to a ‗genuine acceptance‘ of the disarmament it has been ordered to carry out.59 After these 
events the United States no longer had the patience, nor the intention, to carry on with 
inspections. The countdown to war had begun. All four leaders - Bush, Blair, Aznar of 
Spain and Barroso of Portugal - convened in the Azores on 16 March 2003. This was after 
attempts to gain a second resolution to mandate war was withdrawn due to French, Russian 
and German opposition. The group agreed that, according to UNSCR 1441, Iraq had not 
complied with the obligations prescribed in the resolution, and therefore there was legal 
authority to act upon the ‗serious consequences‘ Iraq would face by failure to submit to the 
resolution.
60
  
 
Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning, told Lawrence Wilkerson, that it was a 
‗creeping decision.‘ 61  Pillar explained that one of the most baffling things for future 
historians is that there is no one meeting or single paper the president signed where it can 
be said ‗that‘s the decision.‘62 As the process of planning and preparation was already 
underway in the first half 2002, and by summer 2002 there was no going back. The White 
House in summer 2002 started major efforts to sell the decision to go to war which they 
unveiled in September of that year.
63
 Andrew Card on 6 September said ‗From a marketing 
point of view you don‘t introduce new products in August.‘64 The immediate inclination to 
go to war after 9/11 effectively progressed to a decision by spring 2002.
65
 Colin Powell 
explained that there was never a moment when the Principals made recommendations 
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followed by a presidential decision.
66
 Rice concurred with this view, ‗there‘s no decision 
meeting.‘67 As Lawrence Freedman explains, after 9/11 an ‗established policy of regime 
change‘ was given heightened attention to the degree US military power could be used to 
achieve the goal.
68
 Michael Rubin asserts that the invasion of Iraq was talked about 
seriously in 2002, even talked about in 2001. But the final decision was not made until US 
fire power ‗kinetic‘ action was used, in essence a day or two before the Shock and Awe 
strikes commenced. Military planning and consideration were conducted thoroughly in 
2002. Phase I, the preparation phase, which involved deployments, build-up and putting 
everything in the theatre of operation was underway in 2002 and early 2003.
69
  The 
military build-up accelerated in March and accelerated further from June 2002.
70
 Tommy 
Franks explains that his official request for ‗Pre-N-Day‘ force, the regional force build-up 
(Phase I of operations) was submitted on 22 November 2002. This would be only the first 
request for pre-war build up that would bring 128,000 soldiers to the Gulf by 15 February 
2003.
71
       
 
4.2  SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE SERIAL GAMBLER  
Saddam‘s rhetoric allowed him to be perceived as a threat. He constantly expressed his 
disdain for US imperialism and for Israel. Saddam told April Glaspie, US ambassador to 
Iraq, on 25 July 1990 ‗We too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their 
ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but 
individual Arabs may reach you.‘72 This seems to have happed on 9/11 although it was not, 
apparently, Iraqi sponsored. In interrogations conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) agent George Piro after his capture, Saddam Hussein acknowledged that Iraq 
accepted UNSCR 687. However, Saddam further acknowledged that Iraq had made a 
‗mistake‘ by destroying some weapons without UN supervision. In Saddam‘s view, UN 
inspectors wanted generous expenses, including accommodations, travel, and other costs 
paid for by Iraq. Instead of waiting for the inspectors and bearing these expenses, Iraq 
commenced destruction of the weapons unilaterally. Saddam stated during his 
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interrogation with the FBI that Iraq did not hide these weapons. UN inspectors later 
requested documentation of the destruction of the weapons and visited various places 
taking samples for review.
73
 Scott Ritter also stresses that the Iraqis claimed that the bulk 
of Iraqi WMDs were decommissioned unilaterally in July 1991. However, this issue 
remained the cause of continuous tension with inspectors, as formerly recorded weapons 
could not be accounted for and verified.
74
   
 
Another reason for Saddam‘s defiance was that he believed that Iraq could not appear 
weak to its enemies, especially Iran. Saddam believed Iraq was being threatened by others 
in the region and must appear able to defend itself. Saddam stated that Iran was Iraq‘s 
major threat, due to their common border. He believed Iran intended to annex Southern 
Iraq. Such an attempt by Iran was viewed in Baghdad as the most significant threat facing 
Iraq. Even though Saddam claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the 
major factor dissuading him from supporting the return of the UN inspectors after the 
events of 1998. Saddam stated he was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq‘s 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions for the United States for his refusal 
to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq.
75
 The declassified FBI interrogation documents 
suggest that Saddam and his regime perceived Iran to pose a greater and more immediate 
threat than the US. His plan was to deter Iran and his adversaries in Iraq by doubt, but in 
doing so he overlooked the implications of an emergent pre-emption doctrine in the US.
76
       
 
Although Saddam had not expected a US invasion of Iraq, he felt US hostility had evolved 
before his invasion of Kuwait. He told his FBI interrogator: ‗I ask you as an American, 
when did the United States stop shipments of grain to Iraq?‘ He also asked: when did the 
United States contact European countries to boycott sales of technological equipment to 
Iraq? He responded, ‗1989.‘ Saddam believed the US was planning to destroy Iraq, a desire 
pushed by a Zionist political agenda in the United States. Moreover, he attributed the 
invasion to Israel itself, a regional neighbour which saw Iraq as major threat after the end 
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of the Iran-Iraq war.
77
 However, in 1989, as mentioned previously in chapter two, the US 
government, namely the Bush administration, had a policy of engagement contrary to 
congressional attempts at sanctions which Saddam seems to have confused.    
 
Moreover,  according to the Iraqi Survey Group‘s 960-page report (known as the Duelfer 
Report), Saddam was convinced that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had 
thoroughly penetrated his regime and thus would know not only that he had dismantled his 
WMD (which the CIA apparently did not), but would also know about his plans for 
important intelligence operations.
78
 Saddam had also inadvertently confirmed to the US the 
existence of his WMD in a speech given in June 2002. In the speech he had stated that you 
cannot expect Iraq to give up the rifle and live with a sword when his neighbour Iran had a 
rifle.
79
 Additionally, Saddam believed the United States was a paper tiger. He even told 
Glaspie on 25 July 1990: ‗I do not belittle you. But I hold this view by looking at the 
geography and nature of American society into account. Yours is a society which cannot 
accept 10,000 dead in one battle.‘80 Michael Rubin states that ‗Saddam was bluffing, he 
thought the US was bluffing as well.‘81 For this reason saw no significance in taking the 
US invasion seriously. Saddam also believed that France and Russia would prevent war. 
Even if hostilities began, a ceasefire would be declared under enormous international 
pressure.
82
 Saddam Hussein probably assumed that an attack on Iraq was unlikely to 
happen in the absence of a unanimous vote at the UN Security Council, which would be 
most likely vetoed by France and Russia.
83
      
 
Saddam seems to have constantly misinterpreted US policy. Veteran British left-wing 
politician Tony Benn stated that he wrote to Saddam Hussein in 1990 after he had invaded 
Kuwait and had taken British hostages. He later visited Saddam in Baghdad to try and 
persuade him to release all the British hostages. Benn said he had a three hour talk with 
Saddam, and was struck by his sense of utter betrayal by the United States. Saddam had 
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said that the US had armed and supported him. He even stated ‗the American ambassador 
in Baghdad said you can go into Kuwait, and now they‘ve turned on me.‘84   
 
Saddam also maintained the image that he had WMD stockpiles to deter his domestic 
enemies: the Iraqi Kurds and the Shiite.
85
 Bush asked David Kay, Head of the Iraq Survey 
Group, why Saddam had not been open about his lack of WMD. Kay responded believing 
that Saddam had found the invasion of the Iraq by the US a highly unlikely scenario. For 
this reason, he wanted to use the doubt to deter his internal population, especially the 
Kurds and Shiites. Kay continued telling Bush that totalitarian regimes tend to fear the 
domestic populations more than external threats.
86
 
 
4.3  REASONS FOR WAR: DIFFERENT PEOPLE, DIFFERENT AGENDAS 
As early as September 2001 Douglas Feith had prepared a memo for 15 September NSC 
Camp David meetings concerning the purpose of a possible Iraq invasion. Feith listed 
several points: to de-throne a regime which supported terrorism; that actively pursued 
WMD; that attacked US forces on a daily basis and threatened US interests in the region. 
And, finally, invasion would make it easier to confront other state supporters of terrorism 
through coercive diplomacy.
87
 In August 2002 Condoleezza Rice‘s staff prepared the 
rationale for war in a paper titled ‗Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Regime.‘ It 
provided four main reasons for invasion going beyond the CIA assessment that Saddam 
had WMD stockpiles: firstly, Iraq‘s WMD capability and infrastructure; secondly, its 
support for terrorism; thirdly, threats to neighbours; and finally its tyrannical nature. 
Essentially what Feith describes as the WMD plus three Ts.
88
 In the 14 August 2002 top-
secret document ‗Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy‘ (mentioned earlier) the Bush 
administration also listed the reasons why Iraq‘s regime should be toppled. In this 
document it asserted six major points: firstly, eliminating the WMD threat; secondly, the 
means to deliver them; thirdly, to prevent Saddam from breaking out of containment; 
fourthly, to eliminate Iraq‘s threats to its neighbours; fifthly, liberate Iraqi people from 
tyranny and, finally; to prevent Baghdad supporting terrorists.
89
 The problem with tyranny, 
Feith explains, was not merely the fact that Saddam was a threat to his own Kurdish and 
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Shiite population, but the fact that in tyrannies there tended to be a lack of transparency, 
meaning diplomacy and agreements were hard to verify. Secondly tyrannical regimes 
lacked any domestic checks or balances that could restrict the tyrant‘s freedom of action.90  
 
Thus, the end of Saddam‘s regime became an ideal target in President Bush‘s war on 
terrorism. Saddam Hussein was an unpredictable and ruthless dictator who could attack the 
US without any hesitation, therefore his removal elevated to the top of the agenda.
91
 
Prevention was thus born from this form of thinking. The National Security Strategy of 
September 2002 reflected this thinking. ‗The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction‘ – and the more ‗compelling the case for taking anticipatory action‘ to defend 
America.
92
  
 
In many respects, President Bush understood the danger of war, and wanted to avoid it as 
much as possible. This was particularly evident in his approach to North Korea and Iran. 
But when it came to Iraq, he felt that all channels had been spent for more than a decade. 
These channels included sixteen Security Council resolutions that Saddam had defied.
93
 
Iraq was considered in a class of its own when compared to other ‗rogue nations.‘ In his 
State of the Union address the president made it clear that Iraq holds the potential to bring 
great harm to the US. The difference between Iraq and the two other Axis of Evil powers 
was that the US believed it had exhausted all means short of war to deal with the Iraqi 
threat.
94
  
 
In this respect two different decisions were taken in the aftermath of 9/11. One was about 
the actual purpose of the war with Iraq and the other concerning Iraq after Saddam. As 
regards the first issue of regime change, Rubin stated among all US agencies there was 
‗almost unanimous agreement.‘95 And asserted that the ‗broad swath of the policymaking 
community agreed with at the time.‘96 It was a decision that was supported across the 
board by republicans and influential democrats and public opinion. David Pollock, senior 
fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, stated that it is ‗a serious error to 
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look for some kind of small group.‘97 A National Security Council official explained that 
there were several camps that backed the decision to invade Iraq. The military camp 
(Pentagon) was arguing that US planes were being attacked on a daily basis, the 
intelligence camp (CIA) thought Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and Saddam 
supported terrorism. There were some people that believed a democratic Iraq would help 
the Middle East.
98
 The majority of policy makers thought Iraq was a threat and dangerous, 
‗the risks were so great, not worth taking the risk.‘99 As regards the reason for the war 
there were a variety of motivations. Wilkerson asserted, ‗different groups had different 
agendas‘ and ‗different people had different motivations.‘ 100  Adam Garfinkle, also 
believed that there was not one reason, but a host of people had different reasons.
101
 Pillar 
reiterated this sentiment. As far as motives were concerned there were ‗different individual 
motives.‘ The president wanted something, the vice president something, and Rumsfeld 
something else.
102
  
 
As American financier J. P. Morgan once famously asserted ‗A man generally has two 
reasons for doing a thing. One that sounds good, and a real one.‘ The next section of this 
chapter addresses the various motivations and interests that led to the invasion of Iraq. It 
makes sense to look at the various reasons for war and the priority and place each reason 
held in terms of the decision making process. For this reason a geological analogy is well-
suited to portraying this process by categorising the reasons into different layers: A crust 
(visible), mantle and core (underlying) may be used to express the various layers of 
reasons and the variety of motivations that helped drive the war on Iraq.   
   
4.3.1  Pronounced ‘Sounds Good’ Reasons: The Crust 
4.3.1.1  Weapons of mass destruction  
 The major reason the administration focused on WMD as a casus belli was because it 
would be ‗easier to get attention that way‘ a National Security Council official told the 
author.
103
 When it came to providing justification for war Rice believed it would be 
impossible to gain international support on Iraq‘s human rights records. The National 
Security Advisor also asserted that the terrorism issue was considered ‗weak or 
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unprovable.‘104 Thus, in light of Iraq‘s breach of numerous Security Council resolutions 
and its development of WMD it was considered the most reasonable channel to seek 
international support for a possible campaign in Iraq. Wolfowitz declared in 2003, that for 
bureaucratic reasons, the administration had to settle on weapons of mass destruction, 
because it was the one reason everyone could agree on.
105
 In an interview with Vanity Fair 
in May 2003, Wolfowitz stated: 
The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government 
bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which 
was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but . . .there have always 
been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the 
second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi 
people.
 106
      
Pillar stated, that policy makers did not ask him for anything resembling strategic input in 
relation to Iraq at all before the war.
107
 According to Pillar, the policy makers did not ask 
questions, sought no intelligence and did not seek assessments. Even the Weapons 
Estimate was not requested by the administration but by the Democrats in Congress.
108
 
George Tenet, CIA Director, states in his memoirs that policy makers were not showing 
much curiosity as regards requests for new reports on Iraqi WMD and the implications of 
conflict in Iraq.
109
  Even before the war General Franks made it clear to the president that 
there was a lack of evidence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. He stated ‗Mr. President 
we‘ve been looking for Scud missiles and other weapons of mass destruction for ten years 
and haven‘t found any yet.‘110  
 
An anonymous National Security Council official explained to the author that there had 
certainly been times when the US had involved itself in regional conflicts not because it 
had felt threatened itself but because international security had been at risk. But he also 
stressed that the Bush administration thought that the US was at risk from Iraq. The official 
was unequivocal ‗I have no doubt that they felt that Iraq was a threat, no doubt, it was a 
threat on homeland security.‘111 Senior Congressional staffer, Richard Kessler, stated that 
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the key purpose, even prior to 9/11, was that Iraq was considered a centre for WMD 
production and had links to terrorism. Kessler affirmed, ‗they did not make it up. They 
believed it sincerely.‘112 
 
In an interview with British journalist Trevor McDonald, President Bush stated ‗I made up 
my mind that Saddam needs to go‘, he added ‗The worst thing that could happen would be 
to allow a nation like Iraq, run by Saddam Hussein, to develop weapons of mass 
destruction, and then team up with terrorist organisations so they can blackmail the world. 
I‘m not going to let that happen.‘113 Post 9/11 there was a real feeling that America was 
going to be attacked again. It was not a matter of when but how bad and how soon. The 
administration was doing everything it possibly could to find threats and neutralise them 
quickly.
114
 There was a genuine belief that Iraq had WMDs.
115
 
 
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the deeper root of the conflict was the US assumption 
that Saddam could not be deterred from using WMD.
116
 George Tenet stresses that there 
was never a ‗serious debate‘ about the imminence of a threat from Iraq before the war. It 
was, however, about acting before Saddam did.
117
 Vice President Cheney was always a 
strong advocate of the war. He made his point clearly on USS John C. Stennis. ‗The United 
States will not permit the forces of terror to gain the tools of genocide.‘ Frederick Kagan, 
Resident Scholar at AEI, asserted that the ‗purpose was to eliminate WMD. We were 
wrong. There would not have been invasion if Saddam complied.‘118 Richard Perle echoed 
this view: ‗If Saddam had convinced us that he didn‘t have WMD we wouldn‘t have gone 
in.‘119  
    
President Bush feared that Saddam might use his nuclear weapons when acquired to 
‗blackmail the United States.‘120  Former Congressman and marine Lieutenant Colonel 
James Longley stressed that it was universally understood that Saddam had WMD.
121
 The 
most important incident advancing the Iraq invasion was a week after 9/11, when five 
anthrax-laden letters stopped Congress from working. Henri Barkey explained that with 
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five letters the perpetrator managed to freeze the administration. The US suspected that it 
was far too sophisticated an operation for an individual or organisation to provide and 
orchestrate. And it was perceived as a message to the rest of the world that the US was 
weak. Barkey explained that Saddam was well documented to have these anthrax spores, 
and was considered capable of doing this.
122
 An exercise conducted a few weeks before 
9/11 named ‗Dark Winter‘ had already brought home the horrors of a possible smallpox 
attack on the US.
123
   
 
American knowledge about Iraqi WMD went back to 1973. Republican Congressman 
Robert Huber of Michigan told Congress of Soviet supplies of poison gas to Iraq to 
suppress its Kurdish minority on 6 November of that year.
124
 Moreover, mention of Iraqi 
WMD and chemical weapons, as discussed earlier in chapter two, specifically was made 
during Rumsfeld‘s first visit to Baghdad in 1983 when meeting with Tariq Aziz. But this 
issue was only mentioned in the context of a range of issues relevant to US-Iraq 
relations.
125
 
    
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US revised all the threats to its national security. 
All vulnerabilities overlooked prior to the attack were viewed in a different light. All 
threats whether or not directly related to al-Qaida were explored. Iraq having been a 
concern before the attacks seemed graver and more serious.
126
 The CIA reports stressed 
that Saddam‘s regime possessed chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. 127  This 
turned out to be incorrect. However, Saddam had retained the expertise and facilities to 
resume a WMD programme.
128
 The Iraq Survey Group report findings after the invasion 
explicitly stated that Iraq had dual-use capabilities to resume its programmes if it wished. It 
also had the scientific know-how to achieve this goal after sanctions were removed.
129
    
 
The nature of the 9/11 attacks and the amount of carnage was unprecedented. It was 
perceived as a case of ‗terrorism of mass destruction‘, a departure from previous acts of 
attention seeking political theatre. To this end the US found it utterly unacceptable to risk 
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allowing WMD to fall in the hands of terrorist organisations, leading to focused attention 
on WMD acquiring, terrorist supporting, states.
130
 Rumsfeld had argued that the chief 
strategic danger was that an extremist group would obtain WMD. And considering Saddam 
had a track record of WMD production and terrorism sponsorship, he was seen as a 
potential supplier. Thus Rumsfeld stated that the Iraq campaign should ‗focus on 
WMD.‘131 Donald Rumsfeld also defended regime change in Iraq as a message to countries 
pursuing WMD ‗that having them…is attracting attention that is not favourable and is not 
helpful.‘132   
 
The Bush administration was genuinely concerned about a combination of WMD and 
terrorists. It represented the next potential danger it wanted to deal with. The policy 
essentially was to deal with the threat of WMD‘s possessed by Saddam Hussein. Perle 
explained that after 9/11 ‗We didn‘t know the full scope of the attack.‘ The Bush 
administration thought WMD would fall to al-Qaeda, so attention was turned immediately 
to this issue. According to Richard Perle the US had intelligence that al-Qaeda was 
attempting to acquire WMD. The administration had asked itself whether it had to expect 
others to come and, if so, how to prevent them. The US made a list of potential WMD 
suppliers to terrorists and Iraq was high on the list. Perle insisted the concern was ‗not that 
Saddam would attack America directly.‘ The concern was that Saddam would share his 
WMD with terrorists. The United States knew Saddam hated the US. Perle stressed that 
Saddam was bitter about his defeat, ‗he cheered 9/11. He approved 9/11.‘ Perle 
acknowledged that although it turned out to be factually wrong that Saddam had WMD and 
was a likely supplier thereof for terrorists, he did have the capacity to produce them even 
though he didn‘t have a stockpile.133 
 
4.3.1.2  Sponsoring terrorism 
Bush asserted that terrorism was a state of mind that had to be defeated. The president 
affirmed to congressional leaders ‗They hate Christianity. They hate Judaism. They hate 
everything that is not them.‘134 President Bush‘s broad concept of a war on terrorism was 
shared by Rumsfeld. The secretary helped the president develop its premise and objectives 
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and worldwide nature. Rumsfeld warned against restricting it to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan 
and failing to define it as a worldwide threat.
135
 
 
The main factor which led to the US invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam was the 
potential threat of terrorist action. David Pollock stated that there was ‗no ideological 
agenda‘ except to address fears and vulnerabilities exposed by 9/11. The event created a 
genuine concern that Saddam‘s regime might be inspired to attempt something of the kind. 
It created a different political atmosphere in Washington where such threats were 
perceived more likely and more politically acceptable to contemplate.
136
  
 
Iraq was first placed on the State Department‘s list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1979 as 
a founding member. It was removed in May 1982 after it agreed to close down the Abu 
Nidal Organisation. It was re-included in 1990 after Saddam‘s occupation of Kuwait.137 
Iraq was perceived as connected heavily with terrorist groups. It had resumed refuge to 
Abu Nidal and Iraq was believed to have been associated with the perpetrators of the 
World Trade Centre attacks in 1993. The training of foreign fighters was also conducted in 
Iraq.
138
 Before the war on 26 February 2003, Bush stated that Saddam‘s removal ‗will 
deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron‘ that funds terrorist training, and ‗offers 
rewards to families of suicide bombers.‘ It would be a ‗clear warning‘ that support for 
terror will ‗not be tolerated.‘139 Within this context a major purpose of the war on terrorism 
was to protect the American way of life. The policy makers at the Pentagon thought it 
would be a travesty to allow the threat of terrorism to curtail civil liberties in America.
140
  
 
In his 2003 State of the Union address Bush outlined to the American people the threats 
posed by Saddam‘s regime and the potential damage his regime could do.141 He stated that 
a brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ‗ties to terrorism,‘ with great 
potential wealth would not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United 
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States.
142
 In response to a question by Bob Woodward on the president‘s expectations for 
the consequences of the Iraq war Bush replied that it was his responsibility to ‗secure 
America.‘ Bush reiterated that his frame of mind was focused on ‗the solemn duty to 
protect America.‘143 The Bush administration also had in mind the opportunity of fighting 
terrorism outside US territory. On 7 September 2003 Bush stated that the ‗surest way to 
avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans.‘ He 
stressed that the US was fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan ‗so that we do not 
meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities.‘144 
 
To the US government, law enforcement was a deterrent, a method to punish not prevent. 
America came to recognise that it could no longer treat terrorism as a law enforcement 
matter. War was considered a suitable method to prevent further attacks. This included 
other actors from a broader spectrum than those responsible for 9/11.
145
 Douglas Feith had 
drafted a paper entitled ‗Strategic Thoughts‘ on behalf of Rumsfeld which captured the 
concept of the US global war on terrorism. The draft was edited by Rumsfeld and sent to 
the president on 30 September 2001. The core concept of this paper was the focus on ‗state 
actors‘ as the sources of threat and potential danger to the national security of the US 
through the procurement of nuclear and biological weapons for terrorist organisations. It 
was the objective of this paper to suggest to the president that a rational course of action 
was to target some rogue states militarily, with the consequence of making other state 
sponsors change their policies on supporting terrorism. The overall enterprise was military 
action or diplomatic pressure to disrupt terrorist activities in the long run.
146
           
 
The Defense Department was convinced that a war with Saddam Hussein was part of the 
War on Terror. Two other documents were established towards this end. The first, on 3 
October 2001 ‗Strategic Guidance for the Defense Department‘ followed by the June 2002 
‗Political-Military Strategic Plan for Iraq.‘ Both documents defined the War on Terrorism 
as ‗a confrontation with state and non-state supporters of terrorist groups, as well as the 
terrorist groups themselves.‘ The objective of this plan was to focus on states that 
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supported terrorism as well as aspiring to WMD. The June 2002 document also stressed 
that a war with Iraq should not be for the sake of ending Saddam‘s threat per se but also to 
‗convince and compel other countries to renounce WMD and support to terrorism.‘147  
 
Pillar argued that Feith was creating impressions to advance the cause and sell the war. 
However, Pillar stressed that it was not about ‗fabricating evidence‘, but rather stitching 
things together in a way to promote a perception that things were different from what they 
were. So much of it rendered false impressions to the American public; it was not a matter 
of fabricating one particular fact, partly drawing conclusions that were not justified, to 
convey there was an operational alliance between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Pillar emphasised that 
it was a matter of rhetoric with a constant drumbeat about 9/11 and Iraq, using the same 
two things in the same sentence.
148
 According to Pillar, the intelligence community, 
despite being pushed, turned over every stone; the basic judgment being that there was no 
alliance between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
149
  
 
Paul Wolfowitz firmly held the view that the invasion of Iraq was the right thing to do. 
After 9/11 Wolfowitz believed that terrorism was no longer a manageable evil. It had to be 
handled and dealt with even if at the expense of American lives. The networks had to be 
destroyed and the sponsoring states attacked. To Wolfowitz, Saddam‘s regime had long 
deserved to be overthrown, but 9/11 had only made this necessity more obvious.
150
 
 
4.3.1.3  Liberation 
Bush had a great interest in seeing the US being perceived as liberator rather than an 
occupier, and he made this known to his war council before the start of the Afghan war. He 
wanted visible humanitarian assistance delivered to the Afghan people, emphasising the 
moral mission of the United States.
151
 President Bush made his aspirations known to his 
aides after 9/11 when preparing his 2002 State of the Union speech: 
Let me make sure you understand what I just said about the role of the United 
States. I believe the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world. And I 
believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom that is as solemn as the 
responsibility is to protecting the American people, because the two go hand-
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in-hand. No, it‘s very important for you to understand that about my 
presidency.
152
 
The 2002 State of the Union speech was never intended to be focused on the ‗Axis of 
Evil‘, but rather to emphasise democratic liberties envisaged in a new Afghanistan. It was 
more of a message to the Muslim nations that all liberties supersede the power of the 
state.
153
 Bush further asserted this to Bob Woodward in an interview. He said: ‗I say that 
freedom is not America‘s gift to the world. Freedom is God‘s gift to everybody in the 
world…and I believe we have a duty to free people.‘154 
 
The Bush administration‘s ambition to promote democracy was as heavily linked to 
changing the domestic politics of Iraq and the region as it was about human rights concerns. 
Bush believed that action in Iraq was not merely about ‗strategic purposes or defensive 
purposes‘ but also about the ‗immense suffering‘ and ‗the human condition that we must 
worry about.‘ President Bush had referred to starvations and hunger in North Korea and 
Iraq and his passion to attend to these phenomena.
155
 Bush clearly indicated in his 2002 
State of the Union address to the American nation, that he had a new emphasis, asserting 
US commitment towards ‗human dignity.‘ Rice thought this had never been so vividly 
expressed as a US objective in American history.
156
 In his West Point address he conveyed 
the purpose of his new foreign policy: ‗We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace 
by replacing poverty, repression and resentment around the world with hope of a better 
day.‘157 In his 2002 National Security Strategy Bush asserted ‗we will extend the peace by 
encouraging free and open societies on every continent‘, expressing his intention to ‗use 
this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.‘ Bush was 
adamant about this cause to him ‗freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; 
the birthright of every person—in every civilisation‘ and ‗The United States welcomes our 
responsibility to lead in this great mission‘, Bush stressed. 158 On the evening of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Bush stated ‗We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to 
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others and we will prevail.‘ The liberation of Iraqis was a major part of his thinking.159 
Bush felt that the ‗first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people, 
themselves.‘160  
 
4.3.2  Unpronounced Underlying Reasons: The Mantle 
4.3.2.1  Ending the threat to Israel 
One of the reasons the US believed that Saddam‘s overthrow would be favourable was the 
threat Iraq posed to the region, especially towards US friendly allies in the Middle East. 
The security of oil rich Arab Gulf states and Israel especially was definitely a motive. 
However, contrary to conventional wisdom, pressure from Israel and the Jewish lobby was 
not a major factor behind the decision to attack Iraq in March 2003. Nonetheless, it was not 
insignificant. David Mack explained that he met with numerous members of the Israeli 
government and intelligence before the war. In their minds Iran was the real threat and Iraq 
a secondary issue. Mack stressed Israel played a part in US views, but not the most 
important part.
161
 According to Mack even for neoconservatives, Israel was not the major 
factor. Saddam‘s toppling would be better not only for the US for all the people of the 
Middle East.
162
 Lawrence Wilkerson explained that there were regular visits from members 
of Mosad, the Israeli Defence Force, the Israeli Likud Party and other representatives of 
Israeli society and government, initially to dissuade the US from the invasion of Iraq 
because they thought Iran was the principal target and the Iraq campaign would only lead 
to a disequilibrium in the balance of power in the Gulf. But once they concluded that the 
US was going to war in Iraq they were willing to help with intelligence and influence on 
the American Jewish community.
163
  
 
The war, however, was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure. 
According to Philip Zelikow, a former member of the President Bush‘s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and a 
counsellor to Condoleezza Rice, the ‗real threat‘ from Iraq was not a threat to the United 
States. The ‗unstated threat‘ was the ‗threat against Israel‘, Zelikow told an audience at the 
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University of Virginia in September 2002. ‗The American government,‘ he added, ‗doesn‘t 
want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell.‘ Also within the US, 
a main driving force behind the war was a small band of neoconservatives, many Jewish, 
and many with ties to Likud. Mearsheimer and Walt argue it would be wrong to blame the 
war in Iraq on ‗Jewish influence.‘ Rather, it was due in large part to the Israeli lobby‘s 
influence, especially that of the neoconservatives within it.
164
 Pillar argues that sympathy 
for Israel played a role as Wolfowitz in particular had strong ties with Israel.
165
 The rising 
influence of evangelicals also affected US foreign policy by increasing US support to 
Israel.
166
 Ann Norton argues that the neoconservatives‘ focus on the Middle East combined 
with Christian belief regarding the Second Coming of Christ to the land of Israel, created a 
sense of common purpose and unity with the Christian evangelicals, which advanced the 
neoconservative agenda.
167
 
 
On 11 September 2002, Bush met with eleven House members and clearly told them ‗The 
biggest threat, however, is Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. He can 
blow up Israel and that would trigger an international conflict.‘168 Bush also told a group of 
Congress members on 26 September 2002: ‗Saddam Hussein is a terrible guy who is 
teaming up with al-Qaeda. He tortures his own people and hates Israel.‘169 And several 
weeks before the American invasion of Iraq in a speech to the largely pro-Israeli American 
Enterprise Institute, Bush explained that removing Saddam from power: ‗could also begin 
a new stage for Middle Eastern peace‘ by depriving Palestinians of a wealthy patron.170  
 
In April 2004, after the Iraq invasion, President Bush advised the Palestinians that the 
‗realities on the ground and in the region have changed greatly over the last several 
decades.‘ The president wanted a Palestinian acknowledgment to ‗take into account those 
realities.‘ The implication of Bush‘s overthrow of Saddam was the destruction of a major 
sponsor to Palestinian activities. With Saddam‘s departure this wealthy and radical Arab 
nationalist support structure would no longer exist. The president advised ‗in light of new 
realities on the ground‘, which included ‗already existing major Israeli population centres‘, 
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it was unrealistic for the Palestinians to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations 
would be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.
171
 
 
4.3.2.2  Easy target  
To the Bush administration, as Barkey put it, Iraq was the ‗lowest hanging fruit.‘172 The 
relative ease in which the Afghanistan war had panned out further fuelled this perception. 
Scooter Libby believed, the war in Afghanistan going well, that it would be a good idea to 
sell a war on Iraq within the broader framework of the war on terrorism.
173
 The Bush 
administration believed that Iraq was an inviting target, not because it was an immediate 
threat in any way but a potential threat. Rather it was a strategic opportunity to deliver the 
US message of pre-emption.
174
 The US perceived 9/11 as an opening window for the 
opportunity to take action. Iraq was a prime target belonging to the Axis of Evil group and 
having significant vulnerabilities; it was an ideal candidate for regime change.
175
 Moreover, 
the US was convinced that Iraqi forces were no match for America. Perle in an article in 
the summer of 2002 doubted the Iraqi military‘s effectiveness and competence. Perle stated 
that the Iraqi forces were a third of what they had been in 1991 and ‗11 years closer to 
obsolescence.‘176 Iraq was still stuck with what it had remaining from its First Gulf War‘s 
1970s Soviet arsenal while the US had taken military technology to unprecedented levels 
of sophistication, power and accuracy.
177
 Rice had even clarified in her 2000 Foreign 
Affairs article that Iraq was internationally isolated, its ‗conventional military power has 
been severely restricted.‘178  
 
Though the US felt Iraq was weak, it also had no concrete intelligence on Iraq‘s genuine 
lack of WMD. To US military commanders WMD was a major threat. The military 
campaign‘s swift nature and the ‗shock and awe‘ strategy was most probably the major 
reason for this course of action. Iraq‘s conventional army posed no serious challenge to the 
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US military establishment. America feared Iraqi biological and chemical attacks. Tommy 
Franks, CENTCOM commander, had made available special protective suits in case of 
such attacks. All forces were prepared to respond to incidents involving biological and 
chemical weapons. On the eve of the war Franks had received intelligence that Iraqi 
frontline units and Republican Guards had been armed with nerve and mustard gas, anthrax 
and botulinum toxins.
179
 CENTCOM had produced leaflets and dropped hundreds of 
thousands of them on Iraqi positions. The leaflets warned that Iraqi units will face ‗severe 
retribution‘ and unit commanders will be ‗held accountable‘ if WMD is used.180 Franks 
was equally convinced that a speedy strike against Saddam‘s regime would decrease the 
chances of any successful Iraqi WMD attacks on the invading force. Franks had told his 
commanders that speed of advance would kill the enemy and disrupt the Iraqis ability to 
react effectively
181
  
 
4.3.2.3  Democracy promotion 
Thomas Friedman contends that Bush‘s war to disarm Iraq, topple Saddam and rebuild a 
viable state is something that defied political reason, as the president was betting his whole 
presidency on it. Bush was ‗a man on a mission.‘ Friedman describes it as something 
coming from his own belief as it was a war of choice.
182
 Bush expressed his intentions on 
26 February 2003: ‗A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example 
of freedom for other nations in the region.‘183 Mack stressed that US foreign policy has 
always had a ‗missionary streak.‘ It was based on the premise that the US has an obligation 
to ‗spread our values and way of life.‘184  
 
Condoleezza Rice‘s paper prepared for the Principals‘ Committee meeting on 9 August 
2002 titled ‗Liberation Strategy for Iraq‘ (mentioned earlier) was one of the first 
documents prepared to this end. One of the points made was to create a democratic and 
unified Iraq that can be a model of good governance for the region and a strategic partner 
of the United States, as such Iraq would have a ‗transforming effect on the region.‘185 Feith 
argues that the paper was testimony to Rice‘s own strong support for democracy promotion 
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in the Middle East also reflected the ‗intensity of the president‘s commitment to the 
idea.‘186 
 
Cheney was concerned about the president‘s vision of a new Iraq, not just the replacement 
of Saddam Hussein, but creating a democracy. He knew neither the State Department nor 
its secretary were sympathetic nor envisaged a transformation in the region. They believed 
democracy was a step too far for a place like Iraq that had never experienced truly 
representative government.
187
 Cheney himself had argued in meetings with other Principals 
that the US had an obligation to stand up a democracy in Iraq. He asserted that the United 
States had to give the Iraqi people a chance at those fundamental values ‗we believe in.‘188 
Cheney stated on 9 August 2002 that ‗we should make it clear that we are intent on major 
democratic change.‘189   
 
After 9/11 the US became more interested in promoting democratic institutions as a 
method to tackle jihadist extremism.
190
 Bush‘s Middle East policy to promote democracy 
came in part to counteract the populist anger exploited by hardline Islamist groups.
191
 Feith 
asserts that the creation of a democratic Iraq would help counter political extremism in the 
Muslim world. This was something the US hoped for. Nevertheless, he also stresses that 
the US officials‘ main priority was to protect the National Security of the US and in no 
way to control Iraq in the long term or compel them to do things the US way.
192
 The idea 
of promoting democracy in the region as a whole was only incidentally connected with 
Iraq. The origins of democracy promotion lied in 9/11. Thus, democracy was to be a long-
term solution to the problem of terrorism.
193
 
 
The debate in Washington before the invasion was whether to replace Saddam with one of 
his generals or whether to try set Iraq on a fundamentally democratic path. That was when 
the neoconservatives chimed in.
194
 Rubin stated, the debate‘s premise was, if there was a 
war, would the US replace Saddam with a ‗General or establish democracy‘, 
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neoconservatives advocated democracy.
195
 Perle stated that democracy was not a 
motivation in the war, ‗but we didn‘t want another dictator.‘196 
 
Melvyn Leffler, however, argues that the Bush Doctrine is vulnerable to criticism, not 
necessarily because it is a departure from previous policies, but rather due to the 
incompatibility of its means with the ends, and the difficulties of achieving those ends. 
Only when military power is reconciled with moral clarity can ends and means unite in a 
winning outcome. The democratisation of the Middle East required both preventive war 
and supporting authoritative regimes, both means were contradictory to the end result of 
democratisation.
197
  
 
The spread of democratic institutions around the world in the twentieth century had 
benefited US security and freedom, Feith asserts. The US knew it was proven that war 
between democratic states is highly unlikely.
198
 President Bush urged Iraq to adopt 
democracy. But Feith argues that that was as far as US interests could stretch in terms of 
the future governance of Iraq. According to Feith, US interests in a new Iraq were 
restricted to an Iraqi government that did not create the four problems of the previous 
regime: aggression towards neighbours, support for terrorism, killing its own citizens and 
WMD aspirations. Feith describes US interests as both national and humanitarian and all 
four covered core American interests in Iraq.
199
 
 
Feith argues that the Bush administration has been criticised for thinking it could easily 
export democracy to Iraq. But Feith asserts that that was never the thinking for a country 
that lacked a democratic past. He explains that it was always considered a difficult task 
since Iraq lacked the cultural and institutional building blocks to adopt democracy easily. 
Though it was recognised as a complex task it was deemed possible as the history of 
democratic progress suggested.
200
 Bob Woodward was told by President Bush that many 
positive things had occurred in Iraq. He said he understood that Iraq would be a difficult 
and time consuming issue, but asserted that he was optimistic of the outcome, ‗it‘s just a 
matter of time, it‘s a matter of society evolving. It‘s a matter of a sovereignty issue 
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evolving.‘ Bush said the liberation was ‗changing a mentality.‘ 201  The president was 
adamant in his belief in the necessity of promoting democracy. Bush believed the world 
had a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, as stable and free nations do not 
breed the ideologies of murder. Free people ‗encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better 
life.‘202 
 
4.3.2.4  A broader purpose: transforming a region 
On 15 September 2001 President Bush made it clear that the intention of his campaign had 
a larger implication to the broader international community. To him the Afghan campaign 
against al-Qaeda and its Taliban host was a message to other countries like Iran who had 
supported terrorism to change their behaviour.
203
 Bush‘s major attention was on the 
Persian Gulf, a targeted focus on Iraq, while keeping an eye on Iran as well. The US 
perceived Iraq as a ripe target in the Middle East.
204
 Iraq was to play the role Poland had 
achieved in changing Eastern Europe in 1989, but this time in reforming the Middle 
East.
205
 President Bush made it clear to his war cabinet that the Middle East had to be 
reformed. In a NSC meeting on 17 September 2001 he stressed that the defeat of the 
Taliban transmitted a vital message to rogue states:  
Let‘s hit them hard. We want to signal this is a change from the past. We want 
to cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their views. We want to 
hit as soon as possible.
206
 
President Bush admired how Harry Truman had made the most of the political capital he 
had attained after America‘s World War II victory and believed he too had to make the 
most of his newly found political capital after the US Afghan victory.
207
 The president had 
made it clear that with his new war on terror a new era was about to be born. He told a 
group of business leaders in New York that he truly believed that out of the war on terror 
will come ‗more order in the world‘ and ‗real progress to peace in the Middle East, 
stability with oil-producing regions.‘208 Cheney knew Bush truly believed in the 
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transformation of the Middle East, and knew that the president had faith that Iraq would be 
the stepping stone towards the promotion of freedom and democracy in the region.
209
 On 
14 April 2003 Cheney said ‗Democracy in the Middle East is just a big deal for him. It‘s 
what‘s driving him.‘210 
 
Bush wanted to change the US foreign policy mindset, so he used his second inaugural 
speech to address this issue. He wanted his speech to reflect his ambitions for the spread of 
liberty as a requisite for the defence of the future of America and its security. It was 
intended to be the most dramatic shift since the beginning of the Cold War in the late 
forties with policies such as containment and deterrence.
211
 The Greater Middle East had 
emerged as Bush‘s major foreign policy preoccupation with a solid scheme titled the 
GMEI (Greater Middle East Initiative) in 2004, endorsed in his January 2005 State of the 
Union speech. This geopolitical theatre included the entire Middle East, North Africa, 
Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
212
  
 
The motivation behind the use of American power to get rid of Saddam, in an important 
Middle East state was a desire to use regime change in Iraq as a catalyst to shake up the 
politics and economics in the entire Middle East. Pillar argues that this was also very much 
a neoconservative objective.
213
 Iran was considered as the obstacle and entrance to 
dramatic reform in the Middle East. However, Iraq had to be dealt with first. Rice stated 
that Iran presented major setbacks to US interests in the region. It was destabilising US 
allies in the region, it supported terrorism, and was advancing its military capabilities, it 
was a major menace in the Middle East hindering US interests, a region of great value to 
the US and their key ally Israel.
214
   
 
Rice believed as a result of the US invasion of Iraq, the old authoritarian structure of the 
Middle East had been challenged and destroyed. A new order would emerge. It was the 
beginning of change for the region. However, this would require time, in the same way that 
both world wars had changed the geopolitical structure of Europe.
215
 The Bush 
administration believed that for sixty years the US had pursued stability at the expense of 
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democracy in the Middle East, but had ‗achieved neither.‘ This was stated unequivocally 
by Rice in Cairo in 2005, she continued: ‗Now, we are taking a different course. We are 
supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.‘ 216  In a speech to the American 
Enterprise Institute in February 2003, Bush argued for a democratic transformation of Iraq 
that would eventually promote the political liberalisation of the Middle East. A free and 
liberated Iraq, according to his administration‘s calculations, would serve as a model that 
would motivate and inspire people of the region to good governance.  
A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of 
freedom for other nations in the region. It is presumptuous and insulting to 
suggest that a whole region of the world or the one-fifth of humanity that is 
Muslim is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life.
217
             
The democratic crusade of the Bush administration was a clear triumph for many 
neoconservatives inside and outside the administration. They believed that democratic 
governance would favour US interests in the long run. However, realists outside the 
administration such as Scowcroft believed it was in the US interest, and a requisite of US 
foreign policy, to maintain friendly relations with authoritarian regimes that provided 
regional stability.
218
  
 
In its 20 September 2001 letter to Bush, the Project for the New American Century 
stipulated that US policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for 9/11, but 
must also target those ‗other groups out there that mean us no good.‘219 There was a clear 
meeting of minds between the president, many of the Principals and the neoconservatives 
which made the venture possible. Robert Kagan and William Kristol asserted that the 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power will determine the ‗contours of the emerging 
world order, perhaps for decades to come.‘ They envisaged two possible scenarios, one 
with, the other without Saddam. The world order without Saddam would be one in line 
with liberal democratic principles and US security. The alternative, however, a world order 
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where ‗tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international security hostage.‘220  In 
their book, The War Over Iraq, William Kristol of The Weekly Standard and Lawrence 
Kaplan of The New Republic asserted that the war was ‗so clearly about more than 
Iraq…more even than the future of the Middle East.‘ It would allow ‗what sort of role the 
United States intends to play in the world in the twenty-first century.‘221 The Iraq war, Jay 
Bookman argues, was to mark the emergence of a fully-fledged global empire.
222
    
 
American Journalist Jay Bookman explains that the invasion of Iraq would allow the 
creation of permanent military bases to dominate the region. The 2002 NSS asserted ‗The 
United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and 
Northeast Asia.‘ 223   However, James Longley asserted that the United States did not 
necessarily want permanent bases, but what it wanted was to maintain stability.
 224
  
 
America‘s main concern was Iran which influenced US decisions towards Iraq, as Iran was 
perceived as a highly significant threat to the area and the West.
225
 Some in the 
administration believed that, once the Iraqi regime was toppled, Iraqi Shiites would 
become US allies, especially with the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf situated in Iraq they 
would be able to undermine Iran.
226
 Rubin explained that the neoconservatives were more 
sympathetic towards the Iraqi Shiite as the majority of the country. In this context there 
was a greater tendency among the neoconservatives to argue that not all Shiite are the same, 
and that the Iraqi Shiite and the Iranian government should not be seen as necessarily 
sympathetic to the same ideals.
227
  
 
Kaplan and Kristol describe three potential advantages of democracy in Iraq. A liberal Iraq 
would exert further pressure on Iran‘s leaders to open up. Iraq could replace Saudi Arabia 
as the key US ally, and finally it would encourage other liberalising regimes in the region 
to advance on their path towards democracy.
228
 The US believed it should use its 
unparalleled power to make strategic moves and fundamental alterations rather than small 
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play. Their vision, as Rice described it, was one for an impact comparable to that of post 
World War II in 1947 when it started to lead the free world.
229
 
 
4.3.2.5  Oil  
Iraq sat on one third to one half of all oil reserves in the Middle East, so it was hugely 
important to American interests that Iraq be stabilised.
230
 A definite motivation for an 
interventionist foreign policy is material interests, and one that is relevant to US Middle 
East is oil.
231
 Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs in the 
Clinton administration, identifies the free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the Persian 
Gulf oil as a major US strategic objective of the United States in the Middle East.
232
 It 
could be argued validly that despite recent developments in the Middle East, US goals in 
the region have been surprisingly clear and consistent. Oil has remained one of its three 
pillars. The others are Israel‘s security and intense opposition to the emergence of any 
other regional hegemon.
233
 Hence, a US strategic objective in Iraq was to secure oil.
234
 A 
major US consideration in the Middle East is regional control of oil reserves, its pricing 
and supply routes of the nearby Persian Gulf.
235
 As Michael Cox argues the Iraq war would 
‗allow the world to enjoy lower oil prices.‘236 Jason Gluck of the US Institute for Peace 
stressed that oil was a critical element but not in any way related to the US stealing Iraq‘s 
oil. A democratic regime would through necessity pump oil out on to the world markets for 
its own benefit, increasing world oil supplies. Secondly, Iraq would possibly use American 
oil companies to develop its existing oil fields and vast untapped oil reserves.
237
  
 
Marcy Katpur, who is US House Member for Ohio (Democrat), argued in Congress that 
‗the driving force of this potential war on Iraq is oil.‘238 The toppling of Saddam would 
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indeed guarantee a secure output of oil in the hands of a pro-western regime in Baghdad.
239
 
However, as Lawrence Freedman argues, the oil issue, though not trivial, was a secondary 
consideration in US policy making. The US believed that Iraqi oil would pay for the 
reconstruction of the country.
240
 Paul Wolfowitz in a Congressional hearing a month 
before the war stated ‗there is a lot of money there. To assume that we are going to pay for 
it is just wrong.‘241 Pillar explained that many in the Bush administration thought that, 
because of its oil wealth, Iraq would pay for itself.
242
 Additionally, it would also 
potentially replace US dependency on Saudi oil.
243
       
 
4.3.2.6  Personal grievance: the assassination attempt on George H. W. Bush   
Part of Bush‘s attempt at running for the presidency seems to have been his wish to put the 
Bush name back into the White House. Perhaps a sense of injustice existed in his psyche 
because his father had not been elected for a second term in office. In Bush‘s encounter in 
1997 with Prince Bandar, Saudi Ambassador to Washington, it seemed to the Prince that 
the ‗younger George Bush wanted to avenge his father‘s loss to Clinton‘, Bandar saw that 
the son was trying to say ‗I want to go after this guy and show who is better.‘244 To them, 
President Clinton lacked the experience and integrity to fulfil this role. Clinton was a 
Vietnam War draft evader, while Bush senior was a Second World War hero in their minds. 
The same determination to seek justice seems to have repeated itself before the Iraq 
invasion; this time, however, for Saddam‘s attempt to assassinate his father. During a fund-
raiser speech for a Republican Senate candidate in September 2002, Bush cited a number 
of reasons, in addition to alleged terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction about why 
Saddam was so dangerous to the US, noting, in particular that, ‗after all, this is the guy 
who tried to kill my dad.‘245 In his speech to the UN in 2002 he stated ‗in 1993, Iraq 
attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American president.‘246 Also 
during a visit to the White House by eleven House members on 19 September 2002, when 
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advised to mention Saddam‘s gassing of his own people by Richard Burr a North Carolina 
Republican, he responded ‗I am well aware, he tried to kill my dad.‘247 Bush junior‘s 
family connection to Bush senior and his targeting by Iraqi interests were not lost on his 
son.
248
 The assassination attempt by Iraqi agents seems to have shaken the Bush household. 
It was an event vividly remembered in the family creating in them a personal detestation of 
Saddam Hussein and his regime.             
 
4.3.3  The Primary Reason: The Core 
4.3.3.1  The war that never ended  
There was an prevailing sentiment in Washington that the First Gulf War had not ended. 
Iraq was perceived by many as unfinished business and a remaining US national security 
concern. Elevating this concern was US officials who were convinced that Saddam would 
terminate the sanctions sooner or later if left in power. This would allow Iraq‘s resumption 
of its weapons programmes. A regime with such a history would eventually resume its 
aggressive actions and once again oblige the US to engage militarily. Feith argues that a 
probable second attack on Kuwait would have invited US involvement albeit this time with 
a more dangerous and hostile Iraq.
249
  
 
The Bush administration was also worried that the inspectors would go back and find 
nothing, subsequently the international community would ask for a lifting of the sanctions. 
Rice made this clear in a meeting with senior Congress members at the White House.
250
 
After the invasion the Head of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer described in his 
report the sanctions as considerably weakened and concluded that Saddam was actively 
designing a missile programme in 2000 and 2001 the components of which could be 
procured outside the sanctions regime.
251
 A senior Congressional staffer, stated that by the 
end of 2002 Iraq no longer had any limits on its oil production under the OFF programme. 
This was also a source of concern as Iraq could keep larger sums of its oil revenue.
252
 The 
strongest argument for the war was that Saddam was getting out of his cage. Better to fight 
him when weak rather than strong.
253
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Even if Saddam were to give everything up but stayed in power, the administration was 
convinced that as soon as the world was preoccupied with other issues, Saddam would be 
back again rebuilding his biological and chemical capabilities, and reconstituting his 
nuclear programme. Cheney had explained that the problem was, as before, that Saddam 
would still be in power.
254
 Ari Fleischer described the mental mood of the administration. 
If Saddam admitted he had weapons of mass destruction, then ‗he is violating United 
Nations resolutions‘ and had ‗deceived the world.‘ If he said he had none, then he ‗is once 
again misleading the world.‘255  
 
The anonymous National Security Council official interviewed for this research stated 
there was a big difference between how the war was sold and the ‗real reasons‘ the US 
went in. The United Stated believed the sanctions and the No-fly zones weren‘t working. 
So the US felt they had to make a policy change. According to the NSC staffer the US war 
with Iraq had never technically ended. US planes were targeted by Iraqi defences and this 
was perceived as an ‗act of war.‘256 James Longley argued that it was a major failure of US 
action in respect to the Iraq invasion not explaining ‗why we really did what we did.‘257 
 
The purpose of the US invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein‘s government was 
based on the threat that Saddam posed to United States forces and the difficulty of 
sustaining that force level indefinitely in the Persian Gulf. Longley stressed that within a 
short time after the fall of Baghdad, the US removed most the forces it had based in Saudi 
Arabia when Kuwait was invaded. This made an immediate change to America‘s strategic 
posture in the region. The US did not want to maintain large numbers of troops in the 
region simply to check Saddam‘s behaviour.258  
 
Longley argues the primary reason the US went to war was the strategic aftermath of the 
First Gulf War. America had lost patience. Saddam had failed to moderate his government 
and continued to pose a threat to the Middle East requiring vast expenditures of men and 
material from the US.
259
 The invasion of Iraq was to a large extent related to Operation 
Southern Watch, first imposed in 1991, in part to protect the Iraqi Shiite population and to 
make possible the US containment strategy. Contingents of the US Air Force based in 
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Saudi Arabia were conducting the patrols of the southern No-fly zone. Certain policy 
makers, the vice president in particular, believed that was why al-Qaeda was attacking the 
US.
 260
 There was an understanding that Bin Laden had instigated action against the US 
and because Saddam‘s actions had drawn the US into a lengthy commitment in Saudi 
Arabia.
261
 Administration officials thought if America withdrew from Saudi Arabia it 
would deny al-Qaeda one of its primary reasons to attack the US, but in order to do this it 
would have to get rid of Southern Watch but to do that it had to get rid of Saddam first.
262
  
 
According to Longley, the ‗real reason‘ the US went to war in Iraq was primarily due to 
the history of the First Gulf War, the ceasefire, and Iraq‘s failure to comply with the terms 
of this ceasefire.
263
 After 9/11 there was a feeling of frustration with Saddam Hussein that 
the US was constantly dealing with the same issues since 1991. US military commitments 
in the region were large and had to be continually modified in response to Saddam‘s 
constant acts of noncompliance.  This required significant expense in terms of personnel, 
money and equipment. The US had invested heavily to enforce the No-fly zones to keep 
Saddam at bay.
264
 Longley described it as a ‗cat and mouse game.‘265 
 
The end of the Gulf War was a ceasefire, not a surrender, with conditions stipulating what 
Saddam could and could not do.
 266
 Frederick Kagan stressed that the Iraq invasion was 
undertaken on the basis of UNSCR resolutions that had been passed in the 1990s that had 
ended the First Gulf War. In Frederick Kagan‘s view the invasion of Iraq took place under 
the auspices of the UNSC resolutions. Kagan clarified that it was important to keep in 
mind that there was no formal peace agreement that ended the First Gulf War. The First 
Gulf War had ended in a ceasefire - it was a ‗conditional ceasefire.‘ The conditions were 
that Iraq submit to the unfettered inspection regime of the IAEA and UNSCOM. In 
Kagan‘s opinion Saddam had very self-evidently failed to adhere to that condition which, 
from the standpoint of the US and international law, rendered the ceasefire void. And 
considering that the ceasefire was void, the original UN resolutions that authorised all 
necessary means to impose these inspections on Iraq came back into play in Kagan‘s words. 
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From Kagan‘s view that was the ‗international legal basis‘ for the invasion.267 Wilkerson, 
was willing to state that ‗Iraq was a different matter‘ and that ‗there was really no stop to 
the First Gulf War‘ and that it was ‗only a ceasefire.‘ Wilkerson emphasised that a case 
could be made in International Law that it was a continuation of US foreign policy.
268
    
 
According to Kagan, the Bush administration‘s Iraq policy was a continuation of a policy 
that the Clinton administration had also articulated. It was to prevent Saddam Hussein from 
acquiring WMD and escape the international inspection verification regime that Saddam 
had signed up to, and a US willingness to use force to enforce this. Clinton had fired 
rockets in 1998 at Iraq and maintained the No-fly zones. In terms of the use of force this 
was a continuation of that policy. Kagan stressed that there was no departure in US Iraq 
policy and that there was a ‗tremendous amount of policy continuity.‘ After 9/11 the Bush 
administration decided that the threat posed by an Iraq potentially in possession of WMDs 
was greater than had been previously imagined. The policy before the invasion had 
continued to be regime change. This remained a constant desire of the Clinton 
administration, as it was for Bush senior‘s administration. Kagan asserted it was ‗only a 
change in the method by which that strategy was going to be implemented.‘269 Regime 
change in Iraq was consistent in US policy but was given greater urgency because of the 
impact of 9/11 on the US mindset. The attacks on 9/11 had ‗only amplified the sense of 
threat‘ Rubin explained.270     
 
The decision to invade Iraq, motivated by different reasons and purposes and attributed to 
different motivations and ideological factions within the administration, eventually led to 
the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003. Saddam‘s regime fell in spectacularly speedy 
fashion in three weeks, testimony to US military supremacy and its unrivalled 
technological advancements. However, what technological advancements could not 
achieve nor address was the Phase IV post-hostilities period which is the backbone to 
success of any military venture involving the occupation of a foreign country. The 
following chapter attempts to address US Iraq policy in post-Saddam Iraq, the mistakes, 
changes of course and adjustments in US strategy in pursuit of US strategic goals for the 
new Iraq under the George W. Bush administration.        
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Chapter 5: 
 
THE WAR IN IRAQ:  
A PLANNED WAR, AN UNPLANNED OCCUPATION 
 
Washington isn‘t all that thought out. So much of it is improvisation. Too 
much rationality and planning can be attributed to it. Much of it is trying 
something, taking a pratfall, and then looking either bad or good when you do.  
 
Fred Dutton, former advisor to John F. Kennedy.
1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to review the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. Taking 
an analytical look at the various phases of US Iraq policy under the Bush administration 
after major combat operations ended and providing an in-depth insight into Phase IV of 
post-conflict US operations in Iraq. The events included in this chapter give a 
comprehensive overview of how US policy evolved in Iraq after Saddam was toppled, 
adapting to changing internal and external circumstances. The chapter addresses the 
numerous mistakes perpetrated by the Bush administration during this period and the 
phases of transition of US influence in Iraq up to the conclusion of the George W. Bush 
administration. It addresses the US occupation of Iraq under ORHA and the CPA leading 
through to the interim government, describing US policy in the transitional government of 
Iraq and ending with the permanently elected Iraqi government. Iraq witnessed rapid 
changes after Saddam Hussein was overthrown, eventually substituted for a gradual return 
of sovereignty which this chapter attempts to highlight. 
 
5.1  A DYSFUNCTIONAL ADMINISTRATION  
The military operation to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime can be regarded as a 
success in strictly military terms. Iraq, a country of considerable size, fell to coalition 
forces in only twenty-one days. However, it was the aftermath that brought insecurity to 
the Iraqi people and the coalition. The differing opinions that dominated the actual purpose 
for the invasion were a major reason for this. It is fair to assert that different people had 
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different agendas, leading to varying directions in managing the post-hostilities phase in 
Iraq.   
 
Douglas Feith asserts that senior members of the Bush administration from the CIA and 
State Department were reluctant members of the Bush team. They disagreed with the 
policy decisions being made by the president, but also made no effort to challenge these 
policies openly in interagency discussions.
2
 Richard Armitage believed that the foreign 
policy-making process that was supposed to be coordinated by Rice was not done 
effectively.
3
 Rice had failed to bridge the gaps efficiently during her role as National 
Security Advisor (NSA). Rice was surrounded by very strong and assertive Principals, who 
had once even considered running for the presidency. This had made her job difficult. She 
was the first female NSA to take on this difficult role. One of the most damaging aspects of 
this dysfunction was the hostility and tension between the Pentagon and the Department of 
State, which could be considered as one of the major blows to the efforts in rebuilding Iraq. 
For example, the ‗Future of Iraq Project‘, a 1000 page document of questionable value 
prepared by the State Department, was neglected by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, 
Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the 
first civilian administrator of Iraq, as a result of friction with the Pentagon.
4
 Donald 
Rumsfeld contributed to this friction considerably. From the point of taking up the office 
of Secretary of Defense he was a forceful and strong character. His sense of purpose made 
him highly influential in designing and restricting US military operations for the invasion 
of Iraq and its aftermath. Rumsfeld had expressed discontent with the influence the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had had in his early days as Secretary. He insisted they were not part of the 
chain of command and seemed adamant to reinvigorate the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
Rumsfeld told the Pentagon ‗I‘m the Secretary of Defense…I‘m in the chain of command‘ 
a month after he took office when the first attacks under the Bush administration against 
Iraqi targets were undertaken to enforce the No-fly zones in February 2001.
5
  
 
Feith argues that State and CIA officials constantly delayed and opposed cooperation with 
the Iraqi exiles on all political, intelligence and military matters. Consequently, the US had 
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to run and control Iraq after the toppling of the Baath regime.
6
 The CIA and State 
Department were hostile to any involvement of the Iraqi opposition in the preparation 
stages of the war. Richard Armitage rejected any possibility of an interim government 
before or immediately after the invasion. These attitudes prevented any effective post-war 
planning in the pre-stages of the war.
7
 The root of the tension between the various agencies 
of the government was in the supposition made by the State Department and CIA that there 
would be a rift between Iraqi internals and externals (oppositionists) post-Saddam. This, 
according to Feith, prevented the administration from working sufficiently with the Iraqi 
externals before the war and to quickly transfer authority to the Iraqis immediately after the 
overthrow of the Baath regime.
8
 State Department and CIA officials constantly emphasised 
that the external Iraqi leadership lacked legitimacy and consequently had very little 
political support in Iraq. Feith argues that the idea of ‗externals‘ versus ‗internals‘ was 
crucial to the State Department‘s, CIA and CENTCOM‘s thinking on post-Saddam Iraq. 
The prime reason behind this was the State Department and CIA‘s animosity towards 
Chalabi and, secondly, the ruling regional Sunni elites‘ influence in shaping this idea. All 
of them were Sunni ruled and non-democratic, and feared the prospects of a democratically 
governed Shiite Iraq.
9
  
 
In a Deputies Lunch meeting on 25 July 2002 Richard Armitage distributed two papers 
prepared by the State Department. The first argued against occupation. The second argued 
for a prolonged US occupation, as the Department‘s view was that the Afghanistan Bonn 
model (loya jirga) was inappropriate to Iraq. The justification was that the externals in the 
Bonn process had more weight than in Iraq‘s case. Meanwhile in Iraq the internals held 
more legitimacy than the externals.
10
 In the second document the State Department 
emphasised that a ‗multi-year transitional period to build democratic institutions‘ was 
necessary so as not to alienate internal constituencies and to lead Iraq to ‗develop credible, 
democratic Iraqi leadership.‘11 The neoconservatives, however, opposed the occupation of 
Iraq. They argued for a constitution and bill of rights ahead of time.
12
 Neoconservatives 
like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and Michael Rubin wanted to avoid an 
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occupation. It is likely that the installation of Ahmed Chalabi as head of an interim 
government was their desire.  
 
Additionally, after the war, the US failed to sustain a unity of effort. The idea behind the 
CPA was to create a unity of effort and leadership in Iraq: in practice that was not the case 
- CENTCOM and the CPA both pursued different agendas. CENTCOM reported to 
Rumsfeld, and Paul Bremer‘s CPA on paper had the same obligation, but did not do so. As 
a result there was no unity of leadership and subsequently no unity of effort between the 
CENTCOM and the CPA.
13
 Moreover, interagency disputes in Washington denied the 
reconstruction programme the efforts it required.
14
 
 
Rubin, who worked for the Office of Special Plans (OSP) from the summer of 2002 until 
the summer of 2003, explained that until right before commencement of kinetic action 
there was no agreement within the NSC and interagency process about whether or not the 
US would occupy and control Iraq or hand over control of Iraq to a provisional 
government, i.e. the chosen group of the seven Iraqi opposition leaders mentioned in the 
Iraq Liberation Act. The indecision by Rice and Stephen Hadley (Deputy NSA) over the  
resolution of the issue as to whether the US would have more influence with boots on the 
ground or without boots on the ground, hampered the ability of planning the long-term 
future of Iraq.
15
 
 
The other major problem was the absence of clear goals for Iraq after Saddam. General 
Garner summed up the core reason of the crisis as the lack of a ‗comprehensive strategy 
other than a democracy.‘16 A former member of the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi 
Ambassador to the United States, Samir Sumaidaie, echoed this view, ‗there was never a 
clear statement of objectives apart from the general terms of bringing freedom for Iraq.‘17 
As for the Principals Jay Garner explained, ‗Bush wanted democracy, Rumsfeld, wanted to 
pull out, Cheney expected open arms.‘ As a result a strategy was never developed for post-
war Iraq that all the agencies understood: the administration, CENTCOM, and all agencies 
had separate plans of their own.
18
 Peter Galbraith, former senior Congressional staff 
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member and close observer of events in Iraq, described the Bush administration as ‗ill 
disciplined‘, thus making it difficult to attribute to it any kind of coherent policy. Galbraith 
said it could better be described more accurately as individual policies of the Defense 
Department, the State Department and the NSC ‗rather than Bush policy.‘19 
 
Conrad Crane, an Army War College professor, had co-authored a study before the 
invasion which stipulated that thinking about the war now and the occupation later was 
unacceptable.
20
 However, Bush administration officials did just that.
21
 A major problem 
was the president himself, as he lacked curiosity and failed to give his objectives the 
necessary scrutiny they deserved. Adam Garfinkle pointed out that Bush wanted to be like 
Reagan, wanting to get the big picture right, believing that the details would take care of 
themselves as long as the big ideas were right.
22
 Lawrence Wilkerson stressed that 
President Bush ‗doesn‘t do details‘ and let advisors do everything else. His additional 
handicap was his little foreign policy experience, which was comparable to former 
presidents such as Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover.
23
  
 
Wilkerson argued that Rumsfeld wanted to transform the military, but saw the Iraq conflict 
as an interruption, and that was why he was in favour of a short tenure in Iraq. Rumsfeld 
wanted 100-120 days maximum presence in Iraq, installing Chalabi and then leaving. 
According to Wilkerson Rumsfeld only became an advocate for Pentagon influence in Iraq 
as he realised how inadequate and minor the Pentagon‘s influence was in Afghanistan, 
since it had been primarily a CIA operation.
24
 Rumsfeld wanted to leave Iraq after several 
months, then get back to the transformation of the military, having no desire to engage US 
forces in Iraq in the long term.
25
 Rumsfeld wanted to use the military for war and opposed 
any other task being assigned to it. Ambassador Philip Wilcox described the operation as 
‗go in, remove Saddam, and leave; therefore there was no plan.‘ Consequently, there were 
no preparations for post-conflict stabilisation. According to Wilcox, the State Department 
asserted that the US must stay and rebuild Iraq, but this was rebuffed by the Pentagon. It 
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was only with the US arrival that the administration realised it was trapped in a mess, with 
Garner‘s thinly-staffed team making matters worse.26  
 
Jay Garner added, ‗the problems with the plans was they were developed rapidly.‘ 
Essentially there was not a lot of time to create effective plans.
27
 Garner was not happy 
with the completeness of the plans since he did not have sufficient information on Iraq. 
Garner argued that ‗the plans we had for post-war Germany we developed in 1942 for a 
1945 problem, but plans for Iraq started in late 2002 for an early 2003 problem.‘ In 
Garner‘s opinion there was not enough time and intelligence to make complete plans.28  
Colonel Paul Hughes of ORHA and later the CPA stressed that post-war planning should 
have begun with the war plan. During World War II George Marshall established an office 
in January 1942 less than 45 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, in the then War 
Department, for the occupation of Germany and Japan. Hughes complained about the lack 
of time ‗to pull it together.‘  Hughes stated: ‗Marshall had two and half years to get it right! 
I had 59 days with ORHA, and then suddenly I was on the ground in Kuwait.‘ The same 
situation applied to the Joint Staff and CENTCOM efforts: they too began too late. Hughes 
stressed ‗this is not something that you can think about as an afterthought.‘29 According to 
Hughes even Tom Warrick‘s Future of Iraq Project (mentioned earlier) was not structured: 
‗it is a good doctoral dissertation, it‘s not a plan that is actionable.‘ The Departments of 
State and Defense, according to Hughes, if asked, would have said ‗we don‘t have the 
resources or expertise.‘ The State Department was overwhelmed with the tasks, and 
Rumsfeld had a contract attitude.
30
  
 
5.2  MISTAKES MADE IN IRAQ 
5.2.1  Unilateralism 
US unilateralism had already increased with the end of the Cold War. Secretary Powell, 
however, was not comfortable with US unilateral tendencies for executing the Iraq war, but 
thought Cheney and Rumsfeld‘s position in the war machine made war a likely resort.31 
The lack of faith in the United Nations was a major element of this unilateral trend, with 
Richard Cheney arguing that the president should tell the UN in his annual General 
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Assembly speech ‗Go tell them it‘s not about us. It‘s about you. You are not important.‘32 
Nevertheless, the Bush administration was wary of going it totally alone on Iraq. It was 
their intention to support British Prime Minister Tony Blair to get a second UN Security 
Council resolution. Stephen Hadley was worried about what he called the ‗Imperial 
Option.‘33 
 
However, after the damage inflicted on US diplomacy what Niall Ferguson describes as a 
‗legitimacy deficit‘, in his June 2003 trip to Europe after the invasion, President Bush 
expressed a change of attitude on international issues - a clear shift in his approach to US 
foreign policy. He showed greater interest in multilateral institutions and international 
consensus. The Iraq invasion had most likely proved that superior military power itself was 
not enough to achieve the aspirations of a superpower. Bush started putting greater trust in 
the IAEA and European allies for a resolution to Iran‘s nuclear capabilities. On North 
Korea, he asked for a regional approach to confront the ongoing nuclear threat.
34
 The UN 
involvement in Iraq with the Brahimi mission to select the new interim government was a 
major shift in US cooperation with the UN. It came as part of the revised US policy on Iraq 
and the Middle East.
35
 
 
5.2.2  Lack of Understanding 
Colin Powell tried to convey his message to the president about the aftermath of the Iraq 
invasion and its occupation. He explained that the Iraqis had a very complex history; in 
particular that they have never had a democracy.
36
 The National Intelligence Council of the 
CIA cautioned that building a democracy in Iraq would be difficult, due to its authoritarian 
history, with the only way that the US could secure success was through three major 
channels: firstly, providing security to the Iraqi people; secondly, on the degree of progress 
in transferring power to Iraqis; and finally on the levels of reconstruction and of prosperity 
achieved.
37
 Zalmay Khalilzad explained that during the post 9/11 world of policy, a lot of 
people around the president were very intelligent, but were not trained and did not have 
significant experience in dealing with the broader Middle East and with the challenges of 
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the Islamic world. Many of the people in senior administration had been focused on the 
Soviet Union. But as the centre of gravity of problems shifted southward to the broader 
Middle East this according to Khailzad was a ‗constraint that we faced, but you have to go 
forward with the team that you have.‘ The limitation was the availability of a lot of Soviet 
experts, European experts, and not very many people who knew Iraq or the Middle East. 
Khalilzad stressed ‗the sense of place, you know how a place feels – a strategist who 
doesn‘t have the innate sense about the area he‘s working on is going to get us in trouble. 
The US Government doesn‘t have enough people at the top who have that special sense 
about Iraq and the Middle East on their fingertips.‘ During the period immediately after 
9/11, the US lacked expertise and regional proficiency, skills that require a long time to 
train in appreciating a society, understanding its complexity, and learning its languages.
38
 
Ghassan Salame, political advisor to the UN Iraq mission, argues that the problem was not 
in Baghdad, but rather in Washington. It was a war decided, fought and won by a new 
breed of Americans – a group of ideologues who were different from the traditional brand 
of officials dealing with the Middle East over the past fifty years.
39
  
 
John Stuart Mill was right to argue more than a century ago: ‗If democracy is imposed on a 
country where there is insufficient indigenous support to achieve it, the strong likelihood is 
that it will collapse again into tyranny.‘40 The US failed to recognise that in a country with 
such a poor popular democratic tradition that it would be a long and tedious process. The 
Bush administration failed to recognise that democratic nation-building requires instilled 
legitimacy from domestic grassroots support.
41
 The Bush administration consciously failed 
to provide the US occupation authorities with regional experts. Tim Carney, a former 
ambassador, argued the State Department‘s professional Arabists ‗weren‘t welcome 
because they didn‘t think Iraq could be democratic.‘42 The Iraqi Ambassador stressed that 
the decisions and actions should have taken the realities on the ground into account. As a 
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result of not doing so many opportunities were missed. He added: ‗The Iraqis paid a heavy 
price. The Americans paid a price in their losses.‘43 
 
Additionally hampering the venture as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
(WINEP) had, in a three-day seminar before the invasion, advised the US agencies that 
there was a clear discrepancy and gap between the US rhetoric and its lack of 
commitment.
44
 Alina Romanowski from the National Defense University argued at the 
WINEP seminar that democracy in Iraq would be difficult to adopt. She argued that Iraq 
had never had any form of centralised rule that enjoyed democratic legitimacy. 
Romanowski argued that the US force required to bring down the regime might not be 
sufficient to keep up with US aspirations for that country.
45
 The naïve idealistic and 
ideological analysis and prospects conducted from policy making offices in Washington 
and London bore little resemblance to the facts and realities on the ground.
46
 Iraq was 
tribal, communal and very locally focused, very much an agrarian farming country, where, 
as all over the world, farmers tend to be parochial and suspicious of strangers. Most Iraqis 
lived and died in the communities they were born in and gave their loyalty to kin and 
tribe.
47
 Following the Iraq venture, according to Ariel Cohen, the US continued its 
mistakes, pressuring Egypt to hold elections, where 80% was taken by the Muslim 
Brethren, and then Palestine elections in January 2006. The same mistakes were made by 
the State Department under Rice. Cohen stressed that the US does not ‗understand the 
realities of the people of the region, and lack[s] knowledge of the Middle East; they are 
tribal and religious people, culturally very different than the modern and post-modern 
American, European citizens of industrial and post-industrial societies.‘48  
 
The US also at times used excessive force, which reflected negatively on its overall 
strategy to secure and rebuild Iraq. On many occasions this led to Iraqi distrust and a 
feeling of inferiority. It has even been recalled that an army commander went as far as to 
say ‗the only thing these sand niggers understand is force and I‘m about to introduce it to 
them.‘ 49  From 2003-2006 US military strategy was focused predominantly on force 
protection, attacking the enemy and treating the Iraqi civilian populace as the playing field 
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on which this violence occurred.
50
 The tactic pursued was one of a ‗kill and capture‘ 
mindset.
51
 US tactics failed to realise the actual end result target was to win ‗hearts and 
minds.‘ Acting responsibly would inevitably have led to a strategic victory, namely the 
political support of the Iraq populace.
52
 When Bremer sought to expand the political 
spectrum by delaying the handing over of sovereignty, Iraqi exiles disapproved of the 
approach. Ahmed Chalabi told Bremer ‗by slowing down this political process, you risk 
giving the impression that America intends to stay a long time in Iraq. That is not a good 
signal.‘ The chaotic aftermath in Iraq was not because the US did not have a plan, but 
rather because they adhered to the wrong plan.
53
 Sumaidaie, stressed the problem was 
entrenched in poor and inadequate planning and a lack of understanding of the realities on 
Iraq, in addition to the gap between different US agencies. 
54
 When Garfinkle entered the 
State Department in July 2003, people in the State Department were trying to understand 
what was going on in Iraq, as no one had much knowledge of Iraq since there had been no 
embassy in Iraq since 1990. Garfinkle suggested to Secretary of State Colin Powell that he 
could create a ‗Green Cell‘ of outside experts who knew about Iraq which he approved. It 
was only then that the State Department could prepare specific assessment reports to 
Secretary Powell and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on issues related to Iraq.
55
   
 
5.2.3  The Iraqi Opposition 
The Iraqi opposition essentially was the group designated as the democratic Iraqi 
opposition stipulated in the Iraq Liberation Act. Ian Shapiro explains that one rule of 
thumb is to be suspicious of expatriate groups claiming legitimate opposition unless there 
is demonstrable evidence to indigenous opposition with widespread support.
56
  
 
As a result Carole O‗Leary stressed the American transformers were not prepared for the 
Iraq they found: they were prepared for the Iraq Ahmed Chalabi told them would be 
there.
57
 O‘Leary explained that the Iraqi opposition figures like Ahmed Chalabi ‗told us 
what we want to hear. They never told us what Iraq was really like.‘ Iraq, under Saddam, 
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was an incredibly brutalised place, as the US came to find out.
58
 O‘Leary stressed ‗there 
were counter forces like myself who did not believe that Iraq was fully secular and 
detribalised, or that Iraqis will quickly embrace Israel and the West when freed of the 
Saddam regime.‘59 In response to the WMD controversy, Chalabi told London‘s The Daily 
Telegraph in February 2004, ‗We are heroes in error. As far as we‘re concerned, we‘ve 
been entirely successful. That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad. 
What was said before is not important. The Bush administration is looking for a 
scapegoat.‘  
 
5.2.4  WMD 
During an 8 February 2004 interview, President Bush acknowledged that weapons were 
not found: ‗I expected there to be stockpiles of weapons…we thought he had weapons.‘60 
The CIA had dramatically failed in intelligence gathering. It failed to identify a lack of 
WMD; more significantly it underestimated the significance and importance of the 
paramilitary Fidayeen and also the existence of tons of weapons scattered all around the 
country in caches.
61
   
 
As explained in the previous chapter, WMD was the common denominator among US 
agencies and used as public justification for war. This became a source of great 
embarrassment. It damaged the US cause and legitimacy domestically and internationally. 
In his final days as president, Bush stated ‗I don‘t know -- the biggest regret of all the 
presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq. A lot of people put their 
reputations on the line and said the weapons of mass destruction is a reason to remove 
Saddam Hussein. It wasn‘t just people in my administration; a lot of members in Congress, 
prior to my arrival in Washington D.C., during the debate on Iraq, a lot of leaders of 
nations around the world were all looking at the same intelligence. And, you know, that‘s 
not a do-over, but I wish the intelligence had been different, I guess.‘  
 
5.2.5  A Non-existent Appetite for Nation Building  
Bremer asserts that President Bush‘s message to him was that US involvement in Iraq was 
aiming beyond simple regime change and that ‗a New Iraq‘ had to be created, free from 
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brutality. President Bush believed that, regardless of the inherent difficulties, the US 
should put Iraq on the path of democracy after the Saddam threat had been removed. This 
had been the case with other US enemies in the twentieth century, where defeat followed 
by reconstruction had resulted in benefits to both sides.
62
 In a meeting with Iraqi exiles 
(Kanan Makiya, Hatem Mukhlis and Rend Franke) on 10 January 2003, President Bush 
wanted to understand Iraqi sentiments towards the invasion. He foresaw the likelihood that 
Iraq would be seriously damaged during the military operations; he averred that he was 
planning for the worst. However, he made it clear that the US would take full 
responsibility for these incurred damages and would not abandon Iraq – referring to his 
father‘s failures in protecting Iraqis in 1991. He referred to two US armies: one to fight the 
regime, and the other to rebuild the country.
63
 Before the Iraq war, and during the war 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Bush made it clear that US forces would be used to 
nation build.
64
 Even in his famous 1 May 2003 speech, Bush declared that a new phase in 
Iraq was beginning, a rebuilding phase, also emphasising that time and hard work would be 
required. He said:  
And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government 
of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy 
will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our 
work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.
65
 
However, rhetoric did not match reality. It was only as late as 3 September 2002 that 
Andrew Card gathered a group of senior staff which started off as the ‗White House Iraq 
Coordination Meeting‘, later known as the ‗White House Iraq Group‘, to effectively 
organise the war on Iraq.
66
 And only in September 2002 was the office of Special Plans 
created to deal specifically with Iraq. The Bush administration was concerned that Saddam 
might use WMD in his last efforts to confront the invasion. It was US policy to convince 
Saddam that he was politically astute and that he could outmanoeuvre the administration 
accordingly.
67
 This appears to have played a role in the US lack of assertive planning and 
preparation for the post-war period. This was a typical example of force-protection 
mentality. The other concern was coercive diplomacy. The US did not want to give the 
impression that war was inevitable.  
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Feith argues that during and after ‗Operation Iraqi Freedom‘ his office planned to avoid the 
military occupation of Iraq. An Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) proposal was approved by 
President Bush on 10 March 2003. Feith describes this as a ‗painful tale of a missed 
opportunity to empower an Iraqi authority.‘68 On 10 March 2003 Douglas Feith briefed the 
president at a National Security Council meeting on the IIA  concept of developing an Iraqi 
authority. The idea was to avoid direct and full control of Iraq post-Saddam. The rationale 
of this proposal was that if the US were to pursue an occupation authority it would be 
defined as military rule and subsequently fail to gain support from the Iraqis, the UN and 
the international community in general. Feith emphasised that it would create a power 
vacuum that would be exploited by Iran and other outside powers, as well as creating an 
unhealthy outlet for Iraqi nationalism.
69
 No US agency thought it would be good idea to 
occupy an Arab capital. Garfinkle explained that everyone realised there would be an 
intifada if you had Western troops in Iraq, for a long time. The Departments of State and 
Defense and the CIA did not want to occupy Iraq and thus sought no budget share for that 
purpose. Garfinkle stressed ‗a budget is the most political document in Washington‘ and if 
agencies do not have the necessary funds, they do not begin the process of planning.
70
   
 
Another significant point was that senior administration officials not only paid little 
attention to the possible difficulties in Iraq after the war, but they also did not want others 
to do so either ‗for fear that such attention might undermine the claim that a short, decisive 
victory could be achieved with remarkably few troops.‘71 Planning was disregarded by the 
Pentagon as it focused on the problems of the occupation. This was deemed harmful at a 
time when the decision to invade Iraq was not yet affirmed. Focus on such obstacles would 
have been an impediment to the war.
72
 Galbraith also argues that the Bush administration 
was so focused on making a case for war that they determined to undermine their political 
doubters at home. They were convinced that the Iraqis would embrace American-style 
democracy and were blinded by their ideology.
73
     
 
Although the rhetoric was to rebuild Iraq, Bush had already had an established anti-nation-
building mindset going back to his election campaign: ‗The problem comes with open-
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ended deployments and unclear military missions.‘ Bush wanted clearly defined military 
goals and the pressing question to be asked was ‗When do we leave?‘74 A day before the 
2000 presidential elections, President Bush criticised Democratic opponent Al Gore, 
saying ‗let me tell you what else I‘m worried about: I‘m worried about an opponent who 
uses nation building and the military in the same sentence.‘75  This mentality had a fateful 
impact on US preparations and attitude for post-invasion Iraq. Condoleezza Rice in her 
Bush campaign Foreign Affairs article clearly described the role and function of the US 
military. The US military was a ‗lethal‘ instrument and by no means a ‗civilian peace 
force.‘ Rice asserted that it is ‗most certainly not designed to build a civilian society‘, but 
only as a tool to support ‗clear political goals.‘76 Senator Joseph Biden believed that the 
dominant senior members of the administration were Cheney and Rumsfeld, who were 
assertive nationalists, with no nation building intentions at heart. For them the Afghanistan 
model was their way of doing business, which was a clear case of little US commitment to 
nation building.
77
 To make matters worse, Rumsfeld was not happy with the CIA‘s 
influence in the Afghan war: he had even complained at a Principals‘ meeting about this. 
In the meeting all, including the president, asserted that the Defense Secretary should be in 
charge. Rumsfeld therefore made sure he was fully in charge when assigned to prepare for 
the Iraq war.
78
 This prevented active participation and debate and a sufficient joint effort 
with all other agencies for the post-invasion phase. In an August 2003 visit to Iraq, Donald 
Rumsfeld pressed for an accelerated programme to train Iraqis for the National Iraqi Army. 
Instead of the two battalions the Coalition was training, Rumsfeld requested a twenty-
seven battalion contingent.
79
 This demand would create more Iraqi forces with less training 
to allow a speedy US withdrawal. 
 
The Bush administration wanted to oust Saddam Hussein, shift the balance of power in the 
Middle East in the United States‘ favour, all without committing itself to a lengthy, costly, 
and arguably exhausting peacekeeping and nation-building process, which the Clinton 
administration had committed itself to in both Bosnia and Kosovo. This ‗enabling‘ (Iraqi 
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self-dependency) approach in theory would be best both for Iraq and the US.
80
 Moreover, 
Feith argues that neither the Bush administration nor its predecessors were prepared to 
handle wars of such nature. The US institutions and laws were not prepared to deal with 
post-invasion stability and reconstruction operations.
81
 Rumsfeld had argued consistently 
that the US was not well suited to picking other countries‘ leaders.82 Feith stresses that 
‗Rumsfeld was determined not to do ―nation-building.‖‘ 83  Feith argues that the US 
approach to the Afghanistan war was one opposing nation-building. In his briefing to 
Rumsfeld for an 11 October 2001 Principals‘ Committee meeting, Rumsfeld stated that 
‗creating a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan is desirable, but not necessarily within the 
power of the US.‘ Rumsfeld also stressed that ‗nation-building is not our key strategic 
goal.‘84 Rumsfeld was against nation-building, disagreeing with similar US engagements in 
the 90s. His analogy was that of a kid whose dad never let go of his bicycle, which in turn 
created a forty-year old man that could not ride a bike.
85
 Rumsfeld made his position clear 
in a speech a month before the invasion: ‗Iraq belongs to the Iraqis and we do not aspire to 
own it or run it. We hope to eliminate Iraq‘s weapons of mass destruction and to help 
liberate the Iraqi people from oppression.‘86          
 
Rumsfeld believed the Clinton administration had unnecessarily tied down US forces in the 
Balkans. This was clearly a continuation of the Bush 2000 presidential campaign message. 
He asserted that long deployments of US troops would create a ‗culture of dependence‘, 
preventing the Kosovars from standing on their own feet. For them the Afghan war was the 
right way: help the Afghanis rebuild their own country and not involve a large US 
peacekeeping force there.
87
 A wealth of contemporary expertise had been established. 
Experiences from the Panama invasion were taken to subsequent military invasions: Haiti 
in 1994, as well as to Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. These, however, had not created a 
‗nation-building doctrine‘ in America. 88  The US was wary of being perceived as 
expansionist. President Bush affirmed at West Point in June 2002 that America had no 
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empire to extend.
89
 The Bush administration‘s disapproval of his predecessor‘s 
involvement in nation-building in the Balkans was no more than wishful thinking. The 
Bush administration thought it could simply topple the regime, then leave the rebuilding 
process to the Iraqis.
90
  
 
5.2.6  Low Levels of US Military Presence: The Manpower Deficit 
Rumsfeld influenced General Franks‘ war plans on keeping force levels low. He reminded 
Franks of the large excesses of force that had been used during Operation Desert Storm to 
expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991.
91
 According to a senior Congressional staffer, Rumsfeld 
had a theory of transformational warfare and played out his theory on the real battlefield.
92
 
This was a continuation of the doctrine of military transformation Bush had promised 
during his campaign. During his election campaign, Bush had stated ‗The Gulf War was a 
stunning victory. But it took six months of planning and transport to summon our fleets 
and divisions and position them for battle.‘93 The president too wanted to avoid a long 
open-ended war, telling General Tommy Franks CENTCOM commander ‗It‘s really 
important for us that we don‘t leave ourselves open in the region.‘94 On 15 April 2003, 
Bush met with his senior staff to discuss possible troop withdrawals from Iraq.‘95  
 
Garner‘s team complained they did not have enough resources to get the country 
functioning again. The US military was stretched very thin and could not therefore cover 
all necessities, especially security.
96
 Apparently the Afghan operation had encouraged this 
approach. The number of US forces in Afghanistan had reached no more than 4000 troops 
throughout the whole process of overthrowing the Taliban and attacking al-Qaeda.
97
 
Bremer stressed that ‗Washington provided only enough troops to topple the old regime, 
not enough to deter the emergence of violent resistance, or to counter and defeat the 
resultant insurgency.‘ Bremer complains in his book that ‗the United States thus went in to 
Iraq with a maximalist reform agenda and a minimalist application of money and 
manpower.‘ Bremer attributed the subsequent difficulties encountered to the ‗disjunction‘ 
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between the scope of its ambitions and the scale of its initial commitment.
98
 
 
Ironically Rumsfeld had developed a memo, dubbed a ‗Parade of Horribles‘, on 15 
October 2002 on the potential dangers the US faced in Iraq as a result of an invasion. His 
rationale for a smaller force developed from these expectations and the fact that a smaller 
force would provide ‗speed and surprise‘ that could not be guaranteed with a larger 
invasion force that could potentially elongate the war.
99
 On 11 May 2002, Tommy Franks 
presented his plan to the Bush war cabinet at Camp David. Andrew Card and Condoleezza 
Rice expressed their concerns about a ‗Fortress Baghdad‘ scenario, with Saddam resisting 
fiercely in Baghdad, creating an ugly urban warfare scenario.
100
 These fears were avoided 
due to the speed of the operation.
101
  
 
A senior Congressional staffer on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, interviewed by 
the author, stressed that going in with so few troops was a mistake.
102
 Niall Ferguson has 
argued that the US military ‗manpower deficit‘ in Iraq was a major source of its 
ineffectiveness. He makes a comparison between the British in 1917 and the US in 2003. 
In 1917, for every British soldier there were 20 Iraqis; however, in 2003, for every US 
soldier there are 210 Iraqis.
103
 This was a stark contrast in numbers. Brian Gifford provides 
a comparison of the number of US forces of today at being only 1.4 million. This is at a 
time when US forces at the end of Second World War was close to 12 million active-duty 
personnel and 3.5 million at the peak of the Vietnam War.
104
 The US was keen to not give 
an impression of expansionism. In a meeting with Rumsfeld, former Iraqi opposition figure 
Kanan Makiya expressed doubts at the nature of US dealing in the new Iraq. Makiya stated 
‗you‘re trying so hard not to be imperialists that you‘re not giving Iraqis a sense that you 
are in charge.‘ Democracy, he said, would not develop if the US did not direct it.105 As 
Michael Cox has pointed out, the US is in ‗denial about what it is‘ and thus has primarily 
                                                 
98
 Paul Bremer et al., ‗Early Days in Iraq: Decisions of the CPA.‘ Survival Vol. 50, No. 4 (2008): p. 53. 
99
 Feith (2008), op. cit., p. 333.   
100
 Woodward (2004), op. cit., p. 126.      
101
 Gordon and Trainor (2007), op. cit., p. 489.         
102
 Senior Congressional Staffer, Interview with Author, 2 July 2008, Washington, D.C.   
103
 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 208.   
104
 Brian Gifford quoted in Alastair Finlan, ‗International Security‘ in The Bush Doctrine and the War on 
Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences, ed. Mary Buckley and Robert Singh. (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2006). p. 161. 
105
 Feith (2008), op. cit., p. 420.   
129 
 
been unwilling to pay the price or go anywhere to build a new world order under US 
leadership.
106
    
 
In mid June 2003 Bremer was already getting anxious about the relatively small numbers 
of US troops on the ground. In a call to Condoleezza Rice, Bremer stressed ‗the Coalition‘s 
got about half the number of soldiers we need here and we run a real risk of having this 
thing go south on us.‘107 Yet Rumsfeld visited Iraq in September 2003 to assess the options 
to reduce US forces in Iraq. Bremer affirms that he was putting increasing pressure on the 
military to make it happen.
108
 Rumsfeld‘s doctrine of a small and swift US military had 
been an attractive concept to Bush, but on the ground, the practicalities of the concept in 
Iraq had proven otherwise. Both Philip Zelikow and Meghan O‘Sullivan had anticipated 
the turn of events in Iraq mostly as a result of these manpower deficiencies giving greater 
freedom to the insurgency.
109
 
 
On 25 February 2003, four months before the end of his term as Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Shinseki had told the Senate Armed Services Committee, in response to a question by 
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) as regards force requirements for an occupation of Iraq 
following a successful completion of the war, ‗something on the order of several hundred 
thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We‘re talking 
about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that‘s fairly significant, with the 
kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant 
ground-force presence.‘ Moreover, the contingency operating plan for an invasion of Iraq 
(OPLAN 1003-98) which had last been fully reviewed in 1996 and was updated in 1998 
had envisioned an invasion force of more than 380,000 troops. Former CENTCOM 
commander General Anthony Zinni, who saw gaps in the plan particularly in regard to the 
post-war order, organised a war game named Desert Crossing in 1999 to examine 
additional contingencies.
110
 Franks had not designed an overwhelming force similar to that 
which Colin Powell had put together to defeat Iraqi forces in Kuwait in 1991. Frank‘s 
invasion force did not exceed 170,000.
111
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Major General Spider Marks argued that they did not have enough troops to counter the 
insurgency. He summarised the weaknesses in two major points. Firstly, the US did not 
have enough troops to conduct combat patrols in order to acquire solid intelligence and 
draw a proper picture of the enemy on the ground. Secondly, the US needed more troops to 
act on the intelligence generated. Consequently, the insurgency took advantage of the 
relatively few US numbers.
112
 Sceptics of the US occupation were already emerging before 
the invasion. The Brookings Institution‘s Michael O‘Hanlon, at an American Enterprise 
Institute meeting, warned of the immensity of this commitment and the dark realities it was 
likely to face. O‘Hanlon argued for a possible indefinite US presence, ‗five to ten years, at 
a minimum‘ and the engagement of 100-150 thousand troops.113 
 
Bush had no intention of keeping US forces in Iraq. This was a continuation of his attitude 
in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, Bush asserted ‗The US forces will not stay…we don‘t do 
police work.‘114 Bush was determined that Iraq would not be a Balkan‘s-like commitment 
– it would be a fast, forceful and targeted war with no long-term troop presence.115 Matters 
were only made worse in terms of manpower deficit on 1 March 2003. The Turkish 
Parliament rejected the permission to establish a northern front in Iraq. This was greatly 
damaging, as it prevented a land invasion of the Fourth Infantry Division from the north.
116
 
  
5.2.7  Dissolving The Iraqi Army  
Before the invasion William Luti‘s Office of Special Plans suggested possible plans for the 
reform or possible creation of a new army on 21 January 2003. Garner, however, produced 
his own proposal. This defined the role of the Iraqi army to reconstruction projects as an 
apolitical entity subordinate to civilian control.
117
 General McKiernan, land component 
commander during the Iraq invasion, also believed he could use the Iraqi Army for security 
in post-war Iraq, while Garner wanted to use them as a cheap source of labour before 
retraining them for the new Iraqi Army, mostly due to his shortage in personnel.
118
 General 
Garner had briefed senior officials, including the president, on the retaining of the Iraqi 
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army. This was approved by all, including the payment of salaries.
119
 At a NSC meeting on 
12 March 2003, Douglas Feith argued that the dissolution of the regular army be withheld. 
He believed that 3-5 army divisions could be used as the nucleus of the new Iraqi army. 
Feith‘s plan was ‗not immediately to demobilise all the people and put them on the street, 
but use them as a construction force.‘120 Frank Miller, the NSC staff director for defence, 
proposed the Iraqi army be reduced in size but still functional enough to allow certain 
reconstruction projects.
121
 There were a variety of things ORHA envisioned the old Iraqi 
military could have done under the generic name of ‗reconstruction.‘ ORHA had planned 
to form work units of 100 soldiers under the command of Iraqi officers, but closely advised 
and supervised by Americans, which would have been put to use clearing rubble from the 
streets and public places, fire fighting, clearing canals, fixing water systems, and 
performing other general engineering tasks. Eventually, these units would have been 
recycled into the de-mobilisation, disarming and re-integration (DDR) process as it 
matured.
122
 Hughes, who served as an aide to Garner said that dissolving the Iraqi Army 
‗was absolutely the wrong decision.‘ Hughes said ‗we changed from being a liberator to an 
occupier with that single decision.‘ According to Hughes by abolishing the army, the US 
destroyed in the Iraqi mind the last recognisable symbol of sovereignty, and as a result 
created a significant part of the resistance. The decree to dissolve the army all started when 
Bremer asked Walter Solocome to request the opinion of US generals on the proposed 
disbanding. All the generals had agreed, providing that it be done fast and that personnel 
were recalled under a different name. Solocome went back to Bremer and reported that the 
military were in favour of disbanding the army, but did not say that the army needed to be 
recalled.
123
 One of the cardinal rules of soldiering is to make and retain contact with your 
enemy. This was disregarded as a result of the decree. Hughes made contact with Iraqi 
officers, stressing ‗not one of them was a Baathist.‘ All they wanted to do was help the 
Iraqi soldiers get the 20 USD. It was an attempt to help stabilise their lives and the lives of 
their families. When Bremer dismantled the army this process was stopped. The result was 
that the disbanded soldiers were angry and convinced that the US were liars. This mistake 
of denying soldiers the 20 USD allowance took eight weeks to correct. The soldiers had 
joined the insurgency by the time this mistake was corrected. 
124
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Hughes stated that the US should have allowed Garner to continue with his activities, 
especially his attempt at creating the Arab equivalent of the loya jirga. Additionally, the 
US should also have kept the Iraqi army intact and then taken them through DDR process. 
When de-mobilising a unit, the soldiers and staff parade, and then symbolically the unit 
ceases to exist. Hughes insists this could have been an easier process. Hughes had come 
back to Washington to sign the contracts to get the DDR started when Bremer made the 
announcement.
125
 The disbanding of the Iraqi military was neither discussed with Garner 
or Hughes. This was at a time when Hughes was having the Iraqi military registered to 
keep it controlled.
126
  
 
Ironically, Bremer makes exactly the same case with the benefit of hindsight in 2008. He 
argues that a better prepared and resourced programme for disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration would almost certainly have both attenuated the reaction to the army‘s 
‗disbandment‘ and made reconstitution of a new force somewhat easier. Bremer describes 
these programmes as routine components of most post-conflict reconstruction missions 
over the past 20 years. The ‗failure to develop, fund and staff such a programme prior to 
the invasion proved a costly mistake‘ asserts Bremer.127 
 
The Kurds also played a part in pushing the dismantling decree. Bremer affirmed this in his 
one and only interview with an Arabic media outlet – the Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper. The 
Kurdish leaders were unambiguous about this issue. They told Bremer that if Saddam 
Hussein‘s army was recalled, that would mean there would be no independent and 
democratic Iraq, and threatened to secede from the country. Bremer contended that his 
‗analysis was that if such a thing happened, it would precipitate a regional war involving 
Iraq‘s neighbours.‘128  
 
Sumaidaie did not believe the old Iraqi army was suitable for the new Iraq. ‗The army was 
ramshackle, more generals in proportion to any army in the world. It was in a really bad 
shape‘ he insisted. The army needed deep reform and rebuilding on modern democratic 
terms. Sumaidaie believed that the transition from that army into a new army through a 
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radical reform process was necessary with the proviso that some kind of stipend be 
allocated to prevent officers of the old army from becoming enemies of the new Iraq. The 
former Governing Council member thought ‗the idea of disbanding the army was 
mishandled.‘ 129  In addition to the argument that it was a force detested due to its 
involvement in the oppression of the populace, the other argument was the dismantling of 
the Iraqi army due to its dysfunctional organisation. It had more than 11,000 general 
officers compared with 800 general officers in the US army.
130
  
 
The insurgency was not unavoidable, but was mostly exacerbated by political and military 
blunders. The US failed to prepare for post-combat operations, after waging a war with the 
minimal acceptable level of force. The cancelling of badly needed deployments and 
reinforcements, disbanding of the Iraqi army putting more that 300,000 armed men on the 
streets, and a denial of local elections in the initial stages effected considerably the post-
invasion environment.
131
 Garner described the mistakes made as follows. Firstly, the US 
did not have enough military personnel to secure the post-invasion phase. Secondly, he 
described the decision to disband the army as a ‗disastrous decision.‘ Thirdly, the de-
Baathification decree went far too deep. Fourth, the US should have immediately had an 
Interim Iraqi Government as the face of government. Garner insisted that he did not want 
the US to be the face of the government to the Iraqi people. Fifth, once the US found out 
how bad the infrastructure was, it should have immediately brought in sufficient generators 
to increase electricity capacity to provide a decent quality of life for the population. Sixth, 
Garner‘s plan was to write a constitution no later than July 2003 with the Iraqi Interim 
Government. This was suspended. Seventh, his plans to have elections for city government 
for towns and cities with a population larger than 100,000 was put on hold.
132
 
 
5.2.8  De-Baathification: A Cut Too Deep 
With the attempts to create a representative and credible government for the transitional 
period, Bremer started alluding to the ‗excesses of de-Baathification‘: it was a major 
implicit recognition of a change in US strategy, and also for more Sunni involvement in the 
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government to come.
133
 Both CPA‘s de-Baathification orders and the dissolution of the 
army were considered as the major instigators of the insurgency.
134
 
 
After Condoleezza Rice gave up on the Office of Special Plans, she gave post-invasion 
responsibilities to Frank Miller in March 2003. According to Miller, de-Baathification 
would only be implemented for 1 percent of the Baath Party.
135
 This did not materialise. 
Bremer argued that one of the lessons learnt from the German occupation was the Nazi 
eradication. A decontamination of Iraq through de-Baathification was the best approach. 
To him a speedy vetting process implemented in Iraq would allow the rebuilding of the 
institutions and then a hand back to the Iraqis.
136
 
 
Hughes, who was in Baghdad at the time working for the CPA, disagreed with the 
assumption. He described the de-Baathification as a mistake but not on a par with the 
military disbanding. Hughes argued that the cut made was too deep. The Iraqis knew who 
the Baathists were. They knew who the four top layers (levels of party membership) were. 
The local people knew them and ‗would take them out.‘137 On 4 November 2003 Bremer 
issued ‗CPA Memorandum Number 7‘ empowering the Governing Council to carry out the 
de-Baathification of Iraqi society consistent with CPA Order No. 1. This was done by the 
Higher National de-Baathification Commission led by Ahmed Chalabi. Bremer states that 
he responded to Iraqi demands for more authority over the process. To this the CPA 
empowered Iraqi politicians to implement the de-Baathification policy, which he defines as 
‗a mistake.‘138 Sumaidaie stated that the Baath Party was an evil organisation. It was right 
to banish the party as an organisation and ideology. But it was not right to banish and 
punish every Baathist who had simply wanted to survive. Sumaidaie asserts that the 
Governing Council should have been more forgiving to individuals unless they had 
committed crimes, and that it should have been done through a judicial rather than a 
political process.
139
 Meghan O‘Sullivan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq, also 
asserted that the de-Baathification was badly implemented. O‘Sullivan said that the CPA 
gave the Iraqis authority over the process. This turned out to be detrimental, as it far 
exceeded the original intention, becoming a political tool in the hands of the Iraqi elite. It 
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was not implemented through the judiciary. She asserts that ‗if the orders had been 
implemented a little more targeted‘ it would have minimised the political and economic 
consequences that contributed to the security problems.
140
 However, O‘Sullivan also 
argued that it is important to understand the strategic context of the moment. Both decrees 
(disbanding the army and de-Baathification) were viewed as important in overcoming the 
suspicions that eighty percent of Iraqis harboured toward the US dating back to the First 
Gulf War. The US wanted to show it was serious in rebuilding a new Iraq, and not 
planning on installing a Saddam like figure. The disbanding of the army was a gesture 
towards the Kurds, and the de-Baathification one of goodwill towards the Shiites. It was, in 
her own words, ‗statements to show seriousness about rebuilding Iraq.‘141 
 
5.3  UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES  
 
5.3.1  Insurgency  
As the Iraq war project was not thoroughly thought out, it was consequently ill-executed. 
The adversaries, as opposed to the executors, knew what they did not want from a new 
Iraq.
142
 Dealing with the insurgency was a major dilemma for the Bush administration, as 
the chief premise of Republican foreign policy was to show no more weakness. They were 
not impressed with the Carter or Clinton administrations.
143
 The insurgency in Iraq was 
composed primarily of four major factions, according to Deputy CIA Director John 
McLaughlin: the former Baathists, foreign fighters, Iraqi nationalists and tribal 
members.
144
 Iran also had a large influence in Iraq. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was 
behind a large proportion of the insurgency especially in the making of the roadside bombs 
that were responsible for many US casualties.
145
 Tony Blair told the Iraq Inquiry in 
January 2010 that one aspect of Iraq post-Saddam that nobody had envisaged was that Iran 
would support al-Qaida. The conventional wisdom was that the ‗two would never mix.‘ 
However, what unexpectedly happened was that both had a common interest in 
destabilising Iraq.
146
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There was also a second axis to this alliance. Douglas Feith states that the Bush 
administration anticipated acts of revenge killings, looting, terrorist attacks, fuelling of 
violence by Iraq‘s neighbours and ethnic violence. However, Feith explains that what was 
not anticipated was a sustained insurgency financed and led by the toppled Baathists in 
alliance with foreign jihadists.
147
 When Baghdad fell, members of the Baath regime 
decided Islam was the best slogan to rally support for continuing the insurgency. So a 
marriage of convenience developed between radical jihadist groups and the former 
members of the regime.
148
 Feith argues that another mistake was the US failure to recall 
Osama Bin Laden‘s fatwa in 1996, where he declared war on the US as a result of its 
military presence in the Arab peninsula and described it as a military occupation: a point 
that the Pentagon did not make and one which the CIA should have emphasised.
149
 The 
insurgency in the form it took was never anticipated by either intelligence officers or 
policy makers, Feith claims. The Baathists, in coordination with the Jihadists, had managed 
to launch a damaging military campaign in Iraq.
150
 However, Paul Pillar disputes this claim, 
as he himself had prepared two reports to this end. Pillar stated that the Pentagon 
policymakers did not ask questions, because ‗neoconservatives hate intelligence 
officers.‘151 Pillar had prepared these reports on his own initiative which was released by 
the Senate in redacted form. The first was entitled ‗Regional Consequences of Regime 
Change in Iraq‘; the second ‗Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq.‘152 Both reports 
lay out a very pessimistic view. It predicted sectarian and ethnic violence, slow democratic 
evolution, a lot of back sliding, and political extremism including terrorists who would find 
a lot of opportunities in Iraq.
153
 
 
The reconstruction of Iraq suffered a devastating blow with the beginning of a bombing 
campaign in Iraq. The first was bombing of the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad on 7 
August 2003 followed by the bombing on 19 August 2003 of the UN headquarters killing 
UN special representative to Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello and other UN staff. The second 
was the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Hakim and a group of his 
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followers on 29 August 2003. These bombings characterised the beginning of the 
insurgency in earnest.
154
  
 
The Sunnis were a major part of the insurgency. In a conversation with a Sunni Arab 
leader, Robert Blackwill of the National Security Council gave his assurance, ‗I want to 
reassure you that it‘s our intent that the Sunnis in the new Iraq have in every dimension a 
status and privileges consistent with their role and number in Iraqi society.‘ To which the 
Sunni leader replied: ‗Mr. Ambassador, you don‘t understand. We want to run Iraq.‘155 
Army Colonel Derek Harvey told President Bush at a meeting, where he was briefing the 
president on the state of affairs in Iraq and the insurgency, that there was far too much 
focus on foreign fighters and less focus on the core of the insurgency which was the Arab 
Sunni oligarchy and their sense of ‗religious nationalism.‘156 The future of Iraq and the 
post-invasion period was primarily based on the way Iraqis perceived the new order and 
their subsequent losses and gains. The violence that occurred in Iraq was partly a rejection 
of foreign presence, but mostly a fear of the uncertainty of a new power structure in Iraq. 
No longer were the Sunnis the unrivalled power holders and the Shiite subjugated 
peoples.
157
 Moreover, the desired outcome of the Bush rhetoric may have been to promote 
democracy and peace in the Middle East, but this resonated little with Iraqis and even with 
the liberals and secularists in their midst. This objective was seen as a by-product of the 
Iraq invasion and not a sincere attempt for change. The Iraqis predominantly believed that 
the US invasion was for four primary reasons. Firstly, control of Iraq‘s vast oil wealth; 
secondly, using Iraq to intimidate and check Iran; thirdly, breaking up Iraq to create a 
fragmented and weak Middle East; and finally removing Iraq‘s threat to Israel.158 The 
insurgency which Saddam had himself participated in its earlier stages had devised a 
fourfold plan. It was their intention to, firstly, expel US occupiers; secondly, to weaken 
Iraqi institutions; thirdly, to create dissatisfaction among the Iraqis on the new order; and 
fourthly, to maintain the influence of the Sunni base.
159
  
 
In April 2003, a directive from Iraq‘s intelligence agency was found. It provided guidance 
to the Baath Party, Saddam Fidayeen, and Intelligence members, in the event of Saddam‘s 
toppling, what they were supposed to do in the event of ‗God forbid, of the fall of our 
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beloved leader.‘ It included assassinating collaborators, burning the ministries, looting, 
burning public documents, doing everything possible to create further chaos in Iraq. It was 
essentially advising all members of the Baath regime to raise hell if Saddam were 
toppled.
160
 In another Mukhabarat memo dated 23 January 2003 directed to ‗All Offices 
and Sections‘, orders on what to do if Iraq were invaded were included. It advocated a 
policy of sabotage and looting, requesting that electric power stations be destroyed, as well 
as infiltrating Shiite holy places.
161
  
 
Bremer was frustrated at the lack of attention from the Pentagon to the mounting 
insurgency in Iraq as early as July 2003. In June he had told Bush that he was worried that 
the US was ‗drawing down‘ its forces too soon. Bremer felt that the US military, Rumsfeld 
included, wanted to get the forces home.
162
 On his way back to Washington the insurgency 
was gaining momentum. Bremer felt the US military was ‗struggling to find effective 
means to combat the enemy.‘163 
 
On 31 March 2004, with the insurgency on the rise and in the wake of the start of the 
Faluja crisis, President Bush delivered a speech at the Marriot Wardman Park Hotel in 
Washington. He asserted ‗We still face thugs and terrorists in Iraq who would rather go on 
killing the innocent than accept the advance of liberty.‘ He stressed the US resolve to 
confront the issue ‗This collection of killers is trying to shake our will. America will never 
be intimidated by thugs and assassins. We are aggressively striking the terrorists in 
Iraq.‘164 The US tactics, though successful in the short-run at quelling the insurgency, were 
deeply flawed with regards to strategy. The US military failed to see the end objective and 
focused on temporary tactics to deal with daily crises. At the time the insurgency was 
regarded as composed of a small minority of hostile remnants of the previous regime.
165
 
James Schlesinger, a former Defense Secretary, who led one of the many official inquiries 
into the Abu Ghraib scandal, concluded two major errors were made by Pentagon officials 
due to erroneous assumptions: firstly, failing to plan for a possible insurgency; and 
secondly, failing to react to the insurgency once it erupted.
166
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With the ongoing insurgency and the instability in Iraq, Steve Herbits told Rumsfeld about 
an op-ed written in The New York Times by Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb, the 
former president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The article proposed a possible 
timetable with the objective of setting up three autonomous regions (Kurdish, Sunni and 
Shiite) with a loose federal structure existing in Baghdad. The borderlines were already de 
facto developing, and this seemed like a reasonable solution. Rumsfeld neither agreed nor 
disagreed.
167
 Senator Biden supported dividing Iraq into three major Kurdish, Sunni and 
Shiite enclaves with a weak central government in Baghdad controlling certain issues such 
as foreign policy and oil revenues. The Bush administration wanted to stick to a united Iraq, 
although some observers said that the three part division should still be kept on the table.
168
  
 
5.3.2  Shock and Awe: The Sudden Collapse of the Regime 
Lieutenant Colonel Steven Peterson believed the joint ground and air campaign designed to 
‗Shock and Awe‘ and provide a prompt fall of Baghdad would be fatal to the post-war 
reconstruction process in Iraq and in maintaining order. He believed that some command 
and control would be essential in the rebuilding process of Iraq. This would get the military 
and police forces back in action. Peterson stated in an unpublished paper to the National 
War College that the very actions taken by the military would be detrimental to their 
strategic interests in post-war Iraq.
169
  
 
Rubin explained that Bush administration officials did not expect the government of Iraq to 
fall as quickly as it did.
170
 This was the result of a small and agile US force that toppled the 
Baath Regime in just three weeks. The Bush administration argued that, if they had a 
longer war, the US would have had greater numbers in the theatre to maintain order, but 
this would have been strictly at the expense of American and Iraqi lives. As a result, 
sufficient US troops had not arrived in Iraq after Saddam fell.
171
 Tommy Franks had 
considered this and described it as a ‗catastrophic success.‘172 The PUK told the US that all 
Iraqi military, political, governmental and Baath Party institutions would collapse promptly, 
leaving a major administrative vacuum in Baghdad, submerging the country in looting, 
chaos and violence. Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Jalal Talabani‘s deputy on the Iraqi 
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Governing Council (IGC), asserted that they made this point very clear to the Americans 
on numerous occasions before the war started. They advised Ryan Crocker, Zalmay 
Khalilzad and Garner about this likelihood.
173
  
 
However, many officials perceived this as an exaggeration and underestimation of the Iraqi 
army.
174
 The nature of the Iraq war militated against well-advanced planning due to the 
speed and nature of the process. Drew Erdmann argued that the diplomacy conducted at 
the UN would have been jeopardised if relevant officials from US departments had been 
withdrawn for the post-hostilities planning. The occupation of Iraq was comparable to the 
US occupation of French North Africa rather than to Germany, which was thought through 
well in advance.
175
 The wrong questions were also asked before the invasion. Elliot 
Abrams, the National Security Council Middle East Affairs Director, told the president that 
two million people might be displaced as a result of the Iraq war. Preparations were being 
made to this end. Bush made it clear to his team that this effort should be conducted 
properly as a means of public diplomacy, providing a positive image of the US.
176
  
 
5.3.3  Looting 
Sustaining public order was a major factor towards the creation of stability in Iraq and also 
to instilling Iraqi confidence towards their liberators. Jalal Talabani, on a visit to 
Washington in August 2002, told senior administration officials about highly possible 
looting in Baghdad after the invasion. But when Garner took a proposal to the White 
House for US police advisors in Iraq to help secure law and order, the proposal was 
rejected. The US did not want US police to enforce law in Iraq.
177
 Tony Blair stated the 
first assumption was that the coalition would be arriving to a fully functional civil service 
and that the Iraqi police would take internal security into their own hands. As Iraq was a 
highly brutalised state and the police heavily penetrated by Baathist elements, the Baathists 
naturally failed to show up for duty and other Iraqi police personnel, fearing retribution, 
did not go back to work. In addition, Iraqi police had a poor reputation and image due to 
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their inherent corruption.
178
 Frank Miller, on 10 March 2003, stated at an NSC meeting 
that the successful establishment of rule of law in the immediate post-conflict environment 
would be critical to ensuring stability, allowing for relief and reconstruction, and the rapid 
rebuilding of Iraqi society.
179
 
 
After the US invasion of Panama, Richard Shultz argued: ‗At the most general level, the 
first [lesson] is the need to recognise post-conflict situations as important and complex 
missions for the Department of Defense.‘ This was clearly not discerned in Panama. The 
US did not have, at the time of Operation Just Cause, a policy for the period following the 
use of force.
180
 The same mistake was repeated in Iraq. Bremer acknowledges that the 
40,000 US forces stationed in Baghdad in the immediate aftermath of Saddam‘s toppling 
had no orders to stop the looters.
181
 The US failed to protect public property and maintain 
public order, since Secretary Rumsfeld and his senior aides did not think it was 
important.
182
 The administration failed to fulfil its duty as an occupying power by not 
preventing the looting. It did not listen to regional experts and also overlooked guidance 
from its own State Department.
183
 Meghan O‘Sullivan, who was one of the senior US 
officials in Baghdad, confirms that ‗lots of mistakes were made.‘ The first mistake she 
defined was allowing lawlessness to pervade after Saddam fled Baghdad. Part of the 
problem was insufficient number of troops; equally important was that they did not have 
the right guidelines to keep law and order and protect the rule of law.
184
 When the US 
marines arrived in Baghdad, they were shocked with the level of looting. They had had no 
guidance to deal with the problem. All they managed to do was protect several hospitals 
and critical installations. However, they had no orders to shoot at the looters or restore 
order. They were focused on defeating the enemy.
185
 
 
Looting, one of the most troublesome and damaging occurrences of the post-invasion 
period, was identified early on when the ORHA was established. It was mentioned at the 
first major gathering of ORHA officials at the National Defense University in February 
2003 during an exercise Garner described as a ‗rock drill.‘ However, when the subject was 
brought up, CENTCOM officials attending the meeting were instructed not to address 
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‗post-conflict issues‘, mostly due to the lack of enough troops to address them.186 General 
Wesley Clark argues that ‗the ensuing disorder vitiated some of the boost in US credibility 
that was won on the battlefield, and it opened the way for deeper and more organised 
resistance during the following weeks.‘187 A senior CPA advisor acknowledged that US 
policy mistakes created the insurgency. The reluctance of the US to stop the looting, its 
lack of will to impose order, and finally Bremer‘s initial orders, led to the downward 
spiral.
188
 
 
The Rumsfeld Doctrine, of minimal human force, along with the Turkish refusal to allow 
the US military to enter Iraq from the north, created the environment that allowed the 
looting to flourish.
189
 In Panama, a huge looting spree started with the invasion. This came 
as a total surprise to the invading force. Von Hippel argues that ‗the looting [in Panama] 
created the impression that US troops were not managing the situation they had created by 
the intervention.‘ As a result of the Panama looting, precautions were integrated into future 
military planning to address this issue. However, with none of the following interventions 
was looting an issue.
190
 The author asked a senior CPA official visiting Kurdistan shortly 
after the US invasion why the US failed to react, to which the official responded ‗when 
allied troops entered Paris, Parisians didn‘t loot the Louvre.‘191   
 
CPA advisor Noah Feldman explained how the whole downward spiral of Iraq began with 
the looting. It showed how incompetent the US military was, how the US was not asserting 
order and how the Iraqi perception grew that US could not be a serious fighting force.
192
 
Feith argues that before the invasion he asked Christopher Lamb, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, to help prepare a paper on the establishment of civil order after 
major hostilities were over. Lamb produced a paper on ‗maintaining public order in Iraq.‘ 
The premise of this analytical paper was that CENTCOM lacked focus on this important 
issue. It recognised that there was a lack of detailed planning that would affect public order 
in the post-Saddam environment. It emphasised the lack of cooperation between 
CENTCOM and ORHA that could lead to alarming consequences. ORHA believed 
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CENTCOM would provide the necessary forces for maintaining post-invasion stability; 
meanwhile, the latter felt its forces had other priorities.
193
 Feith and Lamb argued: 
Currently the fundamental planning assumption about maintaining order is that 
swift combat operations will limit large civil disturbances, [but] the same 
assumption was made in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and proved 
wrong; massive civil disorder began almost immediately.
194
 
In an 18 October 2002 meeting, Feith had posed the question of post-war Iraq, to which he 
himself replied that the post-hostilities administration would fall to the Department of 
Defense. Feith argues that the intention of this question in General Franks‘ presence was to 
shed light on the lack of attention he saw in the general as regards his duty to running Iraq 
and establishing order after Saddam‘s toppling.195 The major issue, according to Feith, was 
that CENTCOM relied heavily on CIA assessments in its preparation for the war. The CIA 
predicted that the Iraqi police force would remain largely intact. This was a contributing 
factor to help determine US troop levels by CENTCOM commanders in the run up to the 
invasion, assuming the Iraqi police would be able to maintain public order after the 
invasion.
196
 CENTCOM had relied heavily on CIA predictions that public order would be 
maintained through Iraq police force ‗professionals.‘ Actions against looting, rioting and 
civil disorder were retained to the Iraqi police. Feith argues that this was a major 
intelligence flaw; an error Feith argues  would not have required penetration of the inner 
circle of the Iraqi ruling elite. It demonstrated the scarcity of information the CIA had on 
Iraq; moreover, as Feith asserts, the CIA dismissed challenges put forward by 
policymakers in favour of their own confident opinions.
197
 
 
Karin von Hippel argues that the initial period after an intervention is crucial in 
determining the future course of a state emerging from violent conflict. Mistakes made 
during this time have lasting effects, and the intervening power can often spend years 
‗undoing damages done.‘ 198  Many military interventions have shown that once the 
occupying power is not seen as in control and providing security, other militias will form 
to attack the foreign power. And the more anarchic the situation becomes, the more likely 
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it is that the local population will tolerate another authoritarian armed group.
199
 It is indeed 
ironic that the day the US won the war, it lost Iraq. 
 
5.3.4  Outside Interference  
Tony Blair asserts that the second major flawed assumption driving the invasion mindset 
was the unexpected joint disruptive role of Iran and al-Qaeda.
200
 The price the US and its 
foreign policy paid was substantial. Instead of sending a strong message to Iran and North 
Korea, it found itself tied up in a tedious process in Iraq. Instead of showing that the 
transition to democracy was viable, it showed it to be a very difficult process. Instead of 
encouraging further involvement by other nations, it left the British and the US alone.
201
 
Feith argues that the Sunni elites of the region despised the concept of a democratic Iraq, 
which would give way to a Shiite majority to rule the country. This paved the way for their 
deep dislike of the Iraqi externals. They would have preferred Saddam to have been 
replaced by another Sunni general.
202
 Consequently they did not engage the new ruling 
elite in Iraq. There was also clear evidence of Iranian intervention in Iraq. Iran‘s objective 
was to hamper the development of a strong and unified Iraq, especially one where Sunnis 
had led a bloody war against Iran for eight continuous years. Secondly, Iran wanted to 
make regime change a pricy and bloody business for the US to deter any such 
consideration for Iran in the future.
203
 Tony Blair told the Iraq Inquiry that the coalition 
had assumed that Iran would mostly watch and had ‗no interest in destabilising Iraq.‘ 
However, as it turned out Iran did not want a Shiite majority democracy on its doorstep.
204
   
 
Bremer told the Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper that Iran was uncooperative during his period 
as CPA administrator. However, Iran was not overly disruptive either. Bremer explains 
that only occasionally the US would find elements of the Revolutionary Guards working 
inside Iraq. The Americans would also find elements from their interior ministry and 
intelligence, but their contacts were with people of only a modestly senior level, as 
opposed to what happened afterwards. Syria, also was a big problem from the beginning, 
he stressed. The CPA were able to know through those taken into custody that the 
‗majority of suicide bombers had come from Syria.‘ Bremer explained that they gradually 
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came to learn that Syria plays a huge role in recruiting suicide bombers from Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, and North Africa. The suicide bombers involved in destabilising efforts were 
transferred to Syria, then moved onto Eastern Syria, and from there, cross the border into 
Anbar and occasionally through Mosul. Bremer was adamant that Baathist Syria was 
involved as ‗there is nothing that can happen in Syria without the government‘s knowledge, 
as Syria is a closed country.‘205  
 
 
5.4  POST INVASION PHASES 
 
5.4.1  US Occupation 
 
5.4.1.1  ORHA: mentality of humanitarian assistance  
Barbara Bodine, a senior ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Relief)  
official, explains how the plan for post-war Iraq was for the US to be out of the country by 
the end of August.
206
 Lawrence Di Rita, a close aide to Donald Rumsfeld, at a meeting in 
Kuwait before the ORHA team left for Baghdad, stated that the US was not staying for 
more than three to four months after creating an interim government. He also emphasised 
that no more than 25,000 soldiers would remain by September 2003.
207
 The basic 
assumptions of the war were, as a senior Pentagon official had noted, that it would be 
quick, easy, cheap and catalytic.
208
    
 
Feith argues that, in the summer of 2002, he made several attempts to create a post-war 
planning office and designate someone to take up the task. To his dismay, he got nowhere. 
However, on 18 October 2002, Rumsfeld eventually asked Feith for a list of candidates for 
the position. This again had no outcome. Feith later learned from Steven Hadley that the 
president was not willing to open such an office while diplomatic efforts were 
underway.
209
 After Iraq‘s weapons declaration in December 2002, President Bush saw the 
war as inevitable. Now it was deemed possible to create an office to deal with post-war 
Iraq.
210
 Due to the initial plans and expectations of US involvement in Iraq, the Pentagon 
chose Garner to lead the post-war effort.
211
 This clearly indicated the US lack of will for 
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nation-building and their focus on a humanitarian crisis as Garner had led Operation 
Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan to feed and repatriate displaced Kurds. ORHA was 
created on 20 January 2003 by the president.
212
 It was considered part of CENTCOM, to 
help it with its civilian expertise in Phase IV of post-war reconstruction.
213
 ORHA was a 
difficult organisation to make effective, due to its interagency structure as well as its 
objective of working with the military.
214
 Making matters worse Douglas Feith argues that 
General Tommy Franks paid little attention to Phase IV of post-hostilities planning. Franks 
submitted his resignation, six weeks after the fall of Baghdad, evidence for his lack of 
commitment.
215
 
 
Though Rumsfeld was against an occupation authority, he was also reluctant to hand over 
full authority to the Iraqis immediately after Saddam‘s overthrow, as was the case in 
Afghanistan. He believed that the Iraqi leaders were relatively unknown to ordinary Iraqis, 
possibly incompetent, corrupt and abusive of their new authority. The US government 
believed that Iraq was different to Afghanistan due to its substantial army and oil wealth. 
Rumsfeld wanted to strike a balance between immediate recognition like that of 
Afghanistan, and an outright occupation.
216
 However, Feith argues that an early opposition 
conference, as opposed to the one held in December 2002 in London followed by several 
others, might have changed the post-Saddam political landscape in Iraq. It might have 
paved the way to an earlier transition of authority and avoided the occupation authority of 
the CPA that lasted more than a year.
217
 Garner explained to the author that he did in fact 
bring to Baghdad leading Iraqi opposition leaders, Chalabi, Allawi, Pachachi, Barzani, 
Jalal Talabani and Hakim. He told them to set up operations, and he would make them into 
an interim government. Garner stressed that ‗Bremer cancelled it.‘ In Garner‘s words the 
initial US plan was to create the IIA (Iraqi Interim Authority) to bring leaders forward ‗to 
continue to have a liberation, not an occupation.‘218  
 
However, this changed, the acknowledgment of serious flaws in the post-war operations in 
Iraq made the administration re-think its strategy. They were unhappy with Garner‘s 
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performance and replaced him with Paul Bremer.
219
 Meghan O‘Sullivan, who was in 
Baghdad at the time, explained that the US was not prepared for what actually transpired, 
but was operating on a set of assumptions that turned out not to be true. People did not 
expect that that the structures of society would come apart so quickly. The assumption was 
that when Saddam was removed, institutions of government would be in place. When that 
turned out not to be true: ‗we had a problem with public order, we had a problem with the 
rule of law, and no counterparts to work with.‘220 Rumsfeld had confirmed this assumption 
in February 2003: ‗Iraq has a solid infrastructure with working networks of roads and 
[resources] and it has oil to help give free Iraq the means to get on its feet.‘221 ORHA was 
changed to CPA, as a realisation that the original construct for ORHA was narrower than 
what was needed in Iraq, O‘Sullivan explained. ORHA had been initially created to deal 
with humanitarian assistance and some reconstruction. ORHA had a branch to alleviate 
displacement, and a lot of the planning was for that. However, that was not a consequence 
of war. What was perceived to be needed was a much more comprehensive effort to 
reconstruct the institutions of the state, as ORHA had too narrow a mission. The thinking 
was to get a new organisation that had the capacity, authority, and capability to play a 
larger role to help rebuild Iraq.
222
 Garner was informed of his replacement in late April 
2003. The Pentagon claims that the replacement of Garner was part of the plan all along; 
but George Packer explains how the original plan was to send a civilian ambassador to 
support an interim Iraqi Government.
223
 Garner emphatically stressed that he ‗did not 
expect to have a CPA, and thought he only would have ORHA deal with post invasion 
Iraq.‘224 
 
5.4.1.2  CPA: from liberators to occupiers  
Upon his arrival, Bremer used Germany and Japan as examples for the scale of his new 
assignment. He affirmed to his aides, on his arrival date on 12 May 2003, that democracy 
cannot work unless the political structure is backed up with a civil society, which can only 
be assured with the presence of political parties, a free press, an independent judiciary, and 
accountability in public spending.
225
 Paul Bremer arrived in Iraq only after the military 
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operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein had successfully concluded. Bremer stresses that 
he was assigned the difficult role of rebuilding a new Iraq. He summarises the challenges 
that faced the US-led coalition in three points: ‗provide security for the Iraqi people, set 
Iraq on the path to a more open, humane and democratic society, and finally, reform Iraq‘s 
closed and moribund economy.‘ According to Bremer the first task was the responsibility 
of the coalition military, and the latter two of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
that he led.
226
 
 
With Paul Bremer‘s arrival, the policies of the US began to change dramatically, including 
those approved by Bush and those worked on by Garner. It was a complete reversal and 
change in strategy.
227
 Brad Swanson, a CPA official, described the US presence in two 
phases. Firstly, the arrogance phase, in which an under-manned, under-planned 
administration would take over the country then leave in six weeks with a functional 
government in place. This was followed by a hubris phase, which would involve great US 
involvement financially and in manpower. These were opposite strategies, and both were 
ideological responses.
228
 A variety of issues had changed with Bremer‘s arrival, as there 
was no overarching coherent strategy for the Middle East, specifically for Iraq, according 
to Paul Hughes. Garner had taken steps to begin building a national government for Iraq. 
But the media had trumpeted the looting, rioting and gunfire. When Rumsfeld then said 
‗stuff happens‘, it painted a picture that no one was in control. Bremer was then sent over 
to get things under control. Hughes explained ‗The assumption was then all Iraqis would 
say yes. It was the kind of hubris that was totally unsubstantiated.‘229 
 
Bremer believed that with a solid political infrastructure to leave behind, the US had a 
greater chance of ‗a success story‘ in Iraq. He wanted to emulate the German and Japanese 
examples, otherwise, he stressed, it would descend into chaos, civil war or tyranny.
 230
 The 
two options available were: handing over authority to an unelected Iraqi government 
immediately; or retaining authority while following a slower, more deliberate political 
process towards restoration of sovereignty.
231
 As a result of differing opinions on the 
transfer of power to the Iraqis, the US ended up with a long term occupation authority. It 
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resulted mainly from the desire to create a more inclusive political environment.
232
 With 
the ongoing difficulties in Iraq, the Bush administration revised its original plans for the 
post-invasion period. No longer could nation-building be averted. The number of US 
forces increased, which led to more and aggressive patrols in Baghdad. In short, June 2003 
saw an era of change in US policy towards Iraq, embracing an attempt to nation-build.
233
 
 
Bremer asserts that he decided to create a plan of action as ‗Washington‘s pre-war plans 
had been overtaken.‘234 Bremer refused to adopt the IIA plan due to his view that the Iraqi 
leadership lacked competence and that they were unrepresentative.
235
 Feith argues that the 
creation of an Iraqi authority pre-invasion did not win support in the administration. But 
the creation of an Iraqi authority, known as the Iraqi Interim Authority, in the post-invasion 
era with power sharing agreements incorporated was approved by the president and the 
National Security Council, but was delayed by Powell and Armitage, implemented by 
Garner, and sidelined by Ambassador Bremer.
236
 Feith blames the delay of the Iraqi 
political conference by almost a year as highly damaging to post-Saddam Iraq. He blames 
Paul Bremer for sidelining the Iraqis, on the basis that they showed no productive 
engagement to build the new Iraq, as the initial plan was to handover immediately a 
substantial amount of power to the Iraqis. If further close interactions had been arranged 
among the Iraqis as a result of the conference this might not have occurred, Feith argues.
237
 
 
As a consequence full US control in an American provisional occupation authority was 
adopted. The idea behind the ‗Transitional Civil Authority‘ Armitage had proposed was 
that the externals be prevented from taking a major role in post-Saddam Iraq. Feith argues 
that when State Department and CIA officials were challenged they asserted that the 
externals lacked competence and legitimacy.
238
 Feith asserts that the State Department and 
the CIA may have had little sway at the table at National Security Council and Principals‘ 
meetings. However, State Department officials on the ground had substantial impact on 
Ambassador Bremer‘s views of the Iraqi externals. The CIA and State Department officers 
at CENTCOM also managed to belittle the military commanders‘ perceptions of the Iraqi 
externals. This also resulted in the commanders‘ opinion that training the Iraqi externals 
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was a waste of time.
239
 Even when Bremer created the IGC he decided to give no authority 
to the IGC independent of the CPA, thus no power sharing arrangement.
240
 On 13 July 
2003 the CPA created the Iraqi Governing Council, composed of the six Iraqi leadership 
council members plus one internal as well 18 others chosen by the CPA in a nationwide 
search.
241
 However, the Iraqi Governing Council was rendered ineffective. Sumaidaie, a 
member of the twenty-five member council, expressed the council‘s frustration. In the 
early stages the council needed to put its message to the people in respect to what the new 
Iraq was about and how it was proposed to take care of citizens‘ needs. The Ministry of 
Information had been disbanded. ‗We the Governing Council were not given a channel to 
broadcast our ideas‘ explained Sumaidaie. As a result a big gap ensued. The Pentagon had 
assigned this task to a company called Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC). It became a serious defect for the IGC as the council was denied crucial access to 
the public. This could have prevented the building up of the insurgency.
242
 
 
Nawshirwan recalls Garner‘s visit to Kurdistan in April 2003 requesting Barzani and 
Talabani to travel to Baghdad and help set up a new Iraqi administration. Garner requested 
that the G5 of friendly opposition groups expand their base to 20-25 by including new 
groups into the process, and from this organise a national conference inviting 300-500 Iraqi 
personalities to create the first post-Saddam Iraqi government under US supervision. This 
failed to materialise mostly due to the former opposition‘s inaction. Mustafa argues that the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) kept the talks going without 
allowing significant progress. And only after obstructing this request for three weeks did 
they approve the inclusion of the Islamic Dawa Party, led by Ibrahim Jaafari and the 
National Democratic Party, led by Naseer al-Chaderchi. This saga eventually led to the US 
disillusionment with the Iraqi opposition and encouraged its taking direct control of Iraq. It 
proposed UNSCR 1483 which was approved, and officially changed the US status from 
liberator to occupier of the country.
243
 Bremer affirms this position. He states that when the 
group of exiles with which the US government had been in contact proved unable or 
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unwilling to increase its representation, the CPA itself sought out Iraqi leaders who could 
broaden the group.
244
  
 
Colin Powell and Richard Armitage were adamant about keeping power out of the hands of 
Iraqi ‗externals‘ instead of transferring authority from the US to the Iraqis. Armitage, as 
mentioned earlier, had believed that the US would have to maintain control for a ‗multi-
year transitional period‘ since early summer of 2002. This belief originated from his deep 
distrust of all Iraqi externals, especially Chalabi, and a desire to create a ‗credible‘ Iraqi 
leadership.
245
 Bremer, also, was not happy with the skills of the Iraqi leadership. To him 
they lacked the dedication, diligence and necessary skills to govern. Accordingly he 
planned to run Iraq until he could establish a civil society, develop a democracy and 
cultivate a new leadership. The CPA would have to stay in power for several years until 
this could be achieved through the preparation of a new constitution and elections. 
Bremer‘s concept of legitimacy and the required work needed to this end was considered 
an open-ended commitment and unnecessary by Rumsfeld.
246
 Bremer asserted: ‗the exile 
leadership group did not reflect a balance of Iraq‘s population.‘ Bremer believed Sunnis 
were hardly represented, the Kurds overrepresented. The group included no women or 
members of important Iraqi minorities, such as Christians and Turkomen. Bremer states 
that the group was neither ‗well-established‘ nor ‗broadly representative.‘247  
  
Michael Rubin stated unequivocally that the ‗neoconservatives were against the creation of 
the CPA.‘ 248  Before the war, there had been disagreements within the American 
government about the length of the occupation of Iraq. Some, including Feith, argued that 
as soon as Saddam was ousted, America should turn over sovereignty to a small group of 
Iraqi exiles with whom the US government had been in touch. However, officials at the 
State Department and CIA, emphasised the deep divisions in Iraqi society caused by 
Saddam‘s long tyranny, and suggested the US would be obliged to undertake a long-term 
effort to put Iraq on the path to representative government. Bremer affirms that the 
president had agreed with the short-occupation version sometime in March.
249
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Feith criticises Paul Bremer for his claim of Iraqi reluctance to forward the political 
process. To him it was evident that Bremer could have made the Iraqi political figures 
advance if he wanted. Examples of this were the 15 November  2003 agreement, which led 
to the creation of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the dissolution of the 
Iraqi Governing Council and the creation of the interim government.
250
 Bremer was 
constantly under pressure, intensifying in early October 2003, to hand over sovereignty as 
well as to give an increased role to the newly trained Iraqi police and army. Bremer was 
frustrated asserting ‗if America cannot stand the heat after less than six months, we are 
going to have a very untidy century.‘ 251  Bremer had told Andrew Card that an early 
transfer of power to the Iraqis would ‗make the president‘s vision of Iraq very difficult, if 
not impossible.‘ Bremer was conscious of the domestic implications of a prolonged 
occupation but insisted that the US ‗do what‘s right for Iraq for five, ten, twenty years 
ahead.‘252   
 
Bremer was determined to create a blueprint to direct the CPA‘s efforts in Iraq. He had an 
‗ambitious vision‘ to transform a shattered country into a prosperous, equitable, peaceful 
and civil society.
253
 Bremer announced his seven-step plan in The Washington Post article, 
entitled ‗Iraq‘s Path to Sovereignty,‘ on 8 September 2003. The CPA and the IGC, 
according to Bremer, had agreed that the first step was for the latter to convene a 
conference to draft a new constitution. This would have been ratified by the Iraqi people, 
leading to elections, a sovereign Iraqi government, and the end of the occupation. This 
political sequence Bremer believes was outlined to top coalition leaders within weeks of 
the CPA‘s establishment. 254  However, Feith argues that Bremer‘s article in The 
Washington Post setting out seven steps to Iraqi sovereignty was a blatant deviation from 
the administration‘s IIA policy. It was effectively the State Department‘s multi-year 
occupation Transitional Civil Authority.
255
 Bremer initially informed the Governing 
Council that the CPA plan for the return of sovereignty rested on the sequence below: 
 
1. Writing a permanent constitution. 
2.   General referendum on the permanent constitution. 
3. Holding general elections to elect a General Assembly and a cabinet recognised    
internationally. 
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4.  Then returning sovereignty to Iraq. 
 
Nawshirwan asserts that for none of the steps above had Bremer suggested a timeline.
256
  
The Sistani 26 June 2003 fatwa rejecting a written constitution by CPA appointed officials 
was one of many changes of course in Iraq.
257
 Additionally, Rumsfeld wanted an agreed 
‗timetable for early recognition of Iraqi sovereignty, so that the Coalition could shed the 
―occupying power‖ label.‘ The US did not want to oppose nor appear to oppose 
elections.
258
 As a result, and after the 15 November agreement, these major changes were 
agreed upon. 
 
1. Partial elections for a transitional General Assembly allowing the creation of an interim 
government. 
2. Dissolution of the Iraqi Governing Council and CPA. 
3. Returning sovereignty to Iraq. 
4. And then setting the stage for general elections, allowing the drafting of a permanent 
constitution. 
 
However, for these stages, a fixed timeline was stipulated.
259
   
 
Rumsfeld called Bremer on 13 September to advise him to hand over sovereignty to the 
Iraqi Governing Council or any other group of Iraqis.
260
 Rumsfeld was committed to 
avoiding a prolonged US occupation of Iraq. Rumsfeld had proposed that an end date be 
declared for the termination of the CPA, preferably by the end of June 2004. The seven- 
step plan by Bremer was discarded as a result. Instead, an interim constitution was agreed 
upon, as elections would have prolonged the occupation.
261
 Even Vice President Cheney 
was not happy with the mistakes made. He felt the establishment of the CPA and the 
appointment of Paul Bremer slowed down the transition process. In his mind, the creation 
of a provisional government before the invasion would have created grounds for a swifter 
transfer of power to the Iraqis.
262
 The plan changed dramatically, due to objections from 
Sistani and Washington. So on 15 November 2003, with the approval of the US 
government, the CPA and the Governing Council laid out a new plan. The new plan was to 
work with Iraqi legal experts and the council to draft an interim constitution that would 
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establish the framework for Iraq‘s politics and lead to elections. The agreement provided 
for an indirectly elected Iraqi government to assume sovereignty from the coalition. Al-
Sistani objected to this aspect of the agreement. The CPA and the UN worked to answer 
his concerns and were able to gain a broad consensus on the transition process. All parties 
agreed that the TAL (interim constitution) would be drafted by the Governing Council and 
Iraqi legal experts in spring 2004, and that the CPA would then hand sovereignty to a non-
elected, but representative, interim government by 1 July 2004.
263
 
 
Bremer did not believe that the former Iraqi opposition deserved to govern. Qubad 
Talabani, the Kurdistan Regional Government‘s (KRG) representative to Washington and 
son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who was in Baghdad and involved in the negotiations 
of the TAL, stated that Bremer believed the ‗Iraqis were hopeless.‘ 264  Bremer was 
convinced that the inability of this group ‗to agree upon even the most basic questions‘ of 
its own internal functioning clearly showed that it was not ready to govern Iraq, or even to 
share substantially in such responsibilities.
265
 The Iraqi Governing Council had far less 
power than the IIA was intended to have.
266
 Bremer, Feith explains, though briefed before 
his departure about the creation of the IIA in Washington, set aside the IIA plan as he had 
developed his own views as regards his role in Iraq. He thought of the plan as merely a 
Pentagon one, and was convinced that he had greater flexibility as the man on the 
ground.
267
 Even before he arrived in Iraq, Bremer had decided that an Iraqi leadership was 
incapable of receiving authority early on; he described the intention of the proponents of 
this attitude as a ‗reckless fantasy.‘268 Bremer‘s goal in the TAL document was to create an 
Iraq that was unified, democratic and stable, which had a vibrant economy and a 
representative government.
269
 Bremer wanted to create an Iraqi authority to show the Iraqis 
that the US was serious about political reform and transferring authority to the Iraqis. 
Bremer also emphasised that his intention was to broaden the political landscape to make it 
‗representative of all Iraqis.‘ This he also told the G7 of Iraqi opposition leaders in his first 
meeting.
270
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Bremer believed he had a direct mandate from the president. President Bush was adamant 
that the Iraq project had to be seen through vigorously, regardless of circumstances. He 
told Bremer that he was committed to bringing representative government to the Iraqi 
people and that he would not abandon them. Bush had asserted ‗We‘ll stay until the job is 
done. You can count on my support irrespective of the political calendar or what the media 
might say.‘271 At a 12 November 2003 NSC meeting in Washington, Bush stressed ‗I 
believe in the inherent goodness of the Iraqi people. They have a basic instinct to live in 
peace, guided by universal values which are beyond politics…It‘s important for everyone 
to know that we‘re going to stay the course and that I‘m determined to succeed.‘272 Bremer 
argues that the interim constitution, or TAL, was the CPA‘s most important contribution to 
Iraq‘s political future.273 
 
Rumsfeld‘s intervention halted the occupation of Iraq that would have lasted for several 
more years. However, Bremer‘s plan, according to Feith, did long-term strategic harm. 
Firstly, it helped gain the insurgency public support. It confirmed their claims about the US 
desire for domination and exploitation. It also damaged the standing of the democratic 
opposition. It changed all Iraqi problems – political, social and economic – into US 
ones.
274
 Nawshirwan stresses that if it were not for the isolation and international pressure 
from France, China, Russia and Germany, as well as the insurgency, the US would have 
disregarded Iraqi sentiments and would have mocked the possibility of transferring 
authority to the Iraqis and the restoration of Iraq‘s sovereignty.275   
 
Bremer had already made it clear to his superiors in Washington that he had ‗three red 
lines.‘ He wanted to leave behind a professional, uncorrupt and human rights-conscious 
police force; secondly, an army not involved in internal affairs of Iraq; and finally to ‗pass 
sovereignty to an Iraqi government elected on the basis of a constitution.‘276 Bremer was 
focused on paving the way to a new Iraq that enjoyed representative government, 
recognising that this was a ‗complex challenge‘ requiring time, as Iraqis had little 
experience in ‗self-rule and the institutions that supported it.‘ His ambition was to ‗instil an 
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understanding of democratic government.‘ 277  Wolfowitz had met with Bremer on 22 
September 2003 to discuss the possibility of handing over sovereignty to the Governing 
Council. During this meeting, Bremer stressed the incompetence of the Iraqi Governing 
Council and its lack of representation. Bremer believed in Wolfowitz‘s notion that a 
democratic Iraq would revolutionise the region, but stressed that patience was a pre-
requisite if achieved.
278
 Bremer‘s intention from his involvement in Iraq was not only to 
install democracy, but also to provide the social shock absorbers that guaranteed its 
sustainability. He was frustrated with certain administration officials he described as 
nation-building evaders.
279
     
 
Feith explains that the US committed grave mistakes in Iraq, but he stresses that by far the 
greatest mistake was the mishandling of the transference of authority to the Iraqis after 
Saddam‘s overthrow. It opened up the perception that the US was not a liberator, but an 
occupier in the eyes of the average Iraqi. He explains ‗it offended the personal dignity and 
national pride of many Iraqis, creating opportunities exploitable by hard-core Baathists, 
sectarian extremists, foreign jihadists, and Iraq‘s ill intentioned neighbours.‘ 280  Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari stressed that the biggest mistake was to change the nature 
of the mission form liberation to occupation.
281
 Feith asserts that the concept of liberation, 
not occupation, was an objective at the senior layers of government. President Bush had 
emphasised ‗liberation, not occupation‘ as his guiding principle. There was general 
consensus before the invasion among all agencies of government that occupation would 
invite ‗guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political instability.‘282 George Packer, however, 
describes the replacement of Garner with Bremer as a rational departure in US policy and 
an attempt to get Iraq under the control of the Iraqis.
283
  
 
Even Bremer was losing patience. The CPA adjusted to the new realities on the ground. He 
asserted to a NSC meeting on 21 April 2004 that the more he has been in Iraq, the more he 
is ‗attracted to the idea of returning sovereignty to them as quickly as possible.‘284  On 19 
January 2004, Bremer met Kofi Annan in New York, where he emphasised that the 
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Coalition would welcome the reestablishment of ‗a long-term partnership with the UN‘ as 
well as to guarantee security for its officials upon returning to Iraq.
285
 And on 23 April 
2004, Bremer announced his relaxation of the strict de-Baathification policy by 
reemploying many army officers and teachers.
286
 
 
Ali Allawi, a minister in the Iraqi Governing Council cabinet, identifies two blunders of 
this period that contributed immensely to the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Firstly, the 
CPA made no effort in developing a new system of governance, as is the case in occupied 
territories, other than replacing the top echelons in government and replacing them with 
Iraqi expatriates. It was merely a continuation of the Baathist design of government. 
Secondly, the CPA did not have the mandate to directly administer the country and 
subsequently conduct such thorough reforms. This course of action clashed with the notion 
of liberation and added to the fear of a long-term commitment in Iraq that was not 
appealing to the US public.
287
 
 
The CPA was predominantly ‗about destroying the old Iraq‘ Nabil Al-Tikriti, Fellow at the 
US Institute of Peace, stressed.
288
 Yet it had no desire to a commitment as difficult as 
rebuilding it. US goals changed in Iraq due to external (international) factors as well as 
internal factors. The internal factors were twofold: Washington and domestic US opinion, 
and Baghdad and domestic Iraqi opinion.  Hughes explained how the objectives evolved. It 
was simple liberation as the president had described. But then it became more complex. 
The US wanted an Iraq that recognised the sovereignty of its neighbours, was not going to 
pose a threat to them, would participate in a free market economy, recognise humanitarian 
international law, and have a representative government. This was eventually recognised as 
too stringent a list that could not be achieved, so it was scaled back. The goal then became 
an Iraq that could defend itself, govern itself and sustain itself. The standards were 
suddenly lowered.
289
 Rubin describes it a typical case of ‗mission creep‘, if you compare 
the stated objectives before and after the invasion.
290
 Tommy Franks makes clear that his 
mission was restricted to two objectives. Firstly, regime change and secondly to deprive 
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Iraq of weapons conventional or WMD.
291
 This was the most damaging as it denied it the 
necessary attention in Phase VI. Sumaidaie emphasised that in the early days the 
expectations were high; they were moderated in the light of reality, and reduced with 
reality.
292
 Before creating the Iraqi Governing Council, Bremer issued the following orders, 
which had a dramatic impact on the events in the aftermath of the military invasion. 
Bremer eventually issued 100 orders during his administration of Iraq. 
  
1. CPA Order Number 1: De-Baathification of Iraqi Society on 16 May 2003. 
 
2. CPA Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities on 23 May 2003. 
 
3. CPA Order Number 3: Weapons Control on 23 May 2003. Overlooked as it could not 
be enforced.  
 
4. CPA Order Number 4: Management of Property and Assets of the Iraqi Baath Party on 
25 May 2003.   
 
5. CPA Order Number 5: Establishment of the Iraqi De-Baathification Council on 25 May 
2003.
 293
 
 
5.4.2  Towards Sovereignty: The Interim, Transitional and Permanent Governments 
The way in which the interim government was established was a reflection of a change in 
mood and perception in Washington. This was for two major reasons: firstly, the CPA 
proved incompetence in handling post-war Iraq; secondly, it reflected the deep flaws and 
ignorance of the neoconservative war camp in Washington as regards to the realities on the 
ground in Iraq. Because of the constant chaos in Iraq, the role of the neoconservative camp 
began to decline. The State Department and the intelligence services began to gain further 
influence in the formulation of US Iraq policy.
294
 The neoconservatives were losing ground 
to other power centres in Washington. With the empowerment of the interim government, 
arguments concerning stability and order in the Middle East began to resurface in 
Washington.
295
 The interim government was used as a token to reconcile the Arab world 
and calm their fears. It was manifest of a new outlook for Iraq contrary to the 
neoconservative model. The Shiites had been profoundly marginalised, reducing fears of 
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the Arab world regarding the emergence of a Shiite state that would be naturally allied to 
Iran.
296
 The Shiite Islamist presence during the CPA was toned down in the interim 
government, with only one true Islamist minister, Adel Abd el-Mahdi, who could be seen 
as more of a moderate than a radical. Power was being redistributed in Iraq with US 
interests in mind.
297
 The continuing insurgency in Iraq also led to a reappraisal of previous 
Washington strategies. The violence in Iraq was no longer attributed to dead-enders and 
regime remnants. An acknowledgment was emerging of the Sunni rejection of the post-
invasion order. Sunnis were encouraged and supported to become more influential in the 
new evolving order. Even Baathists who could contribute were accepted. The composition 
of the interim government reflected this new approach.
298
 It was a twist in strategy that the 
Allawi interim government was determined to tackle. The de-Baathification order would 
be diluted only to the closest Saddam henchmen, and the senior officers of the previous 
regime would be accommodated to ensure more Sunni participation in an attempt to 
reverse the insurgency.
299
 This was a reversal of strict de-Baathification and de-
militarisation policies in order to appease the Sunnis, who were considered instrumental to 
the insurgency.
300
 General Sanchez was relieved of his post as supreme commander and 
replaced by General Casey.
301
 The UN was also being brought back centre stage.  
 
US strategy was changing. The constant and unrelenting violence created the 
circumstances for a major rethink of the Bush administration‘s policy towards Iraq. Having 
appointed an authoritarian Allawi, the neoconservative discourse was being sidelined in 
Washington. This new approach for Iraq was perceived to have merit.
302
 The intention 
behind the structure and nature of the interim government was to limit Iraq‘s links with 
Iran and also to keep the pan-Arab appearance alive. Most of all, it was designed to keep 
Iraq in step with the US policy of isolating Iran.
303
 During this period, the Kurds were also 
marginalised, treated as non-players. Allawi was portrayed as a strong man, although he 
did not have Saddam‘s ‗fear factor.‘304 The interim government was used as a force for 
change and reconfiguration of previously pursued post-Saddam policies. It was a tool to 
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bring back alienated Sunnis into the political process.
305
 However, the rhetoric remained 
fairly consistent, with a further emphasis on democracy promotion. Failing to find WMD 
in Iraq after the war, the Bush administration focused its rhetoric to promoting democracy 
with no mention of the Baath regime‘s record or potential threats.306  
  
Nevertheless, Feith argues that the appointed interim government performed its job in 
advancing the political process. It was mostly dominated by externals and no issue of 
legitimacy was raised during that period, Feith asks why the US government failed to 
install an Iraqi government for 14 months, and imposed an occupation.
307
 Bremer refutes 
this argument as unrealistic since ‗such a government would have operated in a legal and 
political vacuum‘, answering to no-one, least of all to the people of Iraq. Bremer contents 
that in such a scenario, an interim Iraqi Government would have assumed power with no 
constitution and not have accepted procedures for structuring or choosing a government, or 
for making decisions or passing and enforcing laws.
308
  
 
However, this would change. Professor Juan Cole of the University of Michigan gave a 
concise description of the election outcome for the transitional National Assembly: ‗This is 
a government that will have very good relations with Iran…In terms of regional geopolitics 
this is not the outcome that the United States was hoping for.‘309 This explains why Zalmay 
Khalilzad arrived in Iraq in June 2005 with a new objective. Zalmay stated that ‗I went to 
Iraq with a clear view that we needed to bring the Sunni Arabs into the political process.‘ 
The Sunnis had boycotted the elections for the transitional constitution-writing assembly 
that had taken place in January 2005 leading to Ibrahim Jaafari election as Prime Minister. 
Khalilzad had come to Baghdad as ambassador ‗with a mission of bringing them [Sunnis] 
into the political process.‘310 
 
In November 2004 General George Casey also reviewed the US strategy in Iraq after 
General Ricardo Sanchez‘s departure. A new strategy was formulated in partnership with 
the British to ensure a counter-insurgency strategy with focus on the training of Iraqi 
security forces under the supervision of the US military. In February 2005 an unnamed 
official acknowledged that the senior leadership was contemplating an ‗overarching 
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counterinsurgency campaign plan.‘ After almost two years the US had finally recognised 
that the Iraq war was not over.
311
 The ‗Clear, Hold, Build‘ method was doctrinally 
established in FM 3-24 and endorsed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005: ‗In 
short, with the Iraqi Government, our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold, 
and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, 
national Iraqi institutions.‘312 Casey took a different approach in dealing with the security 
crisis in Iraq. Casey focused on containing the insurgent violence, building up Iraqi 
security forces, rebuilding the economy, reaching out to the hostile Sunni community both 
through co-opting and coercion.
313
   
 
However, this strategy proved flawed. US forces would clear, and then assign the role of 
holding the terrain to Iraqi forces which were lacking in quality and quantity.
314
 The US 
was constantly returning to re-clear previously cleared terrain.
315
 The basic problem with 
the approach was that US troop strength was inadequate to hold the terrain and 
subsequently secure the population.
316
 President Bush had also recognised the failed US 
strategy in Iraq especially with the insurgency compounded by sectarian violence. The US 
had in 2006 both an insurgency and brewing civil war to deal with.  
 
As it stands, the post-invasion period of Iraq was characterised by three major phases. The 
first phase immediately after the fall of Saddam‘s regime was a neoconservative phase. 
The Bush administration pursued its idealistic and naïve perceptions of a post-war order 
with little success. The second phase was more sober, with a clear emphasis on security 
and stability, enshrined in the interim government of Ayad Allawi. In this period, the 
idealistic aspirations of the US for a new Iraq were abandoned for security. Former Baath 
and military elements were included in the security process. The third phase straddled the 
clear defeat of a pro-western political order to a transitional government of Shiite 
dominance. This phase was characterised by great personal involvement of Zalmay 
Khalilzad in achieving further Sunni participation in the drafting of the constitution and the 
creation of a power-balance to the excessive Shiite power in the post-Saddam era.
317
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Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Dom Caraccilo described the different phases of 
the US invasion as follows: liberators, occupiers and counterinsurgents with no parallel to 
any other US enterprise in history. Caraccilo refutes any possible comparison with 
Germany, Japan, Vietnam and French Algeria. To him the insurgency had no organised 
structure, it was a confused mixture of various combining elements.
318
 Matthew 
Stephenson of the State Department described US Iraq policy under President Bush having 
three distinct phases applying consistently to the political, military and economic levels of 
US interaction with Iraq. The first phase was a US managed operation, later transitioning 
into a joint US-Iraq effort, and finally by the end of the Bush administration a US 
supported effort.
319
 Stephenson, described political evolution in Iraq, he divided the 
political timeline into three phases. Post Operation Iraqi Freedom the CPA had full 
sovereignty. The US then created an interim and a transitional government with 
sovereignty being transitioned during this period and Iraq only fully sovereign after the 
constitution was adopted and the constitutional permanent government elected.
320
   
 
Khalilzad acknowledged that the US adapted ‗I think if you go in with very fixed ideas and 
do not have the agility to adjust, dealing with reality as you find them, I think that could be 
a constraint that could help cause failure.‘ He affirmed that as one of the few that knew the 
region, ‗he could absorb the realities‘ of the region he could advise leaders what sort of 
adjustments were required in US plans, in order to make progress and be successful.
321
 
Qubad Talabani uses personalities to describe the evolution in US policy after the invasion, 
‗you can gauge the US through characters.‘ Jay Garner was ‗a sleeves-rolled-up official‘ 
working with his hands. Then you had ‗a sharp, stern and serious Ambassador Bremer.‘ 
Negroponte he described as a reclusive figure, the US purposely taking the back seat to 
allow Iraqi sovereignty to flourish. Then Ambassadors David Satterfield and James Jeffrey 
who did not quite fill the void, followed by Khalilzad who was all about shuttle 
diplomacy.
322
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Bush made clear he was adjusting: ‗stay the course means, let‘s get the job done, but it 
doesn‘t mean staying stuck on a strategy or tactics that may not be working.‘323 On 10 
January 2007 Bush announced the surge. In a candid speech he stressed that ‗it is clear that 
we need to change our strategy in Iraq.‘324 It is quite clear from the re-election of Bush for 
a second term that the policies of the Bush administration were far stronger than a handful 
of neoconservative intellectuals and the American Enterprise Institute. It was a national 
choice, and, even if a Kerry White House had been the outcome, the international 
circumstances would have left no choice, but to continue existing policies. Therefore it 
could be argued that the very continuation of the policies of the Bush Doctrine explain that 
its principal themes correspond to American values, interests and capabilities.
325
 On the 
eve of the fifth anniversary of 9/11 in 2006 President Bush took the opportunity to 
acknowledge mistakes made and also emphasised the necessity of continuity in the 
ongoing campaign in Iraq. He said: ‗whatever mistakes have been made in Iraq, the worst 
mistake would be to think that if we pulled out, the terrorists would leave us alone. They 
will not leave us alone. They will follow us. The safety of America depends on the 
outcome of the battle in the streets of Baghdad.‘ 326  The adjustments made reflected 
changes in strategy i.e. what to do, and tactics i.e. how to do it. The principal policies 
remained the same.  
 
Nevertheless, the second Bush term saw major changes as regards the Bush foreign policy 
team with several replacements in high profile positions in the administration, Rice, 
Wolfowitz, Feith and later on Rumsfeld. The US showed greater warmth towards Europe. 
There were also attempts at showing more interest toward multilateralism as regards Iraq. 
The Bush administration pressed the UN into a greater role in Iraq with UNSCR 1770 
allowing a greater political role with respect to promoting national reconciliation in the 
country.
327
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The National Security Strategy of 2006 perpetuated the notion of pre-emption and all other 
aspects of the Bush Doctrine, and in so doing echoed the already declared policy.
328
 The 
Bush administration took its election for a second term as a mandate to continue its current 
policies.
329
 Condoleezza Rice emphasised this attitude as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, in a 2005 statement in Cairo: ‗For 60 years, my country, the United States, 
pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here, in the Middle East – and 
we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the 
democratic aspirations of all people.‘ 
 
This is not to say after the continuous setbacks and discouragements on the ground in 
Afghanistan and especially with the insurgency in Iraq, as Philip Gordon states, a clear 
change in tone and style was not witnessed from the start of President Bush‘s second term 
in office, which Gordon defines as ‗counterrevolution‘; this time round multilateralism, 
alliances and consultation were given greater value. International institutions such as the 
ICC, which it was reluctant to support during the first term were given greater value as 
well as pledges to support the United Nations on certain issues; all became visible signs of 
retreat from previous policies.
330
 
 
5.4.2.1  The mid-term elections 2006 
The major change in Iraq came when the internal violence in Iraq reached unprecedented 
levels. The insurgency was compounded with signs of early phases of an all out sectarian 
war between Iraq‘s Sunnis and Shiites. The November 2006 congressional elections were 
also a major indication of the decline in public support for the Bush administration and its 
Iraq war. The Democrats had promised a new approach to Iraq policy as their campaign 
slogan and had won Congress back. However, Bush was adamant that there would be no 
change of policy even with the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report in the 
pipeline.
331
 The recognition of the deteriorating situation of Iraq was only publicly 
recognised in late 2006. The turning point seemed to be the statements made by Senator 
John Warner who said the ‗situation is simply drifting sidewise‘ and that a ‗change of 
course‘ should be considered if the situation had not changed by the end of 2006. 
Condoleezza Rice also visited Baghdad in October 2006 expressing her frustration with the 
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Iraqi authorities due to their ‗political inaction.‘332 The Iraqi Study Group co-chaired by 
James Baker and Lee Hamilton had already been commissioned on 15 March 2006 to 
assess the situation in Iraq. The study had 79 recommendations. The boldest was that the 
US accelerate handing security to the Iraqi government and start withdrawal. The president 
however disagreed with this approach and was determined to see it through. Certain 
conservative and military figures intervened, advocating a new approach which eventually 
became known as the surge. Frederick Kagan was who was one of the leading architects of 
the surge was a neoconservative, whereas cautious realists like Baker-Hamilton opposed 
it.
333
 Even though the neoconservative agenda gained momentum as a result of 9/11, the 
marriage of convenience between realists, pragmatists and neoconservatives had begun to 
unravel in the mid second term of the Bush presidency as a result of the mounting troubles 
in Iraq.
334
  
 
Congressman Christopher Van Hollen (D-MD) affirmed that in the lead up to the war the 
Congress passed a resolution in the fall of 2002 authorising the president to use force in 
Iraq. It gave the president a ‗blank cheque‘ and it did not require the president to come 
back to Congress. The Congress provided little oversight and continued its blank cheque 
until January 2007.
335
 In 2006 and 2007 the US Congress re-established itself as an equal 
arm of government after many years of passiveness as a result of the 9/11 attacks.
336
 With 
mid-term elections due in November 2006 and the presidential elections due in late 2008 
no one in Washington was really prepared to ask for more troops. Both Republicans and 
Democrats wanted troop levels reduced.
337
 When Democrats gained control of Congress in 
late 2006, there was more accountability in the development contracts. There was more 
accountability in terms of how effectively the training and equipping programme was 
going with the Iraqi military. The Congress held the administration accountable on 
benchmarks on which they had publicly stated the Iraqi government would be judged. 
Richard Kessler, however, referring to the US Congress, argued that when you influence 
something when it is pretty much under way, influence is diminished. His perception is 
that influence usually comes at the beginning when you try to articulate policy. But if you 
attempt to exert influence along the way, this will have diminished.
338
 A senior 
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Congressional staffer argued that until the Democrats took over in late 2006, Congress did 
very little in the way of oversight because it had a Republican majority that was not going 
to be tough on its own administration. Congress really only began its job in early 2007. 
The Democratic takeover also led to the concentration of the minds in the Bush 
administration leading to the surge. Congress did not do a lot in the immediate aftermath of 
the war. It did not do a lot to question the Bush administration‘s moves. Bush had realised 
in 2006 it was a ‗do or die situation‘, and the last chance to save the Iraq war. The 
administration knew that its back was against the wall and that there was a danger that the 
antiwar movement could grow, and be led by Congress.
339
 
 
5.4.2.2  The surge 
As the insurgency began to build, General David Petraeus was assigned the role of 
reforming US military strategy to tackle the violence. This was almost a year after the 
invasion.
340
 However, the actual change in Iraq came in the fall of 2006. General Peter 
Pace created a secret panel to review the Iraq strategy. The conclusions of the panel were 
briefed to the president on 13 December. The conclusion was to change the strategy from 
direct combat operations to a new supportive, training and advisory role. This was to be 
done through an initial increase of 20,000-30,000 to confront sectarian violence and 
increase security in Baghdad.
341
 As a result in 2007 General George Casey‘s ‗clear, hold 
and build‘ was replaced by a new strategy implemented by General David Petraeus that 
focused on protecting the Iraqi populace.
342
 Petraeus took over the coalition forces 
command in Iraq on 10 February 2007 after he had demonstrated considerable success in 
his tour as head of the 101st Airborne division in 2003. The idea this time was to increase 
the US military presence in Baghdad and Anbar by 17,000 and 4000 troops respectively. 
Petraus would establish 36 outposts across Baghdad where US and Iraqi forces would live 
and operate together. Iraqi troops would lead the way with US forces backing them as well 
as preventing sectarian violence. This new approach known as ‗the surge‘, would also 
‗clear, hold and build‘ rather than embark upon the taking and re-taking of cities again and 
again as had been previously done and would focus on the protection of civilians, which in 
preceding years was at best a low priority.
343
 The surge was enhanced by other internal 
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factors. Frederick Kagan stated that Muqtada Sadr‘s truce was helpful, but that was less 
important than the Awakening movement that was facilitated by the surge.
 344
 Another 
major factor assisting the success of the surge was Iran‘s later adopted strategy, they 
allowed calm in Basra and Iraq to allow US and British withdrawal – a prime Iranian 
objective.    
 
General Odierno was very prominent in designing the surge. He and his staff did most of 
the military planning before Petraeus arrived in February 2007 although Petraeus was also 
involved. General Petraeus had authored the Counterinsurgency manual which had laid out 
the template.
345
 Frederick Kagan explained to the author that the strategy that the US 
pursued after it belatedly recognised it was facing an insurgency and a determined terrorist 
campaign in Iraq was a strategy that was based on two fundamental assumptions about 
counterinsurgency. One, was that the presence of counterinsurgency forces is an irritant 
that fuels the insurgency, and therefore the number should be minimised and the profile of 
exogenous counterinsurgency forces should be minimised. The other assumption was that 
it is very important not to do things for the host government or security forces lest it 
become dependent on the external ally and fail to establish its own ability to do what needs 
to do to defend itself. This was an assumption that underlay General Abizaid‘s approach to 
the conflict throughout his tenure and the assumption that guided General Casey as Iraq 
commander.
346
 The problem was, however, a third factor about counterinsurgency that the 
US military ignored. If the population is not provided with security then it does not matter 
if the profile of the external forces is minimised; if security is left to the host government 
incapable of providing an adequate security situation, the latter is capable of deteriorating 
very rapidly to the point of total collapse.  
      
The situation that was developing in 2006 as the capabilities of the Iraqi government 
security forces were increasing steadily, was that violence was increasing exponentially. 
Kagan stated that it looked that there was no way the capabilities of the Iraq security forces 
were going to halt the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. So Kagan and others inside 
and outside the military proposed a change in strategy to prioritise providing security to the 
Iraqi population first, and worry about other things later. This was the origin of the shift in 
strategy in 2007, namely the surge. Executing that strategy required more forces. However, 
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Kagan stated that if the US had injected more forces into the previous strategy it would 
have failed. The issue was not more forces but change in strategy that needed more forces 
to work.
347
 Kagan stressed that the surge was designed to provide security for the Iraqi 
people. This could not be done without controlling certain key terrain, but the purpose of 
the surge was not to control the terrain.
348
  
 
Bush had always been sceptical of his successor‘s commitment to Iraq, which is why he 
hoped the surge would succeed. He stated: ‗The danger is that the United States won‘t stay 
engaged.‘ He hoped for a longer presence of US forces in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi 
government. Bush asserted ‗the danger is, people come to office and say, ―Let us promote 
stability – that‘s more important.‖ The problem is that in an ideological war, stability isn‘t 
the answer to the root cause of why people kill and terrorise.‘349 Bush expressed his views 
on the escalating crises in Iraq on 1 December 2008. Regarding a possible pullout of Iraq 
he argued that it would have ‗compromised the principle that when you put kids into 
harm‘s way, you go in to win.‘ Bush described his decision ‗a tough call,‘ particularly, 
‗since a lot of people were advising for me to get out of Iraq,‘ and pull back in Iraq.  
However after listening to a lot of voices he ultimately decided ‗I‘m not going to let your 
son die in vain; I believe we can win; I‘m going to do what it takes to win in Iraq.‘ 
 
Garfinkle argued that there were not any changes in policy. The policy was consistently 
‗don‘t get defeated.‘ This meant conclusive military victory and preventing the appearance 
of defeat.
350
 Pillar talked about these changes as more tactical in nature. He described as ‗a 
lot of stumbling and fumbling‘ where a certain approach was pursued leading to failure 
then looking towards other alternatives.
351
 Frederick Kagan described it as a kaleidoscope 
as the US alternately pursued very bad and good strategies. Kagan explained that it is not 
very unusual in the way the US conducts wars and is common that America starts badly 
then rights itself after a period. ‗I think we‘ve done that in Iraq‘ Kagan asserted. Kagan 
also affirmed that all US interests lead in the direction of standing by the Iraqi people in 
addition to the moral obligation to stand by Iraq.
352
 Kagan stressed that US policy towards 
Iraq had been very consistent ‗changes in foreign policy no, our foreign policy has been 
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very consistent, changes in military strategy, yes.‘ 353  Andrew Morrison of the State 
Department argued that US foreign policy is greatly consistent. Morrison asserted that ‗the 
same fundamental questions, the same fundamental issues lead to the same fundamental 
answers.‘354  
 
The US objective was to restore Iraq to stability. Former Congressman James Longley 
affirmed ‗I don‘t think the end objective has ever changed.‘ Another objective is to make 
Iraq a moderating influence in the Middle East.
355
 The State Department‘s Matthew 
Stephenson argued that, ‗the end goal has always been the same.‘ The question has been 
how to reach that end goal. The goal has remained consistent with different routes 
attempted to get there. Stephenson affirmed that the US objective in Iraq is for a 
democratic state at peace with its neighbours, which is economically strong and is not a 
haven for terrorist activities, a country that really is a place where political and economic 
growth can take place. The US, he asserted, was in the process of reaching such an 
objective: ‗we‘re not there but we‘ve made progress.‘356 The success of the surge cooled 
temperatures in Washington a senior Congressional staffer explained.
357
 This has helped 
the US pursue its goals in Iraq. 
 
The Bush administration also adjusted to realities on the ground. Bush surrounded himself 
with pragmatists and problem solvers like Robert Gates and was not as strongly motivated 
by the ideology born after 9/11.
358
 The new shift was managed by pragmatists and sceptics, 
those whose advice had been denounced and disregarded.
359
 During this transition the US 
became pragmatic and less idealistic. Stephenson explained ‗I think that‘s fair to say‘ that 
there had been a transition in US policy from idealistic aspirations to more realistic 
goals.
360
 The administration dropped the policy to create a model Iraq for the region. The 
idea that it can be a full-fledged democracy has diminished. It is to leave Iraq as a stable 
semi-democratic Iraq, not a democracy in the American or British sense of the word.
361
 
Rubin emphasised that policy is the art of the possible. The goals were significantly 
narrowed as difficulties were encountered. The main US goal by the end of the Bush 
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administration was to leave Iraq a stable place so that America did not have to go in again. 
The US initially thought much more broadly about democracy during the CPA. The 
broader goal up through the CPA was creating a permanent democratic system for Iraq. 
During this first phase there were other clearly defined goals: eradicating WDM, disarming 
terrorists and restoring stability to Iraq. As violence was encountered the goal of creating a 
permanent democratic system decreased in importance to the White House and the focus 
was on stability.
362
 Meghan O‘Sullivan stressed that there was a shift towards a more 
pragmatic stance on a whole number of questions. The most obvious example of a 
movement towards pragmatism was working with the Awakening Councils ‗Sahwa.‘ This 
idea of working with armed groups outside the Iraqi security forces had been rejected in 
earlier years as being at odds with the development of good security institutions. 
Supporting such groups, however was eventually recognised as something that had 
inherent risks but overall had potentially more benefits than risks; such risks were 
something that the US and Iraq would have to manage jointly.
363
 
 
The final episode of the Bush administration‘s Iraq policy was the future of the US military 
presence in the country. The US and Iraq started to negotiate a mandate authorising the US 
presence after the expiration of UNSCR 1790 mandate on 31 December 2008. It was a 
priority of the US negotiating team to stay in Iraq. The US negotiations team wanted bases 
in Iraq, so they were willing to let the Iraqis make demands. From their point of view they 
were facing a new Cold War and a generational challenge against radical Islamic 
extremism for which bases were necessary in Iraq.
364
 This did not materialise. On 27 
November 2008 the Iraqi parliament approved a security pact that required the US military 
to end its presence in Iraq in the end of 2011. The pact, however allowed the Iraqi 
government to negotiate with the United States to extend the presence of US troops if 
conditions on the ground were not stable. The Bush administration was anxious about the 
agreement slipping through to the Obama administration. Bush stated: ‗Two years ago, this 
day seemed unlikely but the success of the surge and the courage of the Iraqi people set the 
conditions for these two agreements to be negotiated and approved by the Iraqi 
parliament,‘ The security pact was composed of two major documents: US-Iraq Status of 
Forces Agreement and a Strategic Framework Agreement allowing cooperation to take 
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place on military and various other levels.365 As Richard Fenning, CEO Control Risks 
Group, argued the transfer of ‗full sovereignty‘ did not return back to Iraq until the end of 
2008.
366
 Iraq was now engaged with the US in a bilateral agreement removing Iraq from 
the mandate of the multi-national forces.  
 
The post-invasion transition in Iraq took on several stages. Initially the US was an 
occupying power, and subsequently the dominant military power in the country. The 
transition towards sovereignty was gradual. With the new governmental institutions 
becoming more capable and established, they gradually acquired more capacity for 
independent decision-making. From the first appointed Allawi government to the Maliki 
government formed after the national elections in December 2005, the transition was 
gradual. Iraq having an elected government and constitution in place gained much more 
legitimacy and capacity to take independent decisions. Sumaidaie defined the evolution of 
US-Iraq relations as a ‗relationship transformed from a subservient relationship in 2003 to 
something approaching the relationship of two sovereign countries each fending for their 
own interests.‘367  
 
This chapter and the preceding three conclude the initial focus of this research on US Iraq 
policy at the national level, in other words US policy towards Arab Iraq. The chapter that 
follows, however, attempts to address in meticulous detail a novel and highly neglected 
aspect of US foreign policy relating to the Kurds of Iraq. It focuses on a highly important 
aspect of US Iraq policy at the sub-national level helping give foreign policy analysts and 
students an insight into the location of the Kurds in US foreign policy discourse and helps 
illustrate Iraq‘s significance in US Middle East policy.  
 
 
                                                 
365
 Sudarsan Raghavan. ‗Security Accord Approved In Iraq‘, The Washington Post, (2008, November 28). p. 
A01.  
366
 Richard Fenning. (2009). Analysis: A New Iraq? [BBC Radio 4] Available at: <URL: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analysis/transcripts/15_06_09.txt > Access Date: 20 
September 2009.   
367
 Samir Sumaidaie, Interview with Author, 24 July 2008, Washington, D.C.  
172 
 
Chapter 6: 
 
THE IRAQI KURDS IN US FOREIGN POLICY:  
FROM KENNEDY TO BUSH II 
 
The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development…  
 
Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Speech, 8 January, 1918.
1
 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters of this thesis are largely focused on US Iraq policy at the national 
level. As such the previous chapters are restricted to US interaction with Arab Iraq and its 
largest ethnicity – the Arabs. What contemporary scholarship largely fails to address is US 
relations with Iraq‘s Kurds, the second largest ethnicity in Iraq, who were largely absent 
from government in Baghdad until the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003. This chapter 
attempts to describe and address this sub-national interaction, perceiving it as the second 
limb of US Iraq policy. This chapter attempts to study US policy, or lack thereof, towards 
the Kurds of Iraq. It aims to identify various phases of interaction and non-interaction, 
resulting mostly from the evolution of regional and international political events. The 
chapter attempts to tackle US relations with Iraq‘s Kurds, starting from 1961, when the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq ignited and first sought US support under the 
Kennedy administration. The research will follow through the various stages, highlighting 
the most important interactions, but will concentrate on the George W. Bush 
administration, as this is the prime focus of this study. This angle of research will also 
allow a rigorous understanding of continuity and change in US Iraq policy at the sub-
national level.  
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6.1  Historical Overview 
The Kurds of the Middle East are caught up, reluctantly, in the strategic geopolitical 
calculations of the various influential actors of the region. With the creation of the post-
colonial order, both superpowers and regional powers have fought relentlessly for 
domination of the Middle East. The Kurds, a substantial ethnicity in the Middle East, with 
nationalistic aspirations at heart, have had to struggle in a hostile political environment to 
promote their cause. As a result, and at their peril, the stateless Kurds have had to play at 
both regional and international levels to advance their ethnic struggle. Following the onset 
of the Cold War, the Kurds have been embroiled in the superpowers‘ competition for 
dominance in the Middle East. Their first major shock came in the context of the very 
initial phases of the Cold War, when the Soviet-supported Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 
collapsed in December 1946, due to US demands for Moscow‘s withdrawal from northern 
Iran. They were, perhaps, among the first victims of the Cold War.   
 
The Kurds, initially promised a nation of their own in the 1920 Sevres Treaty, ended up as 
major losers in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Their nationalist aspirations were crushed by 
the powerful regional player, Turkey. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds, 
deprived of a nation-state of their own, were subjugated by the nations of the region. They 
found themselves divided among superior regional adversaries - Iraq, Iran, Turkey and 
Syria - who have constantly sought their suppression. Regardless of the circumstances, 
they have continued to fight continuously for the right to self-determination. Despite these 
inherent difficulties, they have managed to sustain their struggle.  
 
Moreover, the stateless Kurds, though not a primary actor in the region in a state-centric 
international system, have had considerable influence on the evolution of political events 
in the Middle East. To advance their cause they have had to play at both the complex 
interdependent regional and international systems, attempting to maximise their power vis-
à-vis existing regional rivalries and superpower interests. As a result, they have found 
themselves politically undermined in the severest ways. At both levels they have found 
themselves enmeshed in complicated political situations, and exploited as a tool to advance 
the interests of regional and international powers.  
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6.2  The Kurds: Victims of the Cold War 
6.2.1  The Kurds Ignored: 1961-1972  
The US gradually gained influence in the Middle East with the decline of the British 
Empire; and soon the United States started to show interest in the Kurds, a substantial 
ethnicity in the Middle East and sizable minority in Iraq. One of the earliest-documented 
signs of such interest came in a memo sent by Edward Crocker II, the first US ambassador 
to Baghdad, on 10 April 1950. Crocker sent a cable from Baghdad to the State Department 
after eight months about the publication of a new Kurdish language news bulletin, prepared 
weekly by the US Information Service at the American embassy in Baghdad. Crocker 
described the venture as strictly directed at Iraqi Kurds with the sole intention as ‗an effort 
to fill the gap in the democratic information activity countering Soviet propaganda to the 
Kurds.‘2 The US interest in the Iraqi Kurds at this time served two purposes. Firstly, it was 
an attempt at keeping the Kurds from Soviet influence. Secondly it was to help the pro-
Western Iraqi monarchy keep the Kurds under control. In a declassified telegram from the 
US embassy in Tehran, Henry Grady encouraged the broadcast of VOA (Voice of 
America) in Kurdish; he also emphasised that it should in no way encourage Kurdish 
political nationalism, but rather promote Kurdish support for the central Iranian 
government.
3
 This would largely apply to Iraq as it, too, was ruled by a friendly pro-
Western monarch.                
 
With the September Revolution of 1961 under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani, the 
Kurds of Iraq tried to reach out to the outside world. The objective was, firstly, to gain 
recognition for their national cause; and, secondly, to obtain military and financial support 
to continue their armed struggle. The Kurds knew that without an outside power on their 
side, their national struggle had little chance of success; and, they thought, no power was 
better suited to perform this role than the US. The image of the US as a beacon of freedom 
and democracy was not lost on the Kurds. Woodrow Wilson‘s fourteen points, among 
them (in point 12) the right to self-determination for ethnicities living under the crumbling 
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Ottoman Empire, had considerable influence on the Kurds. Iraq had also started to drift 
away from the West after the 1958 revolution, and signs of its friendship with the Soviet 
Union were becoming apparent. Thus, on a practical level, the US seemed the most 
attractive ally.         
 
To this end, the Kurdish leadership made attempts to develop contacts with the US. It 
appears that Barzani‘s attempts to establish links with the US were based on strategic 
calculations relevant to that era - Iraq had gained the enmity of the US after the 1958 
revolution. The incoming Qassim government restored relations with the Soviet Union, 
permitted Iraqi Communist Party influence and suppressed pro-Western party activities.
4
 
Three years earlier, it overthrew the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy. Qassim had also 
withdrawn from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact of 1955 and the 1937 Saadabad Pact, 
intended to curtail Soviet influence.
5
 Moreover, it was a nationalist regime with pan-Arab 
aspirations and disdain for Western colonial influence. After Qassim overthrew the British-
installed monarchy in 1958, the US grew anxious about the new regime in Baghdad, which 
it perceived as a largely radical nationalist entity, developing ties with Moscow. The 
Qassim government further offended the Kennedy administration‘s sensitivities by its 
attempts to nationalise the Iraqi oil installations, which were owned by US and British 
interests. For these reasons the US embassy in Baghdad established links with dissident 
officers in the Iraqi army. In 1963 a second coup, led by these officers, replaced Qassim 
before the nationalisation was achieved.
6
 With the overthrow of Qassim in 1963, the US 
was happy with the nature of the new regime; declassified US documents describe the new 
1963 Iraqi government as a ‗moderate regime.‘7  
 
The earliest reports of US-Kurdish relations suggest that the first contacts were made in the 
early sixties. Mustafa Barzani appears to have started seeking support from the US during 
this period. Asad Khailany, the KDP‘s Baghdad branch head, first made contact with the 
US embassy in Baghdad in 1960; this was before the 1961 revolution and the start of 
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hostilities with Qassim‘s regime. He was the first Kurdish official to do so. His first serious 
approach, on behalf of the KDP for political support, was to the First Political Secretary 
James Akins in 1962. The US had very little information on the Kurds at the time. In 
Khailany‘s words ‗most of them were ignorant about the [Kurdish] case.‘ In 1964, Akins 
invited Khailany to meet with Under Secretary of State Philip Talbot in Baghdad. Talbot 
was interested to know more about Iraq and the Kurdish plight, because the Kurds were 
emerging as a significant force in the country and the US had little information about them. 
Khailany asked Under Secretary Talbot to give him one good reason why the US did not 
support Kurdish nationalist rights; to which he responded, ‗It‘s not in my hands, that‘s 
politics.‘ The US continued to show sympathy, but no material support, for the Kurdish 
cause. State Department policy was not to recognise Kurdish nationalist rights; however, 
they backed human rights. The Kurds asked for US support, but the US did not respond.
8
 
In a 1962 interview in The New York Times, Barzani told Dana Adams Schmidt ‗Let the 
Americans give us military aid, openly or secretly, so that we can become truly 
autonomous, and we will become your loyal partners in the Middle East.‘9 Barzani seems 
to have believed that the Kurds could play a significant role in the region as a strategic US 
ally. They wanted to attract American support in return for becoming a loyal regional 
partner. The Kurds, a non-Arab ethnicity, believed that they could play the role of a 
significant client to counter pan-Arab and Islamist tendencies in the region. However, the 
US did not seem to lack strategic allies in the region. On a strictly realpolitik assessment of 
the region, the US had more to gain from regional allies like Turkey and the Shah‘s Iran 
than from the stateless Iraqi Kurds.   
 
In a March 1972 memo (declassified on 21 June 2006), NSC official Harold Saunders 
reported a request from SAVAK, the, Iranian intelligence service, for US assistance to 
Mustafa Barzani. Saunders stated that ‗similar approaches have been made over the last ten 
years and have been turned down‘. He also made clear that ‗there is nothing absolutely 
needed from us except that they want to involve us.‘ Moreover, he contended that ‗the 
odds are against the Kurds succeeding.‘ Saunders also stated that US involvement in this 
issue ‗could be regarded by the Soviets as a move directed against them.‘10 In 1968 
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Barzani made a visit to Israel to nurture a relationship that, he thought, would eventually 
help advance the Kurdish cause. Barzani knew that Israel‘s relations with the US were 
unique and, for this reason, wanted to enlist Israel‘s support. Barzani had initiated contacts 
with Israel in 1963, and military cooperation had begun in 1965. Barzani did not trust 
Israel, but sought Israeli attention, hoping it would attract US support. This was to no avail. 
Harold Saunders advised against US involvement, for he believed that ‗any assistance that 
may be needed by Barzani is fully within the capability of Iran or Israel to provide.‘11   
  
US-Iraqi diplomatic relations were totally suspended over the Six-Day War of 1967. 
Following this, in 1968, the Baath Party ascended to power in a coup, for the second time 
making the US uneasy; a radical, nationalist and pan-Arab party was a cause for concern in 
Washington. Although there were no diplomatic relations, the US described the new 
Baathist government as ‗a little harder to deal with than the old.‘12 The Baath ideology of 
Arab socialism was by default closer to Soviet communism. The Baathists, eager to 
establish strong roots in the country they had lost once in November 1963, were able to 
advance their regime economically with the nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company 
in 1972. They also managed to secure a strategic security relationship with the Soviet 
Union in April, 1972 - all the more reason for the US to be concerned about Iraq.  
  
Mustafa Barzani enjoyed the backing of the Soviet Union, until the Treaty of Friendship 
between Iraq and the Soviets was signed in 1972;
13
 this appears to be another reason why 
Barzani aspired to further support to from the opposite pole, the US. The Kurds believed in 
the possibility of greater US attention to the Kurdish revolt as a counter-balance to the 
Soviet alliance with Iraq. However, two calls for US support, in 1971 and 1972, were 
totally ignored. The Pike Congressional Report
14
 asserts that both requests were deemed 
destabilising, as they would create the opportunity for Soviet intervention in both Iran and 
Turkey, both US allies, which had large Kurdish populations.
15
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The US continued to ignore Kurdish requests for support for their nationalist movement. 
The negative US reaction to this appeal was based on several concerns, as shown by 
declassified US documents. The US felt that a Barzani-dominated regime would have 
difficulty surviving in the face of what would, doubtless, become consolidated Arab 
opposition to it, from both inside and outside Iraq. Secondly the Soviets were so well-
established economically in Iraq that, even if Barzani succeeded in overthrowing the 
Baathists, it was unlikely that Barzani could break Iraq‘s ties with Moscow, unless the US 
were prepared to step in with immediate and substantial assistance. Furthermore, US 
support, for a coup operation which was perceived to be ill-organised, would be difficult to 
conceal; thus the US would risk further strain on its relations with the other Arab states 
because of support for a non-Arab movement, backed by other non-Arab states (Iran and 
Israel), against the Arabs. Fourthly, facilitating the coming to power of a Kurdish-
supported government in Baghdad also risked raising Kurdish expectations in 
neighbouring Iran and Turkey, causing concern, at least in Turkey if not Iran. Additionally, 
any encouragement to the Kurds, from the US point of view, would give further impetus to 
Kurdish nationalist aspirations which aimed, eventually, to establish a separate state of 
Kurdistan. Such a step, they believed, would be retrogressive, in that it would represent 
further fragmentation in an already fragmented area.
16
 Moreover, the US was wary of 
committing itself to a guerrilla campaign, the greatest success of which could only be a 
standoff with the government in Baghdad and preservation of Kurdish autonomy. The US 
knew that if the battle turned against the Kurds, they would neither have the assets nor the 
interest to provide decisive support. Financially the US government emphasised that the 
resources necessary were available in Saudi Arabia and Iran; the US felt that this should be 
a regional effort, rather than one for which they would provide direct support. Finally, the 
US considered the implications of supporting the Kurds in the context of the Moscow 
summit talks of May 1972. It knew that the Soviets had made a recent effort to persuade 
the Kurds to join the Baath Party in a national unity government in Baghdad; hence they 
believed that support for the Kurds would be read politically as a direct anti-Soviet move.
17
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As a consequence of these perceptions the Kurds continued to be ignored by the United 
States.  
 
6.2.2  The Kurds as Pawns: 1972-1975  
The first documented and confirmed evidence of US support for the Kurds, going back to 
1972, appeared in the leaked Pike House Committee hearings. It started with the Shah 
requesting President Nixon and Henry Kissinger‘s help in aiding the Kurds.18 On May 30 
1972, President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger visited the Shah in Tehran. The twenty-
two-hour visit culminated in their approval of the Shah‘s request for covert support to the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq.
19
 The Pike Report asserted that ‗the project was initiated as a 
favour to our ally, who had cooperated with US agencies and had come to feel menaced by 
his neighbour.‘20  
 
In a memo to Nixon, Kissinger explained why the US should support Iran: ‗The Shah of 
Iran is an island of stability in an otherwise unstable area…the Shah‘s foreign policy, while 
increasingly flexible, is openly based on a special relationship with the US. From our 
viewpoint, he is a good friend.‘21 The Shah intended, with this support, to use the Kurdish 
revolt as a bargaining chip to increase pressure on Iraq.
22
 The Pike Report quoted CIA 
memos which characterised the Kurds as ‗a uniquely useful tool for weakening (our ally‘s 
enemy‘s) potential for international adventurism.‘23 The shift in US policy had very little to 
do with support for the Kurdish struggle per se. Nor did it have anything to do with US 
recognition of the Kurds as of any political significance or of particular strategic value. 
The secretive nature of the support, a CIA covert operation, suggests that it was only one 
of numerous typical CIA operations. So the Kurds gained significant US support in 1972, 
solely on the basis of the Shah‘s request, which advanced both US and Iranian interests. 
The Kurds were considered an effective pawn to destabilise Iraq. Brent Scowcroft 
expressed the US view of the time, stating: 
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The Kurds were derivative. The Shah was a good ally. And he was 
having this problem with Iraq. We were emotionally supporting the 
Kurds, but it wasn‘t a big deal.24  
Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger saw Iraq as a Soviet client; to topple the Baath regime 
would have been a significant blow in the Cold War.
25
 Hence Woodward argues that, 
during the Nixon administration, Iraq had become a pawn in the Cold War. To achieve 
this, Nixon awarded the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 5 million USD for 
supplies and weapons through the CIA. Britain, Israel and Iran also paid 7 million USD 
collectively to fund the Kurdish revolt. Kissinger, then Secretary of State, recommended 
by 1973 that the funding be increased, since Iraq‘s role as a chief Soviet ally was becoming 
more detrimental. Iraq was also blocking an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal and ‗continued 
to finance terrorist organisations.‘26 Additionally, oil seems to have played a role in 
America‘s reversal of its non-interaction policy with the Kurds. US cooperation only came 
two weeks after the Iraq Petroleum Company was nationalised by the Baathist government 
in Baghdad.
27
 American journalist Aron Latham argues, in ‗What Kissinger Was Afraid of 
in the Pike Papers‘, that the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq would, it was hoped, be the 
equivalent of the truckers‘ strike in Chile. It was intended to topple Saddam Hussein, as 
had been the case with Salvador Allende, and bring about a friendlier regime. Nixon and 
Kissinger thought that the US could then, possibly, regain access to the Iraqi oil fields.
28
  
Moreover, the CIA station chief in Tehran sent a cable to Washington stating ‗only a few 
Kurdish leaders knew that until recently they had our secret support for their military 
resistance because it diverted Iraq from Israel.‘29  Kissinger, with brutal candour, later 
stated in his book White House Years, ‗the benefit of Nixon‘s Kurdish decision was 
apparent in just over a year: only one Iraqi division was available to participate in the 
October 1973 Middle East War.‘30 Two of Barzani‘s visits to Tel Aviv, in 1968 and 1973, 
also confirmed that Israel‘s help for the Kurdish movement was not based on genuine 
support for the cause itself; Israel‘s support for the Kurdish struggle was only to contain 
and weaken Iraq. It also failed to produce the special relationship with the US, which 
Barzani sought. Israel never genuinely supported the Kurdish cause because of its unique 
relationship with Turkey. It avoided damaging relations with its only ally in the Middle 
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East for strategic, political and military reasons, as well as for historical considerations: at 
a time when Jews residing under the Ottoman Empire were being persecuted with the 
‗blood libel‘, Suleiman the Magnificent had declared the ‗blood libel‘ illegal in 1554.  
In a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, only partly declassified in 2006, Harold Saunders of 
the National Security Council stated that the United States could support the Kurdish 
movement on the basis of three major calculations. Saunders believed that, if it permitted 
or encouraged the Kurds to remain a source of instability in Iraq, this would thwart the 
Soviet effort to promote a national unity government as a sounder base for the Soviet 
position. Also supporting the Kurds would be a means of tying down Iraqi forces since the 
security of Iran, Jordan and the Israel were in the US interest. Finally, domestic instability 
in Iraq would lessen the prospect of active Iraqi meddling in the Gulf.
31
 
 
6.2.3  The Kurds Betrayed: 1975  
Lee Dinsmore, a former US Consul in Kirkuk, explains that the Kurds were assured by the 
US government, through the CIA officials in Baghdad, that they would continue to receive 
aid through Iran.
32
 However, with the signing, in 1975, of the Algiers Agreement between 
Saddam Hussein and the Shah, all promises of continued support for the Kurdish military 
offensive against the Baath regime came to an end. Barzani had rejected the 1974 self-rule 
offered by the Baath Government, due to promises he had received from the US and Iran 
of military assistance. He told US officials in Iran ‗This is what they have to use against us. 
If you will give us arms to match those arms, we will fight. Otherwise, we will make peace. 
We don‘t want to be massacred.‘ Barzani told Edmund Ghareeb from the American 
University in an interview in 1976: ‗Without American promises, we would not have acted 
the way we did. Were it not for the American promises, we would never have become 
trapped and involved to such an extent.‘33 In 1970 Barzani and Saddam had made a deal. 
The Shah, who was backing Barzani, did not like the deal, because he was using the Kurds 
as a tool against Iraq. Barzani believed that, because the US was involved, he had a real 
commitment; however, the following year, on 6 March 1975, Saddam and the Shah signed 
the Algiers Accord and the US simply went along with them. Peter Galbraith, former 
senior professional staff member, stated that Kissinger betrayed the Kurds, by allowing the 
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Shah to use the Kurds with a total disregard of human costs.
34
 The US broke its promise of 
support to the Kurdish movement. The Pike report also confirmed this view: the US ‗acted, 
in effect, as guarantor that the insurgent group would not be summarily dropped by the 
foreign head of state (the Shah).‘35 But this all changed; the Shah managed to secure 
genuine concessions from Iraq in the Algiers Accord and, with it, all US and Iranian 
support to the Kurds ceased.  
 
The deliberate termination of US support to the Kurdish struggle shows that it was never 
intended to succeed. Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah, according to the Pike report, hoped 
that ‗our client (Barzani) would not prevail.‘ They preferred instead to sap the resources of 
‗our ally‘s neighbouring country (Iraq).‘ This policy was not imparted to the Kurds, who 
were encouraged to continue fighting. The report concluded ‗Even in the context of overt 
action, ours was a cynical enterprise.‘36 Iran and the White House were only interested in 
prolonging the Kurdish insurgency and not in its success, because the effect success would 
have on US allies, Turkey and Iran.
37
 Ambassador William Eagleton argues that the basis 
of US support for the Kurdish movement in 1972 ‗was a desire to respond positively to the 
Shah‘s request, which was apparently based on Barzani‘s insistence that some kind of big 
power support was needed to balance Iraq‘s Soviet connection.‘ 38  Brent Scowcroft 
explained the US position and attitude: 
In 1975, quite suddenly the Shah made a deal with Iraq. And so he had no 
further interest in fomenting trouble up there in Kurdistan. As a matter of fact 
he had a disinterest, because there are a lot of Kurds up there in Iran. So then 
he wanted us to stop supporting them, and then we had no practical way to 
support them. We ended our support - it was just small potatoes. It wasn‘t 
really an issue at the time that I recall.
39
  
The possibility of interruption of oil flow from Iraq to the West seems to have influenced 
US considerations; the 1973 oil embargo was still a fresh memory at the time. Above all, 
the American ally, Iran, had achieved considerable success in its venture of exploiting the 
Kurds. The Algiers Agreement provided the Shah with many of the concessions to which 
he aspired. Additionally, the US support for the Kurdish movement not only achieved the 
containment of Iraq, it also helped weaken Iraq significantly.  
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Furthermore, by 1975 Anwar Sadat of Egypt had already signed the Sinai Agreement and 
the possibility of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was being considered. 
Syria had refused to join the negotiations, in which Kissinger was deeply involved. 
Baathist Syria, a rival of Iraq, was hostile to the US ally, Israel.  Therefore a weakened Iraq, 
in the face of a hostile Syria, was not favourable to US interests. On the contrary, a strong 
Iraq was considered as an effective tool to encourage Syria‘s agreement to these talks. 
Moreover, the continuation of US support to the Kurds would have provided an excuse for 
further Soviet involvement in the region; both Turkey and Iran had substantial Kurdish 
communities that could have been mobilised through Soviet support.
40
  The US saw no 
need for the continuation of a Kurdish insurgency to weaken Iraq at a time when the Arab-
Israeli peace process was gaining ground and a strong Iraq was counterbalancing its rival 
Syria, which strongly opposed any rapprochement with Israel.  
 
In a statement to the Pike investigation, Henry Kissinger explained, with brutal frankness, 
his role in the abrupt termination of support to the Kurdish movement: ‗covert action 
should not be confused with missionary work.‘41 After the Algiers Agreement, the US took 
no particular interest in the Kurdish cause. For American officials, their ally, Iran, had 
achieved significant concessions in the accord; any support for the Kurdish cause would 
only have aggravated their Turkish and Iranian allies, with their substantial Kurdish 
minorities. The US‘ betrayal of the Kurds went unnoticed. 
 
So the Kurds were left largely ignored by the US. When Barzani travelled to the US for the 
second time, in 1976, he was even, initially, denied a visa. The State Department stipulated 
that his visit would be conditional upon his committing himself not to meet with the media 
or make political statements. Joseph Sisco, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 
visited Barzani, having been instructed by Kissinger to ‗Hear Barzani out and let him blow 
off steam, nothing more.‘ Sisco explained to Barzani that the United States had come in to 
help the Kurds at the request of the Shah; and now, at the request of the Shah it was pulling 
out.
42
 The US did grant around 1000 of his followers asylum in the US, a trivial 
humanitarian gesture when taking into account the gravity of the collapse of the Kurdish 
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movement. Barzani eventually died in Georgetown University Hospital in 1979.
43
 This 
episode was indicative of the degree to which the Kurds were no more than a pawn of the 
Cold War in the Middle East region. The Kurds were simply abandoned from the late 
seventies until the early 90s.       
 
6.3  The Kurds In The US Iraq Tilt: 1979-1990  
 
6.3.1  Saddam’s Adventure in Iran: 1980-1988  
The US tilt towards Iraq after the Shah‘s overthrow was described in detail in Chapter Two: 
Iraq gained favour as an ally against revolutionary Iran. This ensured the continuation, by 
the US government, of the institutional neglect of the Iraqi Kurds. In mid 1983, Iranian 
complaints surfaced of Iraq‘s use of chemical weapons on the battlefield; and, on 5 March 
1984, the US State Department condemned Iraq‘s use of mustard gas. This was before 
Donald Rumsfeld‘s second visit to Saddam; 44  it was partly in response to Iranian 
complaints to the international community and partly the US paying lip service to the 
Geneva Protocol and conventions, to which it was signatory – otherwise, the Reagan 
administration was willing to ignore Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the Iranians 
and its own civilian Kurds. The Reagan administration continued to believe that Iraq‘s 
behaviour could be moderated and that, as a strategic asset, it could protect US interests in 
the region.
45
 The Kurds were absolutely ignored before the First Gulf War. When the Anfal 
and Halabja massacres were committed by Iraq against the Kurds, the US did not react, 
apart from verbal condemnation. The State Department ignored it, since the policy was to 
deal with Iraq at the national level. Hikmat Bamarni, the KDP‘s North America branch 
head, explained that the US had no intention of dealing with the Kurds, because it was 
considered an internal Iraqi matter and intervention was seen as not in the interest of the 
US.
46
  
  
During this period, the Kurds gained no significant recognition at the political level - 
subjected to various means of genocide, they were neglected in the ongoing conflict. The 
only signs of US attention to the Kurds came towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. In 
September 1987, Haywood Rankin, a political counsellor at the US embassy in Baghdad, 
travelled to Iraqi Kurdistan with Congressional staffer Peter Galbraith. Both saw the 
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atrocities of the Anfal Campaign against the Kurds. Rankin produced a 27-page document 
recounting his observations, which was circulated at the State Department and other 
Reagan administration agencies. Galbraith also produced a report published by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee entitled ‗War in the Persian Gulf: The US Takes Sides‘ 
recounting these atrocities.
47
 On his return to Washington Galbraith reported this; it was 
the beginning of his efforts to advance the Kurdish cause in the US.
48
  
 
During the gas attacks on the Kurds, which had actually started in March 1987, the Reagan 
administration remained indifferent: it issued no public statement denouncing these 
actions.
49
 The brutality of Saddam‘s regime continued, with few in the US taking notice. 
After the international public outrage at the Halabja gassing, Senator George Mitchell 
introduced a non-binding resolution, denouncing the attacks made by Iraq.
50
 But the 
Reagan administration was not interested. US State Department spokesman Charles 
Redman even stated, with regard to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons on the Kurdish 
village of Halabja on 23 March 1988: ‗There are indications that Iran may also have used 
chemical artillery shells in this fighting.‘  
 
In April 1988, shortly after the Halabja gassing and before the end of the Iraq-Iran war, 
Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, made his first visit to the US, hoping to obtain weapons and 
support for autonomy. He gave a talk at the Wilson Forum and met informally with some 
White House officials and with Senator Claiborne Pell (Rhode Island Democrat and 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1987-1994).
51
 Peter Galbraith 
managed to arrange a meeting with the director of the State Department‘s Northern Gulf 
Affairs, Larry Pope. However, only a few days later the Turkish President, Kenan Evren, 
protested to Secretary George Shultz over this meeting with ‗Kurdish terrorists.‘ This 
meeting, unknown to Secretary Shultz, resulted in a rebuke for Pope.
52
 The Iraqis, too, 
complained about these meetings. As a result, the State Department declared a ban on 
meetings with the Iraqi opposition, the Kurds included;
53
 so, the Kurds‘ attempt to 
establish contact with the US failed to produce a positive response. 
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In August 1988 the Iraqi Government carried out a second wave of chemical attacks on 
Kurdish villages in the Dohuk Governorate, bordering Turkey. In response, on 8 
September, Secretary of State George Shultz met Iraq‘s Deputy Prime Minister, Saadoun 
Hammadi and denounced as ‗unjustified and abhorrent‘ 54  Iraq‘s use of chemical 
weapons.
55
 The US Senate passed a bill, sponsored by Senator Claiborne Pell, to impose 
sanctions on Iraq. The bill was titled ‗The Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988‘; it was 
passed unanimously on 9 September 1988. A congressional investigation into Iraq‘s use of 
chemical weapons against its Kurdish population was conducted by Galbraith and 
Christopher Van Hollen, to help secure the House‘s support. 56  However, the House of 
Representatives refused to pass the bill, except in a watered-down version.
57
 The 
Prevention of Genocide Act failed because of a number of US interests: expanding trade in 
rice and other grain between US farmers and Iraq, the desire to contain Iran and 
unwillingness to antagonise Turkey superseded any other considerations.
58
 Charles 
Redman, on 14 September, described the Act as ‗premature.‘59 This was a clear indication 
of the United States‘ refusal to accept Iraq as threat or to reject it as a strategic asset. Even 
after the Anfal Campaign and its gas attacks, the US continued to show next to no interest 
in the Kurds.  
 
Galbraith argues that the Reagan administration failed to recognise that the Iraqi regime 
was in no way a reliable US partner, nor a source of stability in the region. In consequence, 
it overlooked the gassing of the Kurds. The Reagan White House continued to believe that 
the Baath regime would moderate its behaviour and eventually be a US strategic asset.
60
  
 
6.3.2  Saddam’s Adventure in Kuwait: 1990  
Jalal Talabani, now Foreign Relations representative of the Kurdistan Front, visited 
Washington, D.C. again on 10 August 1990, a week after Saddam occupied Kuwait. He 
offered US officials military intelligence and cooperation against Baghdad in return for 
military, financial and political support to the Kurds.
61
 In a statement published in The 
Washington Post, hoping to induce US support, he declared that ‗If President Bush 
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approves, I will send 10,000 of my men to fight side by side with the US military in 
Kuwait against the Iraqi army.‘62 This, too, came to nothing. Even after Saddam occupied 
Kuwait, the US policy of no contact with the Iraqi opposition had not changed;
63
 no one 
from the Bush administration agreed to meet him.
64
 He did, through journalists 
sympathetic to the Kurds, manage to meet a junior State Department official in a café; but 
the official told him bluntly, ‗America at this time has no intention of making contact with 
the Iraqi opposition.‘65 Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, David Mack, explained 
that, prior to the beginning of hostilities between US and Iraq, the US was very careful 
how it associated with people from the Iraqi opposition, the reason for that he stressed was 
that ‗we had every reason to believe that they would be of very little help to us in the goal 
of the operation which was the liberation of Kuwait.‘ Moreover, as regards the US goal of 
change inside Iraq the US believed that it was ‗far more likely to come from within the 
Iraqi regime than it was to come from London, ‗that was why when Jalal Talabani came to 
Washington he was seen outside the State Department at a level lower than mine.‘66 
 
6.4  The Kurds Noticed: 1991-2001 
 
6.4.1  Operation Provide Comfort: 1991 
Even after the US-led coalition had ejected Iraq from Kuwait, there was no change towards 
the Iraqi opposition or the Kurds. It seemed that the US, although uncomfortable with 
Saddam‘s behaviour, did not want to upset the status quo. After Galbraith‘s intervention, 
and only a week before the Kurdish uprising of spring 1991, on 28 February, the State 
Department agreed to meet a Kurdish delegation already in Washington. They had been 
scheduled to meet Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. But 
when they arrived at the State Department, they were taken to a coffee shop outside the 
building and received by two junior State Department officials. Galbraith argues that 
‗Turkish sensibilities (were) a main reason for the cold shoulder in Official Washington.‘67 
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However, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee room, on 27 February 1991, Senator 
Pell and Peter Galbraith had chaired an Inter-Parliamentary Consultation on the Kurds. 
Many Kurdish leaders were present including Talabani and Zebari. During their meeting 
with the US senators, the Kurds emphasised their pro-American sentiment and the 
likelihood of an uprising.
68
 The Kurds‘ quest for the fulfilment of their nationalist 
aspirations had turned them towards the US – a Kurdish perception that it was the land of 
freedom and self-determination. Up to this point, every attempt had ended in failure, as US 
political interests overrode any chance of full support. However, this was about to change 
with the two Bush presidencies, the first in 1991 and the second in 2003.
69
  
 
On 1 March 1991, Galbraith tried to contact Richard Haass, the National Security 
Council‘s director for the Middle East, after Talabani had told him of an uprising in Iraqi 
Kurdistan in the 27 February meeting. Failing to reach him, Galbraith spoke to his deputy, 
Sandy Charles. Charles angrily told Galbraith that he was meddling at a sensitive time. 
Galbraith argued that it was US policy to get rid of the regime, to which Charles replied: 
‗Our policy is to get rid of Saddam Hussein, not his regime.‘70 Yet on 15 February 1991, 
President Bush had delivered a speech in Andover, Massachusetts, asking the Iraqi people 
to overthrow the regime; he had stated: 
And there‘s another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi 
military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force 
Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then comply with the United 
Nations resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.
71
 
But the true intention of the administration was to secure a clean overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein, without the involvement of the diverse Iraqi opposition. The US had no interest in 
creating a new regime, only to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein and his inner circle; this, it was 
hoped, would come through a military coup, bringing a new leadership that would sustain 
Iraq‘s territorial integrity and unity, but without creating problems for US allies in the 
region, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
72
 A Kurdish victory in 1991 would have 
meant the possible partition of Iraq and instability in the region - especially in Turkey, 
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which was waging its own war against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers‘ Party). The other 
countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states, feared the 
emergence of a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad.
73
 During the popular uprising of 
1991, the Bush administration refrained from interference in the conflict. The White House 
Press Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, stated on 16 March 1991: ‗We don‘t intend to involve 
ourselves in the internal affairs of Iraq.‘74 President Bush‘s assessment of the 1991 uprising 
is described in Brent Scowcroft‘s memoir as follows: 
Occasionally, he [Bush] indicated the removal of Saddam would be welcome, 
but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. 
While we hoped that a popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the 
United States nor the countries of the region wished to see the break-up of the 
Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long term balance of power at the 
head of the gulf. Breaking up Iraq would pose its own destabilising problems. 
While Ozal put the priority on Saddam and had a more tolerant view of the 
Kurds than other Turkish leaders before or since, Turkey—and Iran—objected 
to the suggestion of an independent Kurdish state. However admirable self-
determination for the Kurds or Shiites might have been in principle, the 
practical aspects of this particular situation dictated the policy. For these 
reasons alone, the uprisings distressed us . . .
75
            
Nevertheless, under Ozal‘s leadership, Turkey now changed its hostile non-negotiating 
posture towards the Kurds. On 8 March 1991 it officially received Jalal Talabani and 
Mohsin Dizai.
76
 This meeting, before the uprising, was the beginning of change. After this 
visit Talabani explained that the most significant result of the meeting was: ‗Turkey lifting 
its objection to the establishment of direct relations between the Kurdish front in Iraq and 
the United States.‘77 Moreover, after the suppressed uprising of 1991 and the mass exodus 
of the Kurds, at the request of France, Turkey and Iran, the UN Security Council passed a 
Security Council resolution (UNSCR 688), demanding that Iraq stop repressing its 
domestic population ‗including most recently in Kurdish populated areas.‘78 As a result a 
No-fly zone, sponsored by the US, UK and France, was enforced to protect the Kurds; this 
enabled flights for reconnaissance and to monitor disarmament.
79
 It should be pointed out 
that this resolution was in clear contradiction of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which 
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prohibits interference in internal affairs.
80
 UNSCR 688 was a significant resolution, for two 
major reasons. It was the second of its kind - after the League of Nations 1926 annexation 
of Mosul vilayet - to mention the Kurds in an international document; secondly, it was the 
first case of the United Nations insisting on the right of intervention in the internal affairs 
of a sovereign state.
81
 The US intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan was also the first of its kind 
based on the humanitarian grounds that became one of the hallmarks of US foreign policy 
in the 90s. 
 
After Secretary of State James Baker‘s visit to the Iraqi-Turkish border, where thousands 
of Kurds were stranded, Baker called President Bush, requesting a change in US policy.
82
 
‗Operation Provide Comfort‘ initially started as a humanitarian effort to relieve those 
fleeing Iraq after the crushing of the 1991 uprising against Saddam‘s regime. It started off 
with a US-protected enclave under the command of Anthony Zinni, a Marine brigadier 
general at the time, to protect the Kurds from potential harm. Zinni argued that ‗we were 
saddling ourselves with an open-ended commitment to protect them in that environment.‘83 
The UN resolution which led to ‗Operation Provide Comfort‘, was initially established on 
the initiative of UK Prime Minister John Major who, at an EC summit on 8 April 1991, 
asked that UN-protected enclaves be established to protect the Kurds (this had been, 
suggested to him by Turkish Prime Minister Ozal).
84
 President Bush senior explained the 
US intervention in 1991: ‗We simply could not allow 500,000 to a million people to die up 
there in the mountains.‘85 Jay Garner, the commanding general of the operation, described 
to the author Operation Provide Comfort as the ‗highlight of the military career of those 
involved.‘ Moreover, he stressed that though humanitarian in nature it did not lack a 
political element. The political element pushed primarily by John Major was that at least 
Britain and US should keep the Kurds from dying as ‗Bush senior had encouraged a 
rebellion that was left to collapse in an intolerant public and politically damaging 
atmosphere.‘86   
 
Qubad Talabani, described the 1991-1998 period as insignificant in US-Kurdish relations. 
The Kurds were in his words ‗just a blip on the radar screen.‘ Even in 1992, when the 
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Kurds held elections, there was no support for them from Washington. In fact, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State at the time, David Mack, strongly discouraged Najmaldin 
Karim, then the sole representative of the Kurds in Washington, from holding these 
elections. When congressional staffers wanted to go and monitor the elections, Mack 
chastised them, urging them not to go and telling them that it was sending the ‗wrong 
messages.‘ Qubad Talabani described this period as one of humanitarian operation and 
nothing more; he went on to claim that, in fact, the humanitarian intervention itself was not 
an American-led initiative; it was John Major‘s and President Mitterand‘s initiative - they 
were the ones who forced it upon the Americans. It was only after James Baker‘s flight to 
the region that he was able to come back and say, ‗we need to do something here.‘ It was a 
reluctant intervention; nobody in the decision-making process in the US during 1991-1992, 
which set up Operation Provide Comfort, the Safe Haven, and eventually the No-fly zone, 
thought that this US-led intervention would create what exists today in Kurdistan. The US 
had no idea that it would evolve into the Kurdistan Regional Government, the National 
Assembly of Kurdistan, flags, a constitution, and the Peshmarga.
87
  
 
On 16 April 1991, President George Bush senior declared that US forces would enter Iraqi 
territory to establish refugee camps, to help feed and shelter Kurdish refugees stranded on 
the Iraqi-Turkish border. He stated: 
The approach is quite simple: if we cannot get adequate food, medicine, 
clothing and shelter to the Kurds living in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraq 
border, we must encourage the Kurds to move to areas in northern Iraq where 
the geography facilitates, rather than frustrates, such large-scale relief effort. 
Consistent with UNSC Resolution 688 and working closely with the United 
Nations and other international organisations and with European partners, I 
have directed the US military to begin immediately to establish several 
encampments in northern Iraq where relief supplies for these refugees will be 
made available in large quantities and distributed in an orderly 
manner…adequate security will be provided at these temporary sites by US, 
British and French air and ground forces, again consistent with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 688…all we are doing is motivated by 
humanitarian concerns.
88
 
On 6 April, Operation Provide Comfort I began. Joint Task Force Provide Comfort was 
formed and deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to conduct humanitarian operations in 
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northern Iraq; the task force dropped its first supplies to Kurdish refugees on 7 April. Air 
units operating from Incirlik enforced a No-fly zone above the 36th parallel. General Jay 
Garner led a 20,000-strong military force to push the Iraqi army southwards. It was 
considered an example of the success of a military humanitarian mission.
89
 Provide 
Comfort I ended on 24 July 1991 and, on the same day, Provide Comfort II began. It was a 
show of force to deter new Iraqi attacks on the Kurds, and had only limited humanitarian 
aspects to its mission. It ended on 31 December 1996. The No-fly zones were also 
indicative of a new post-Cold War American unilateralism. John Pilger asked Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the UN about the legality of these zones. ‗The 
Security Council never approved or in any way ratified these zones,‘ Boutros-Ghali 
stated.
90
  
 
However, the No-fly zone wasn‘t really aimed at the Kurds, but at Saddam. The US no 
longer trusted Saddam and so wanted to contain him as a regional power. It certainly had a 
humanitarian element, to protect the Kurds. However, in reality, it was less about 
humanitarianism and more about pure politics. The US now considered Iraq a nuisance; the 
objective was now to keep it in check. The No-fly zones were one way of weakening  
Saddam as part of this containment policy.
91
  
 
After the negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurdish leadership broke down in 1991, 
the Baath regime withdrew its authority from the major Kurdish areas and imposed its 
sanctions.
92
 It was after these events that the US started to see the Kurds as a useful tool 
against Saddam‘s regime.93 The Kurdish safe haven, established in Northern Iraq through 
the No-fly zone, became part of the US attempt to contain the Iraqi regime.
94
 The US saw 
the Kurdish client as a useful weapon against Baghdad. The US had again, for the second 
time, become pro-Kurdish for reasons not too dissimilar to the 1972-1975 period.
95
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The Kurds managed to hold on to the three predominantly northern governorates after the 
Baathists withdrew. They started to create their own administrative institutions and held 
elections to this end. The US welcomed the 1992 parliamentary elections in the Kurdish 
region after Baghdad withdrew its administration - even though it was an unintended 
consequence. On 15 May 1992 the State Department expressed verbal support; 
spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler stated that the US hoped the elections would ‗help lead to 
a better life for all the people of northern Iraq…[it] welcome[d] public and private 
assurances by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership [that the elections would deal] only with local 
administrative issues [and did not] represent a move towards separatism.‘96  When the 
Kurdistan Regional Government was initially formed, after the first election, the bulk of 
US interests was served as a follow-up to the First Gulf War, where the US had helped 
sustain and create the No-fly zone. The American sense was that the elections were local 
issues, not issues the US wanted to deal with in great depth; its major connection to Iraqi 
Kurdistan was via the INC and humanitarian concerns.
97
 
 
The Kurds were officially received, for the first time, in Washington on 7 October 1991 by 
Assistant Secretary Edward Djerejian. The State Department stated that the meeting with 
the Iraqi Kurdistan Front delegation took place within the context of broadening US 
Government contacts with a wide range of groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and the 
then Iraqi regime. It also asserted that the US did not back any particular opposition faction, 
nor did it aim to shape a government to succeed Saddam Hussein. This was a matter for the 
Iraqi people. The United States, it said, ‗supports peaceful political reform within Iraq, not 
Iraq‘s breakup.‘98  
 
Gradually a new US Iraq policy started to take root. In the early 90s US policy towards 
Iraq changed in the context of dual containment of Iran and Iraq. Ayal Frank, senior 
advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government, explained US policy towards Iraq needed 
to be understood in the context of Iran. Frank stressed that Iraq, for the most part, was seen 
as a lesser evil than Iran; but both needed to be contained, particularly after the Gulf War. 
The Iraqi opposition therefore was seen by the US government only within the context of 
Saddam‘s Iraq. In this context the Iraqi opposition from the American point of view had 
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less significance than Saddam‘s Iraq, Iran, Iraq-Iran rivalry or US interests in the region.99 
During this period the US government saw the Kurds as one player within the Iraqi 
opposition; not the most important, but equal to others. In any case that opposition only 
carried a certain amount of weight in the larger context of US policy towards Iraq and the 
even larger context of US policy towards Iraq and Iran.
100
 Najmaldin Karim, president of 
the Washington Kurdish Institute, pointed out that in the 1990s, Kurdish leaders were 
always received at a higher level if they were part of a larger Iraqi opposition delegation.
101
  
 
The US did not interfere in the day to day details of running the Kurdistan Region. When 
the Oil for Food Programme started, the US made sure that the UN would set aside a share 
for the Kurdish north. Andrew Morrison of the State Department explained that it was very 
much the US which was behind the negotiations with the UN, which led to a 13% 
allocation for the Kurds.
102
  
 
However, although the Kurds constituted part of the opposition, they were arguably in a 
very different category than the rest of that opposition. The Kurds were by far the most 
organised and most legitimate opposition group and had substantial forces on the ground. 
They had intelligence organisations and capabilities. The Kurdish parties had a 
sophisticated infrastructure, relative to other Iraqi opposition groups; they were able to 
house many of the other Iraqi opposition groups and leaders and that carried a certain 
gravitas. So when Kurdish leaders were speaking to the Americans, it was not only as a 
key element of the Iraqi opposition but also as one that represented a genuine 
constituency.
103
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6.4.2  The Washington Accord: 1998 
 
We also want to listen to the real voices of the Iraqi people. Both of these 
leaders [Barzani and Talabani] represent the interests of millions of Iraqi Kurds. 
In extraordinarily difficult circumstances they are working to cooperate with 
the international community and we hope that they will have a chance to talk to 
a wide spectrum of people in Washington and real leaders will be heard from.  
 
 
James Rubin, State Department briefing, 8 September, 1998.
104
  
 
As the civil war between the PUK and KDP was escalating, the US was becoming 
uncomfortable with its repercussions. The lethal character of the conflict was 
unprecedented, leading eventually to the Iraqi army being invited by the KDP to repress 
PUK advances on the KDP and consequently to retake the Kurdish capital, Erbil. In late 
January 1995 President Clinton sent a US delegation with a letter to both Kurdish leaders, 
stating: ‗We will no longer cooperate with the other countries to maintain security in the 
region if the clashes continue.‘105 The civil war led to political instability and this created a 
serious power vacuum, giving regional and international powers an opportunity to become 
involved.
106
 The US was not happy about this; nor was it comfortable with Iranian 
mediation efforts to end the Kurdish civil war. David Litt, Country Director for Northern 
Gulf Affairs at the State Department, at a talk given at the Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy on 8 February 1995, cautioned both the Kurdish parties to reject the assistance 
of the Iranian government, as it was ‗not a disinterested or neutral observer . . . and its 
objectives are not at all consonant with those of the Iraqis or the US government.‘107 Litt 
had visited Kurdistan between 24-27 January of that year, meeting with the KDP, the PUK 
and the INC, as well as the prominent Kurdish politician Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin; he 
threatened that, if the fighting did not stop, and if Iranian intervention was accepted, the 
US would halt Operation Provide Comfort, stop protecting the Kurds, and leave the Kurds 
to Saddam.
108
 On 11 January 1995, Jalal Talabani sent Nawshirwan Mustafa a note in 
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which he stated that the ‗US has threatened to sever relations and says we will be ―crossing 
the red line‖ if we accept Iranian involvement. Dr. Chalabi also says that the US may 
withdraw and we [Kurds] will be left to Saddam.‘109       
 
Andrew Morrison explained that the US was concerned about the fighting at the time. 
There had already been a first Iraqi army incursion and the US was worried that it might 
happen again, if the fighting continued and grew worse, with a potentially very aggressive 
Iraqi force of two divisions on the Kurdistan border. 
110
 The US was frustrated and 
dissatisfied that it had not convinced the two parties to set aside their differences and stop 
the fighting; the KDP-PUK civil war had the potential to become a disaster, with fighting 
in major Kurdish cities, and with Turkey or Iraq getting involved.
111
 Morrison pointed out 
that when the fighting broke out again after the Iraqi incursion of 1996 the US thought it 
was hazardous. The US was also concerned about the potential for a humanitarian crisis, 
and worked intensively to  ensure the civil war did not get out of hand.
 112
 During this 
period, and fearful of Iraq‘s retribution on US employees, in September 1996 the State 
Department received presidential approval for a voluntary evacuation. The US launched 
‗Operation Pacific Haven‘ evacuating more than 6000 Kurds, leading to their legal 
emigration to the US.
113
    
 
The civil war was not in the US interest. Iran was becoming more involved in Kurdish 
issues, providing military support to the PUK, and Turkey was taking the KDP‘s side, 
ensuring air support for advancing KDP forces. The safe haven created in northern Iraq 
was falling into the hands of regional powers, a prospect the US did not relish.  The US 
therefore made an unprecedented effort to stop the fighting; Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State David Welch visited Kurdistan from 17-20 July 1998 to negotiate a settlement. Mack 
explained that the purpose behind bringing the Kurdish leaders to Washington for 
reconciliation was linked to US support for all Iraqi opposition groups based on the 
fundamental desire to isolate and weaken the government of Saddam and prevent him from 
being a threat to regional security. He stressed that ‗it wasn‘t because we favoured Kurdish 
separatism.‘114  
                                                 
109 Jalal Talabani quoted in ibid.   
110 Andrew Morrison, Interview with Author, 21 August 2008, Washington, D.C.       
111 ibid.       
112 ibid.       
113 Herbert Friedman. (2004). Operation Provide Comfort. Available at: <URL: 
http://www.psywarrior.com/ProvideComfort.html> Access Date: 17 December 2009.    
114
 David Mack, Interview with Author, 27 August 2008, Washington, D.C.   
197 
 
The US had not been successful in previous attempts to solve the crisis within the 
framework of the Ankara Process. The first US-sponsored attempts at reconciliation, held 
in two rounds at Drogheda, just north of Dublin, Ireland, in August and September 1995, 
had ended in failure. This time Welch extended invitations to both Kurdish leaders to visit 
Washington to negotiate a final settlement and sign a reconciliation agreement; and this 
time it led to a peaceful resolution, concluded in the Washington Agreement, signed by 
Barzani and Talabani under State Department sponsorship on 17 September 1998. During 
the signing ceremony Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, stated: 
And, as today‘s meeting reflects, we are intensifying our efforts to help Iraqis -
- whether Arab or Kurd, Shiite or Sunni - to develop a deeper sense of common 
purpose and a more effective strategy for achieving their future in a democratic 
and pluralist Iraq.
115
 
There was a gradual progression in the US-Kurdish relationship, starting from the mid 90s 
when the Iraqi opposition movement was becoming more active, and then also during the 
infighting between the KDP and the PUK. The US involvement evolved from considering 
the Kurds  as part of the Iraqi opposition movement, to stopping them from fighting, and 
regrouping them once again. The Kurdish movement was able to stop the internal fighting,  
unify their efforts and then become a leading element of the Iraqi opposition movement.
116
 
Morrison stressed that the US was always involved in Iraqi Kurdistan throughout the 1990s 
but not in the details of everyday governance of the region;
117
 Qubad Talabani explained 
that from 1998 to 2003, there was a sharp increase in cooperation, assistance and support 
from the US.
118
 From the US perspective, Kurdistan was the sole window into Iraq and this 
was not to be disturbed. The agreement, at least in theory, was good, as it rejected any 
invitation or provocation of outside interference.
119
 
 
There was further US interest in the Kurdish question; a congressional hearing was held to 
assess the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime. Professor of Medical Genetics 
from Liverpool University, Christen Gosden, a researcher of the Halabja gas attack, 
testified to the US Senate in April 1998.
120
 The Senate hearing was titled ‗Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Threats to America: Are We Prepared?‘ testimony to an already 
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recognised threat of the potential harm WMD could do to the United States. Gosden 
advised the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the US should take three 
steps to tackle this issue. Firstly, develop a national plan to respond to WMD attacks, 
immediately treat victims of the attacks not only to save lives but to prevent genetic 
disorders in future generations and finally revive and maintain national medical 
programmes to deal with potential civilian and military casualties of chemical attacks.
121
          
 
Moreover, one of the articles of the Washington Accord stressed that both parties would 
endeavour to create a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq that would ensure the 
political and human rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq and of all Iraqis on a political basis 
decided by all the Iraqi people. It also stressed that both parties aspired to an Iraq reformed 
on a federal basis that would maintain the nation‘s unity and territorial integrity. The 
clause ended ‗we understand that the US respects such aspirations for all the Iraqi 
people.‘122 Additionally, the US maintained it would continue to support UNSCR 688 
condemning the repression of the Iraqi population.
123
 Included in the Accord was a 
statement that ‗UN Security Council Resolution 688 noted the severe repression of the 
Iraqi people, particularly the Kurdish people in Iraq. The potential for repression has not 
eased since 1991, when the resolution was passed.‘124  
 
In a letter to Congress on 5 November  1998, titled ‗Status of Efforts to Obtain Iraq‘s 
Compliance with UN resolutions,‘ President Clinton declared: 
Both Barzani and Talabani have made positive, forward-looking statements on 
political reconciliation. We will continue our efforts to reach a permanent 
reconciliation through mediation in order to help the people of northern Iraq 
find the permanent, stable settlement which they deserve, and to minimise the 
opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves into the conflict and 
threaten Iraqi citizens in this region.
125
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Matthew Stephenson from the State Department stressed that the US considered the Kurds 
‗close friends and strong allies.‘ During Saddam Hussein‘s time, it was widely held that the 
Kurds were fighting Saddam and the US supported those efforts.
126
  
 
By 1998 the Clinton administration was becoming entangled in the Lewinski scandal and 
Congress was dominated by the Republicans. Seizing the opportunity created by the 
weakness of President Clinton, the Republicans in agreement with Democrats managed to 
pass the Iraq Liberation Act. The act authorised the president to designate Iraqi opposition 
groups for military assistance to achieve its goal. On 4 February 1999 President Clinton 
chose seven groups to pursue this goal; three of them were Kurdish political parties, 
including the KDP and the PUK. However, the Clinton administration remained focused 
on the policy of containment: in a statement on 28 December 1998 President Clinton 
asserted that: 
The No-fly zones have been and will remain an important part of our 
containment policy…because we effectively control the skies over much of 
Iraq, Saddam has been unable to use air power to repress his own people or to 
lash out again at his neighbours.
127
  
 
6.5  The Kurds, A Valuable Asset: 2001-2003  
 
6.5.1  The Kurdish Model 
In a Deputies‘ meeting on 13 July 2001 under the George W. Bush administration, Paul 
Wolfowitz already suggested empowering the Iraqis towards regime change. He suggested 
excluding Iraqi Kurdistan from the UN economic sanctions. This, he argued, would be a 
step towards freeing Iraq. However, he was conscious that such a step would antagonise 
Turkey, which had its own sizable Kurdish population; Turkey would object to an 
internationally recognised Kurdish enclave, which could pave the way to an independent 
Kurdistan. This led him to suggest the creation of a second free Iraqi enclave in Southern 
Iraq on the border with Kuwait.
128
 
 
The Kurds continued to be seen as an asset in the US, if only to help contain Iraq. Their 
function as a thorn in the side of and a source of humiliation for Iraq‘s regime was 
paramount to US interests in the region. However, this all changed; the attacks of 9/11 
                                                 
126
 Matthew Stephenson, Interview with Author, 10 June 2008, Washington, D.C.   
127
 Bill Clinton quoted in Yildiz (2004), op. cit., p. 89.       
128
 Feith (2008), op. cit., p. 208.  
200 
 
were a watershed in US relations with both Iraq and its Kurds. 9/11 transformed the 
prospects of Iraqi Kurdistan, giving it significant value. The Kurdish leadership had 
already developed close ties with Bush administration neoconservatives. They knew that a 
US invasion of Iraq was imminent.
129
  
 
The Kurds were also used to enlist the US public. Carole O‘Leary stressed that the Kurds 
were ‗an excellent example of Saddam‘s brutality‘ that Bush could pull out in front of 
America, saying:  ‗Saddam Hussein gassed his own people – the  Kurds.‘ The Kurds were 
used as an emotional lever and, for some Americans who were on a knife‘s edge about 
going to war, the Kurds helped to clinch the argument. If the potential threat of WMD in a 
post-9/11 world was not enough reason, Saddam‘s gassing of his own people helped 
change their minds. It was a scary thing for Americans that reminded them of the 
Holocaust and, for some, conjured up horrific ‗Last Days‘ scenarios.130 Daniel Pipes 
explained that Saddam Hussein‘s treatment of the Kurds was one of the contributing 
factors, one of the paragraphs of indictment of Saddam Hussein. In making the case for 
war the genocidal activity by Saddam Hussein even if not politically or legally convincing, 
was morally and psychologically effective in shaping American attitudes to his regime. 
Pipes argues that it provided both a humanitarian and a political justification.
131
  
 
Furthermore, Iraqi Kurdistan was providing a model for Iraqis who did not live in the 
northern zone, of how good life could be for Iraqis not living under Saddam Hussein.
132
 If 
any questions were raised before the invasion about democracy and freedom in Iraq, the 
Americans and those who supported them, could point to the Kurds in the north and their 
successes. These were reasons for the US to value the Kurds;
133
 another reason was their 
availability. Considering that the US objective was to project the image of liberator rather 
than occupier, Douglas Feith argues that the US wanted to show that that they genuinely 
wanted to help the Iraqis rid themselves of Saddam Hussein. The only Iraqis available for 
such partnership were the ‗externals‘: the Kurds and the Iraqi exiles.134 
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In the first weeks of February 2002, the initial phases of the regime-change plan came into 
effect, when the president signed an Executive Finding that gave the go-ahead for CIA and 
military Special Operations (SO) forces to start covert activities, inside Iraq,
135
 to 
destabilise Saddam Hussein.
136
 The Washington Post reported that on 16 February 2002 
the new top secret order for regime change in Iraq directed the CIA to support the US 
military in overthrowing Saddam and granted it authority to support opposition groups and 
conduct sabotage operations inside Iraq.
137
  
 
By the second week of July 2002, the first CIA operatives made their way through Turkey 
into Iraqi Kurdistan; each member was assigned a Turkish officer as a minder. They were 
eight in number but divided into two teams of four. The first team made its way to a CIA 
base close to Turkey and the second to one on the outskirts of Sulaimani City. The 
objective of these CIA teams was to develop an operational base for further covert 
action.
138
 On 8 August the first major military assault inside Iraq began. That night, a fleet 
of Turkish helicopters carrying troops with Turkish commandos, backed by American 
Special Forces, left air bases in Turkey for northern Iraq. Eye-witnesses on the ground 
claimed that air support and/or protection for the mission was provided by Turkish, 
American and British aircraft. The Allies seized the critical Bamerni airport in northern 
Iraq after a brief skirmish with an ill-equipped force from an armoured section of the Iraqi 
army. The airport, just outside the Kurdish region, lies 50 miles north of Kirkuk, the 
disputed Iraqi oil city of the north, and Mosul. After the base fell, several C130 transport 
planes from bases in Turkey were guided on to the airstrips to deliver engineering units, 
heavy machinery and electronic support equipment; these were put to work at once on 
enlarging the field and widening its landing strips.
139
 A senior Kurdistan Regional 
Government official on condition of anonymity clarified to the author that the first 
advanced team of US Special Forces (SO) elements arrived in Kurdistan in November 
2002. Their mission was to evaluate the situation on the ground and start upgrading the 
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capacities available of their Kurdish allies. However, the bulk of US SO brigades started 
arriving in late January and early February 2003 gradually adding to their numbers.
140
        
  
The Kurds, however, mindful of their past experiences with the US, were in no hurry to 
take the role of the Afghan Northern Alliance. They knew that the American plans for 
post-Saddam Iraq would determine the future of their autonomous region in northern Iraq; 
the Kurdish leadership was adamant that they would not cooperate unless they received 
assurances from the US regarding their security, and their status in post-Saddam Iraq.
141
 In 
April 2002, Barzani and Talabani had been invited to the US secretly in a private plane.
142
 
This time they were hosted at the CIA training base in Virginia, known as ‗The Farm‘ 
where they met CIA director George Tenet and a host of other senior US officials.
143
 The 
main purpose of the visit was for the Americans to assure the Kurds that the US‘ intention 
to topple the regime was real; but, also, the US wanted to ask them ‗are you on board for 
this effort?‘144 Most American participants knew that such an operation required full 
Kurdish support.
145
 Qubad Talabani stated that he did not think the US could have 
launched Operation Iraqi Freedom ‗without the buy-in of the Kurds.‘146  
 
The Kurds, having felt betrayed by the US on previous occasions, were worried about their 
security. They feared two possible outcomes of Saddam‘s overthrow: firstly that their 
American-sponsored freedom would end, secondly that the regime‘s demise would result 
in the domination of Kurdistan by Baghdad.
147
 When in April 2002 the US brought the 
Kurdish leadership to Washington, the US conceded to the Kurds the security guarantees 
necessary to get them on board; they agreed to change their policy from responding ‗at a 
time and place of our choosing‘, to an immediate response if Saddam moved against the 
Kurds. Qubad Talabani stated that ‗that was enough for the Kurds buy-in. Some of the 
other things we asked for we are still waiting for.‘148 From that time Massoud Barzani and 
Jalal Talabani were enthusiastic supporters of the US drive to topple Saddam‘s regime. 
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Since they knew that they could not influence Bush‘s decision, they deemed it a strategic 
move to be completely on the US side.
149
  
 
Carole O‘Leary states that the US promised the Kurds ‗nothing, except one thing and - 
even that wasn‘t a real promise.‘ In the fall of 2002 the Kurds were told, at the highest 
levels of the US government, that if they played it right, kept silent about nationalist 
aspirations, stood by the US,  supported American goals in Iraq and didn‘t make trouble, 
‗you will come out of this holding what you have going in to it.‘150 Kurdish fears were 
further eased when, on 6 March 2003, Bush stated: 
Iraq will provide a place where people can see that the Shiite and the Sunni and 
the Kurds can get along in a federation. Iraq will serve as a catalyst for change, 
positive change.
151
 
This statement was what the Kurds were looking for, after many years of fighting with the 
central government in Baghdad. It gave federalism distinct recognition. However, prior to 
this, State Department officials had deliberately avoided support for federalism, due to 
Turkish sensitivities.
152
  
 
But from the summer of 2002 the US was also seeking Turkish cooperation. The US 
briefed the Turkish military staff on the Iraq war plan. The US recognised that Turkey had 
suffered financially as a result of the 1991 Gulf War and had also accepted hundreds of 
thousands of Kurdish refugees. In the light of this, the US prepared a generous aid 
package.
153
 In July 2002 Paul Wolfowitz visited Turkey to start negotiating the Turkish 
role in the possible US invasion of Iraq. Turkey, fearing the revival of nationalist 
aspirations among its more than 15 million Kurds, requested that an independent state of 
Iraqi Kurdistan should not be created and the US assured Ankara that this would not be the 
case.
154
  
 
On 3 December 2002, Paul Wolfowitz led negotiations with Turkey again. This time 
Turkey agreed to allow the use of its air space and bases, providing a second UNSCR 
resolution was obtained authorising military action. US and Turkish officials met again in 
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Ankara in February 2003; by this time the second security council resolution was of no 
significant importance to the Turks. Turkey requested that Turkish forces be allowed into 
Iraqi Kurdistan; otherwise US troops would not be allowed access. They also requested US 
assurances that the Kurdish Peshmarga would enter neither Kirkuk nor Mosul; the US 
agreed. The Turks also promised that their forces would not enter any Kurdish city or town; 
they would stay away from Mosul and Kirkuk unless the Peshmarga entered.
155
  
 
Turkey was concerned that any action in Iraq would affect its own territorial integrity: that 
war in neighbouring Iraq would lead to Kurdish independence and Turkey‘s fracture along 
ethnic lines. Douglas Feith explains that the US reassured the Turkish officials that their 
strategic interests would be respected in Iraq. US officials also told them that they shared 
Turkey‘s concerns that Iraq‘s disintegration would lead to instability in the region; the US 
would give the Turks a substantial say in the post-Saddam reconstruction policy.
156
 The 
Kirkuk oil fields and the possibility of them falling into Kurdish hands was another major 
concern to Turkey; they believed that such a development would provide enough financial 
and political leverage to establish an independent Kurdistan.
 157
 Moreover, the emergence 
of a Shiite state in Iraq was alarming to both the Kemalist secularists and the Sunni-
dominated Justice and Development Party; a Shiite state closely aligned with Iran in the 
vicinity challenged the former‘s secularism and the latter‘s Sunnism.158 Turkey‘s 
unrelenting opposition to Kurdish nationalism, and its solid alliance with the US, dating 
back to the Truman Doctrine in 1947, still are the principal factors preventing an 
independent Kurdistan. Although the US has given occasional verbal support to the Kurds, 
it has always tilted towards its strategic NATO ally Turkey; to its former ally, the Shah, in 
Iran; and prior to 1990 to its tacit ally Saddam Hussein.
159
 American geostrategic interests 
in central Eurasia have made Washington value its alliance with Turkey, which it has seen 
as a force to balance both Iran and Russia.
160
 Consolidating their position as regards the 
likely invasion through Turkey, their foreign ministry issued a statement: 
The Turkish army will enter the region to prevent an exodus, to prevent the 
Kurds from establishing a free Kurdistan, to prevent them entering Kirkuk and 
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Mosul, and also to protect the Turcomans. We don‘t want a clash between 
Turkey and the Kurds, and for that reason we are sending lots of troops to the 
region as a warning.
161
 
 
6.5.2  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Coming after these negotiations and agreements, the refusal of the Turkish parliament to 
allow access to the US 4
th
 Infantry Division (ID), created a crisis in US-Turkish relations. 
It also angered many neoconservatives who valued Turkish relations with the US.
162
 
President Bush was concerned about Turkey‘s position against allowing a northern front to 
be opened; however, he was more concerned about  the possibility of a Turkish incursion 
into the Kurdish north.
163
 During the war, Zalmay Khalilzad was asked to stay in Ankara to 
use his diplomatic skills to prevent a Turkish incursion into Northern Iraq aimed at pre-
empting any Kurdish move for independence.
164
 Richard Cheney had spoken to the 
Turkish leaders as well, before the war, telling them in no uncertain terms that their 
participation would not be needed. ‗I think they‘ll behave. We‘ve got to keep a lid on the 
Kurds too‘ he affirmed.165 The neoconservatives detested Saddam Hussein and wanted to 
get rid of him; they wanted to establish a pluralistic and democratic Iraq. According to 
Najmaldin Karim, just before the US invaded, the neoconservatives were willing to forget 
about the Kurds and deal with Turkey, allowing the Turkish army to come in. The 
neoconservatives (Wolfowitz and Khalilzad) were involved in negotiations to reduce 
Kurdish involvement.
166
  
 
In the initial planning for the US invasion of Iraq, NATO ally Turkey had senior status 
over rival Kurds south of their border in Iraq. The US deemed it inappropriate to embark 
on this venture without Turkish blessing and co-operation. The Iraqi Kurdish officials were 
so convinced that the Turkish relationship with America would take precedence over their 
own concerns, that they asked the Pentagon: firstly, to limit the Turkish presence in Iraq to 
certain supply corridors in northern Iraq; secondly, to ensure that a substantive Turkish 
contingent would operate only in areas south or east of Tikrit — areas of operation that 
Erbil felt would limit Turkish influence in the disputed city of Kirkuk.
167
 However, after 
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the Turkish parliament refused to allow the US invasion of Iraq from Turkey, US-Kurdish 
relations started to improve. On 25 March 2003, after the final US negotiations with 
Turkey failed, the US turned to the Kurds as a major contributing force for the military 
operation. On the night of 26 March more than 1,000 members of the 173
rd
 Airborne 
Brigade arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan through an airdrop over the Kurdish airfield at Harir.
168
 
 
The closer the US got to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the more Kurdish influence became 
evident. In the build up to OIF, the fact that there was a smaller northern front than the US 
had expected created a much greater level of dependency on the Kurds. Had the 4
th
 ID 
been present in the north, it might have been that they would not have needed the Kurdish 
Peshmarga as much; but, in the event, both in Operation Viking Hammer and also in the 
areas of Kirkuk and Mosul, they only had Special Forces troops there. This created a 
strong operational bond, not just a political and strategic bond, between the US military 
and Kurdish forces. The Turkish parliament‘s rejection of a US northern front from Turkey 
created a dynamic that reflected positively on the Kurds. According to Qubad Talabani this 
all came ‗on the back of a Turkish rejection.‘ Turkey, a strategic ally and NATO partner, 
did not let the Americans in and yet ‗here are these Kurds with their Kalashnikovs and 
unsophisticated machinery that are really so passionate about fighting alongside 
Americans.‘169 As the Kurdish political parties had military components, General Tommy 
Franks was willing to appoint liaison officers to the Kurdish opposition groups in northern 
Iraq but was refusing to do the same for the INC, however, eventually conceded under 
Wolfowitz‘s pressure.170 The Kurds had two assets of value in the run-up to the war. The 
first was their command of a military component, the Peshmarga, numbering close to 
100,000 men. Secondly, there was the presence in Iraqi Kurdistan of an al-Qaida-
associated Islamist group, Ansar al-Islam, providing a link to the US War on Terror.
171
  
 
When the war started, the Kurds suddenly became what the Northern Alliance was for the 
Americans in Afghanistan - a dependable ally with which cooperation could be built.
172
 
From 2003 the Kurds of Iraq fought with US forces - both Special Forces and others - and 
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fought well; over time an appreciation grew within the military establishment in Iraq that 
the Kurds were good fighters, and reliable as well.
173
  
 
So, the Turkish refusal to allow the passage of the 4
th
 ID to northern Iraq dramatically 
damaged US-Turkish relations and, at the same time, created unprecedented leverage for 
the Iraqi Kurds, forcing the Pentagon to re-plan its northern front with greater emphasis on 
its Kurdish allies. The Peshmarga, numbering almost 100,000 and a small group of Special 
Forces, constituted a new front in the invasion.
174
  The Kurds effectively led the march into 
Kirkuk and Mosul, a prospect unthinkable if Turkey had been a member of the coalition.
175
 
As resistance in Kirkuk crumbled, Kurdish forces rushed in to fill the vacuum.
176
 This 
caused a major problem for the US - the Kurds were trying to expand their sphere of 
influence, which was a potential trigger for Turkish troops to push into northern Iraq. The 
Kurds were asked to leave, and Colin Powell spoke to his counterpart in Ankara, assuring 
him that Kirkuk would return to normal.
177
 
 
This resembled US policy in Afghanistan. In a Deputies‘ meeting on 9 October 2001 both 
Richard Armitage and John McLaughlin advised against a Northern Alliance incursion into 
Kabul. They believed that it could lead to civil war between the Pashtuns and the invading 
force;
178
 Wolfowitz added that the US should try to create an international force to take 
over Kabul, to show that the US was not trying to favour one Afghan group over the 
other.
179
 In the same way, to prevent a civil war and/or a Turkish incursion, the Kurds were 
advised not to take over in Kirkuk and Mosul; the United States believed that a Kurdish 
takeover would send a message to the rest of Iraq that the US was biased towards the 
Kurds. Restraining the Kurds, however, would ensure US neutrality. Empowering the 
Kurds to take the reins of power in both cities, the US also believed, would allow acts of 
Kurdish retribution against Arab residents in the city. This would have the potential to 
develop into all-out civil war between Arabs and Kurds. In a policy paper, drafted by 
Feith‘s policy shop and produced on 15 October 2001, entitled ‗Military Strategy in 
Afghanistan‘ the Northern Alliance was advised to refrain from dominance in Kabul; it 
stressed that ‗…[T]he future of Kabul must be decided by a political process and not 
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military action alone. We expect you to declare, as soon as possible, that your goal is not to 
establish dominion over the entire country, but to get a political process started that will 
reflect the interests of all the Afghan peoples.‘180 The same concerns determined US Iraq 
policy after the invasion: the US refused to take sides on the highly contentious Kirkuk 
issue, where the Kurds wanted to reverse decades of Arabisation.   
 
Operation Iraqi Freedom also involved the largest US SO force since the Vietnam War, 
with a significant SO presence in Northern Iraq. Coalition personnel worked with Kurdish 
fighters against the regime. SO forces helped bring in the 173
rd
 Airborne Brigade, and 
marked and called in coalition air power on regime targets; they were also responsible for 
attacking a number of specific targets, such as airfields, weapons of mass destruction sites, 
and command and control headquarters.
181
 The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 
elements of Joint SO Command, and CIA Special Activities Division paramilitary officers, 
linked up and were the first to enter Iraq prior to the invasion. Their efforts, under the code 
name ‗Operation Viking Hammer‘, organised the Kurdish Peshmarga to defeat Ansar Al 
Islam; this involved a battle for control of a territory in north-eastern Iraq that was 
occupied by Ansar Al Islam.
 182
 With a larger challenge and greater military operation for 
regime change awaiting, Qubad Talabani explained that the US did not want its Kurdish 
allies to be distracted and engaged with these Islamist militants.
183
 In the North, the 10th 
Special Forces Group (10th SFG) had the mission of aiding the PUK  and the KDP , and 
employing them against the 13 Iraqi Divisions located in the vicinity of Kirkuk and 
Mosul.
184
   
 
Turkey had originally officially banned any Coalition troops from using their bases or 
airspace, so lead elements of the 10th SFG had to make a detour for infiltration; their flight 
was supposed to take four hours but instead took ten. However, only hours after the first of 
these flights, Turkey did allow the use of its air space and the rest of the 10th SFG 
infiltrated accordingly. After Operation Viking Hammer, concurrent and follow-on 
missions involved attacking and thus tying down Iraqi forces in the north, preventing their 
deployment to the southern front and the main theatre of the invasion. The SO forces 
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present in northern Iraq had two roles, one military and the other political. The military 
role was to defeat the 150,000 Iraqi troops on the border of the de facto Kurdish enclave. 
The political role was to keep the Peshmarga in line, preventing the Kurds from taking 
Kirkuk, reason enough for a Turkish intervention. It was in the interest of the US to 
maintain peace between rival Kurdish factions and also prevent them from upsetting the 
status quo.
185
 
 
6.6  The Kurds in the New Iraq: 2003-2008 
 
6.6.1  The Coalition Provisional Authority 
After the fall of Saddam‘s regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) awarded  
five seats out of the twenty-five seats of the Iraqi Governing Council to the Kurds. They 
also had two seats on the rotating presidency of nine Iraqi leaders.
186
 Nawshirwan Mustafa 
Amin, Talabani‘s deputy on the Iraqi Governing Council, asserts that this was the first sign 
of a reduction in Kurdish influence after Saddam was toppled. The Kurdish quota in the 
Iraqi opposition had been one quarter, as opposed to the one fifth imposed by the United 
States.
187
 After the invasion Jay Garner was even instructed not to mention federalism with 
the Kurdish leaders although he had done so privately.
188
 Paul Bremer, US Administrator 
of Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004, has stated that the Kurds had to relinquish a measure 
of the autonomy they had achieved between the First Gulf War and the liberation of 
Iraq.
189
 The Kurds were given the key to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in the first Governing 
Council cabinet; however, signs of US discontent with the Kurds became obvious with the 
establishment of the CPA. The Kurds‘ perception was that they were starting to devalue 
within the context of the new Iraq. After an article critical of the CPA appeared in The New 
York Times based on an interview with Jalal Talabani, Bremer told Talabani that the US 
could not work with his group if confidential issues and disagreements with the CPA were 
voiced in the media after disagreements he had had were made public.
190
 Bremer also talks 
critically about a ‗G7‘ (seven leading opposition groups) meeting in June 2003, with a 
Talabani initiative, for a ‗handpicked national conference‘ to establish a new government 
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to avoid the creation of the Governing Council.
191
 On 25 June 2003 Bremer visited 
Talabani at his headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan; he assured Talabani of the US‘ 
determination to create a federal Iraq. Talabani was pleased that the US was 
accommodating this Kurdish objective.
192
 During this visit Talabani approved a request by 
Bremer to serve on the Iraqi Governing Council.
193
 The next day Bremer made the same 
request to Massoud Barzani, who also agreed.
194
 Michael Rubin, former Office of Special 
Plans and CPA official, stressed that the US support for federalism came from its support 
for Kurdistan.
195
 This mollified the Kurdish leadership enough for them to consent to 
political participation in Baghdad. The CPA however was unequivocal on Iraq‘s territorial 
unity. Bremer had told Tony Blair that he had told the Kurds that the Coalition ‗would not 
tolerate actions that provoked the break up of Iraq‘ as well as telling them that he needed 
full cooperation from them on drafting the interim constitution, the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL).
196
  
 
The invasion was the watershed in US-Kurdish relations. After the invasion, for the first 
time in recent living memory, the Kurds of Iraq were playing an ever-increasing role in 
Baghdad. The US government was relying on the Kurds to serve their interests in Baghdad, 
to be their advocates within internal Iraqi deliberations and decisions as they related to 
Iraq‘s relations with the US.197 The Kurds constantly supported the US under the CPA198, 
and so played a significant role in rebuilding Iraq. It is ironic that the Kurds, who are the 
only major group in Iraq that despise Iraqi identity, took on this role.  
 
Following Operation Iraqi Freedom came the necessity for greater US-Kurdish interaction. 
There was a need for the US to get the Kurds involved in Baghdad; this was to ensure the 
formation of a future government, pass pieces of legislation, and craft the TAL. The Kurds, 
Qubad Talabani affirmed, ‗were able to take our level of sophistication and organisation to 
Baghdad with us‘, and they managed to negotiate most of what was important to Kurdistan, 
in their negotiations with the rest of the country. This, at times, Talabani emphasised, ‗put 
a strain on US-Kurdish relations‘, particularly in the final hours of drafting the TAL, when 
the Kurds staged a walkout and threatened to boycott the process because they were 
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holding firm on a key article (61c) of that law.
199
 This article served Kurdish concerns 
allowing a rejection of the permanent Iraqi constitution if deemed unfavourable to Kurdish 
interests. Qubad Talabani and the other Kurdish negotiators demanded that the permanent 
Iraqi constitution be rendered void if two thirds of the population in three Iraqi provinces 
voted negative against ratifying the constitution. The CPA negotiators had initially insisted 
on four provinces but after the delegation‘s walk out made calls to Washington to seek 
approval and eventually gave way to the Kurdish demand.  
 
The US was not favourable to all Kurdish demands during the drafting of TAL.
200
 The 
Kurds were anxious about the prospect of a permanent constitution that did not reflect their  
concerns. They wanted a specific clause that gave the Kurds a veto if this was to occur. 
Initially Bremer declined to concede this Kurdish request. However, later on he came to 
understand the ‗tyranny of the majority‘ as the Shiites pursued their religious agenda.201 
The eventual document did not include many of the Kurdish demands. The Kurdish 
leadership had to make concessions. The CPA was adamant that a strong central 
government be created in Baghdad - this, of course, was contrary to Kurdish requests for 
less central control. After the TAL was signed, the new Security Council Resolution was 
due to be passed to enforce the end of occupation and restoration of sovereignty. However, 
Kurdish demands for reference to the TAL in UNSCR 1546 were disregarded at the 
request of Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
202
  
 
Among the former Iraqi opposition, the Kurdish leadership were the only ones with a 
recognised constituency, which was  heavily pro-US. They continued to have influence; 
however as the Kurdish element became diluted within the overall context of a new Iraq, 
they gradually lost their special status. The US position started to adapt to the new 
situation; the change in US-Kurdish relations started after 2003, as America‘s interests in 
Iraq broadened. The US had interests in Baghdad‘s position and in the Iraqi state as a 
whole. This meant that the Kurds ranked lower on the American priority list. Nabil Al-
Tikriti argues that it became ‗no longer the most important interlocutor in Iraqi politics‘; 
rather it became one of a number of important interlocutors in Iraqi politics.
203
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Initially, on 27 January 2004, Bremer proposed a framework for the Kurdish region: the 
Kurdistan Region would be recognised as a federal unit, but with few powers. The central 
government would have authority over the region‘s security, natural resources, economy, 
and borders.
204
 The first draft of the TAL, called the Pachachi Plan after the then president 
of the Iraqi Governing Council, had very little in it for the Kurds.
205
  
 
Then, following new instructions from Washington on 6 February 2004, Bremer informed 
the Kurdish leadership that the White House wanted to eliminate the mention of Kurdish as 
an official language in the provisional constitution. Moreover, the Kurdistan Region would 
not be mentioned in the document, and Iraq‘s federal structure would be based on the 
eighteen governorates, rather than the existing structure of Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Shiite 
Arab territories.
206
 As regards the Peshmarga, Bremer wanted to disband them. This was 
drafted in the TAL according to Bremer‘s terms, after he threatened to disregard other 
Kurdish requests.
207
 During the process of writing the TAL, Bremer threatened the Kurdish 
leadership with severing their ‗special relationship‘ when they voiced objections.208   
 
Galbraith argues that the reason for the US desire to dismantle the Kurdish regional 
government was to create an Iraq based on geographical units, reflecting the non-ethnic 
structure of US states: a concept based on ideals rather than reality. Moreover, the intention 
of excluding Kurdish as an official language came from the desire to make Arabic the 
common communication language for the whole nation.
209
 Turkey might have been 
influential, as well, in forming this policy. Gunter argues that the furthest Turkish officials 
and intellectuals were willing to go was the acceptance of a form of ‗geographic 
federalism‘ based on the previously drawn boundaries of the eighteen governorates of Iraq. 
This was to dilute the ethnic composition as well as to break up the Kurdish region, and 
subsequently create a non-ethnic provincial identity.
210
 The Kurdish leadership was 
worried about American pressure. Galbraith advised the Kurdish negotiators in Kurdistan:  
The United States, I pointed out, needed the Kurds at least as much as the 
Kurds needed the Americans…The Bush administration might not like the 
Kurds insisting on their rights, I said, but it would respect them for doing so.
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Nawshirwan, believes that the Kurdish leadership, in its pursuit of special party interests 
and ‗to please the United States‘, failed to make the most of this opportunity.212 Najmaldin 
Karim believes that the Kurdish leadership lacked assertiveness and aggression; Karim 
compared the Kurds with the Sunnis, who are comparable in numbers, but more vocal in 
their requests. The Kurds, he argued, were suffering from ‗The Battered Child Syndrome‘ 
mentality.
213
 The Kurdish proposals for inclusion of a Kurdistan chapter in the TAL were 
received with discomfort by the CPA negotiators; they perceived the Kurdish requests as 
opposing the US desire for a united Iraq.
214
  
 
 
6.6.2  Kurds: Towards a Sovereign Iraq 
The presidency was not to be given to the Kurds during the Interim Government period, as 
a gesture to the Sunni Arabs that the post-Baath period would not change the essential 
character of the Iraqi state.
215
 Bremer told Talabani, ‗For too long they [Sunni Arabs] have 
felt underrepresented in the new Iraq.‘216 For most of 2004, the Kurds were a non-player in 
Iraq; it was only when the constitutional drafting process began that they suddenly became 
a player again.
217
   
 
After Allawi‘s interim government expired with the election of the constitution drafting 
National Assembly in January 2005, Ibrahim Jaafari was nominated for Prime Minister of 
the transitional period. His nomination, however, was not welcomed by Washington. In 
response, the US aimed to counteract a probable Islamist agenda with more Kurdish power 
in the new transitional government.
218
 The first Kurdish president in Iraq‘s history was 
democratically elected in the January 2005 elections. Iraq‘s Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister were also Kurds; and, during Jaafari‘s premiership, the Kurdish 
leadership managed to advance its aspirations during the drafting of the Permanent 
Constitution. The result was a much weaker central government, compared to the TAL, 
which gave greater power to the central government in Baghdad. The Kurds during this 
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period also pushed Zalmay Khalilzad‘s attempts to prevent Jaaffari‘s candidacy for the 
premiership after the general elections of December 2005 for the permanent 
government.
219
 Feith depicts the State Department and CIA assessment of the Kurds‘ role 
in Iraq post-Saddam, externals versus internals, as another example of flawed analysis. 
Both agencies had argued that the Kurds would have no significant national role beyond 
the boundaries of northern Iraq. This, Feith argues, was incorrect, as many Kurdish leaders 
played significant roles in the appointed and elected governments.
220
  
 
Khalilzad was US ambassador to Iraq from June 2005 to March 2007. When he arrived in 
Iraq he may have thought that the administration‘s goal of a ‗democratic, federal, pluralist, 
and unified Iraq‘ was viable. However, as he started his shuttle diplomacy between the 
different Iraqi factions, to assist in the creation of the permanent constitution, it was clear 
that he was not exercising the art of nation-building, but rather ‗negotiation of a tripartite 
peace treaty.‘221 The permanent constitution essentially reversed all Kurdish concessions in 
the TAL for central government control on many issues.
222
 The US seems to have woken 
up to the unrealistic nature of its aspirations for a non-ethnic and non-sectarian Iraq. 
Congressman Christopher Van Hollen (D-MD) stated that the US government‘s position 
was that Iraqis should have strong regional autonomy. The region that is controlled by 
Iraqi Kurds should have a high degree of autonomy and independent decision-making 
powers, all within the overall framework of a united Iraq. Van Hollen also asserted that 
there were some in the US government who would have liked to reduce that degree of 
autonomy, but he believed that most people supported a large degree of autonomy within 
the Kurdish areas.
223
 Christopher Straub, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, asserted 
that the US supported the idea of a federal Iraq because a federal Iraq ‗seems to us to make 
sense.‘224    
 
Even though the Kurds were trying to pursue their own agenda of maximal autonomy, 
America was trying to enforce a different direction. The US policy during the 
appointments of its successive political representatives - Bremer, Negroponte, Khalilzad 
and Crocker - was consistent in seeking to build a strong central government. America was 
extremely unclear and inconsistent on where it stood with reference to the Iraqi 
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Constitution and its support for what was, essentially, ethnic federalism.
225
 O‘Leary 
explained that, inside the State Department, the Iraqi Constitution was rejected and 
ignored, as if it had never been written. According to O‘Leary, very few officials or career 
officers gave any credence whatsoever to the Constitution as it was considered by many at 
State and in the administration as non-representative of the realities on the ground.
226
 The 
US was actually working against Kurdish interests in Baghdad.
227
  
 
The US did not want oil rich Kirkuk to go to the Kurdistan Regional Government, because 
it believed that this would lead to Kurdish independence. The reason the US does not 
support Kurdish independence is because it supports Turkish integrity and believes that a 
Kurdish declaration of independence will cause a war in the region. Furthermore, with 
Kurdish independence, there would be blowback in Turkey among its large Kurdish 
population, leading to the destabilisation of the country.
228
 The US government is very 
attuned to Turkish sensitivities, and that will always be an inhibiting factor - that is the 
main reason US policy will aim to keep Iraq one country.
229
 Mack explained that ‗regional 
stability‘ and the stability of ‗our NATO ally Turkey‘ are heavily considered in 
Washington when it comes to the Kurdish issue.
230
 Peter Galbraith stressed: ‗Turkey is the 
only reason there is no independent Kurdistan.‘231  
 
When the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish military group, and Iranian Kurdish groups, primarily 
the PJAK, in 2006 conducted raids into Turkey and Iran, both countries retaliated by 
bombing and carrying out air strikes against guerrilla hideouts inside Iraqi Kurdish 
territory. The US, however, warned Turkey against any such attacks in the future in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and appointed former NATO commander Joseph Ralston in August 2006 as 
special coordinator to Ankara to deal with the PKK problem.
232
 In 2007, Turkey was 
threatening an incursion into northern Iraq. ‗We are making it very clear to Turkey that we 
don‘t think it is in their interests to send troops into Iraq‘, Bush said at a White House press 
conference on 17 October 2007.
233
 On the same day Geoff Morrell, the chief spokesman of 
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the Pentagon, said that the US government was sympathetic to Turkey, which was 
suffering PKK terrorist attacks; but the best way to deal with this threat is through 
diplomatic means. ‗We have urged the Turks to show restraint,‘ Morrell said. ‗We 
understand their frustration, we understand their anger, but we are urging them not to 
engage in cross-border operations.‘234 There was tension in US-Kurdish relations after the 
Americans eventually allowed an incursion by Turkey into northern Iraq in December 
2007. Massoud Barzani was scheduled to go to Baghdad to take part in a meeting with 
Condoleezza Rice and other officials, but then refused to go, in protest against the 
American position on the incursion and bombings by Turkey. Kurdistan Region Prime 
Minister, Nechirvan Barzani, stated that it was ‗unacceptable‘ that the United States, ‗in 
charge of monitoring our airspace, authorised Turkey to bomb our villages.‘235 Turkey 
entered Iraqi Kurdistan territory again on 21 February 2008. On 28 February 2008, Bush 
urged Turkey to ‗move quickly, achieve their objective and get out‘ and, after their military 
incursion, they did withdraw on 29 February.
236
 A senior Iraqi diplomat explained how 
tremendously US-Turkish relations affected the Iraqi Kurds. When Turkish troops entered 
Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurds protested against US silence on this issue of Kurdistan‘s 
security. According to the diplomat the United States responded by stating that it could not 
stop the Turks from entering northern Iraq, because ‗they have interests with Turkey and it 
would affect their relationship.‘237 A National Security Council official explained to the 
author, however, that the US continues to work with both the Kurds and Turkey on 
confidence-building measures as the US aim is to prevent raids from both sides of the 
border.
238
  
 
In late 2008, the Iraqi Kurds and the Turks experienced some rapprochement; on 14 
October 2008, a special envoy from Turkey, Murad Ocalik, visited Kurdistan Region 
President Massoud Barzani in Baghdad, to work towards an easing of relations.  The Turks 
thus seemed to have modified their hostile stance towards the Iraqi Kurds. As regards the 
US strategic alliance with Turkey, initially the US swung towards the Kurds on some 
occasions and back to Turkey on others. The US, eventually, came to a point where it 
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could actually have a relationship with both sides. Qubad Talabani explained that the 
Kurds told the United States from the beginning that this did not have to be a zero-sum 
game and that the US could have relations with the two entities at the same time. As US 
policy gradually evolved, the US became mindful of both Turkey‘s and the Iraqi Kurds‘ 
sensitivities.
239
  
 
‗Turkey‘s concerns matter to the US very much‘ because Turkey is a NATO ally, 
explained Straub. Turkey is a long-term ally of the US, bilaterally as well as through 
NATO; America shares Turkey‘s concerns about the fact that the Congra-Gel and elements 
of the former PKK are located on Iraqi soil. The US considers both organisations to be 
terrorist movements; and the US has been at war, since 11 September against terrorist 
movements. America agreed with Turkey that it was absolutely not permissible for a 
country to give safe havens to a terrorist movement. The US spoke about this to the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Regional Government, and also to the Iraqi government in Baghdad. However, 
the US recognised the practical difficulties faced, due to the terrain, by the Iraqi 
government, and the Iraqi Kurdistan government. The US continued to urge them to take 
measures to continue to weaken this organisation and to expel it from Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
US approved of improvements in Turkish-Iraqi-Iraqi Kurdish economic and political 
relations, apart from the contentious issue of Congra-Gel. America noted, with interest, 
that relations between Turkey and Iraq were growing closer. Turkey‘s relations with the 
Kurdistan Regional Government were also growing closer; financially, Turkey was the 
biggest investor in Iraqi Kurdistan.
240
  
 
Another significant factor in US geopolitical calculations is Iran. The United States also 
believes that, eventually, it will restore a US-Iranian alliance, and the Iranians, too, are 
fiercely against federalism; not so much because of their 8-9% Kurdish population, but 
because of the Azeris, who represented 30-40% of their population. If the Azeris were to 
demand federalism, it would be the end of the Iranian state.
241
 The ultimate missing piece 
for American foreign policy in the Middle East is Iran. America has never recovered from 
the loss of its alliance with Iran; its alliance with Turkey has never compensated for that 
loss; and the US ultimately wants it back. The US does not want to be in alliance with the 
Arab Sunni world, since it does not believe that the Arab world will ever accept Israel. The 
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US wants an alliance with the main power in the region, Iran; this possible future ally has 
oil and gas and so can balance Sunni influence in the region. Turkey cannot play this role 
in the same way Iran did historically, because Turkey does not have the oil and gas Iran 
has. Iran also has the strategic asset of 70 million relatively educated people. The 
Americans hope to regain that alliance and are willing to sacrifice alliances with Arab 
states in order to do so.
242
  
 
Moreover, Henri Barkey, former State Department policy planning staff member, 
explained that it was in US interest to have a united Iraq as a united and strong country on 
the western flank of Iran would act as buffer to Iranian expansion and influence.
243
 The US 
also opposes an independent Kurdistan out of the conviction that a divided Iraq cannot be 
successful, and that, as a landlocked state, an independent Kurdistan has nowhere to sell its 
oil. It would be in a similar situation to Armenia, leading to regional problems and 
instability rather than stability.
244
 Frederick Kagan explained that the sentiment in 
Washington towards the Kurds was very much opposed to its independence. Kagan 
stressed that a break-up of Iraq beyond the current federal status is neither in US interest 
nor in the interest of the Kurds. Kagan was unequivocal in stating ‗America‘s strategic 
interests are invested much more heavily in Arab Iraq‘ than in Kurdistan. He advised that 
the Kurdish leadership be very careful to recognise that if it looked as if Arab Iraq was to 
succeed, America‘s equities lay much more in making sure that that happened than in 
taking care of the Kurds.
245
   
 
Moreover, the US government from President Bush downwards had no sympathy with 
ethnic federalism.
246
 The fifty American states are geographical administrative units rather 
than ethnic entities.
247
 American nationalism was not based on language and common 
blood - it was not an ethno-linguistic nationalism like European nationalism.
248
 The 
European concept of ethnic nationalism was transferred to post-colonial states – such as 
Iraq itself - after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which was mostly divided on the 
basis of tribal and sectarian loyalties.
249
 Furthermore, Mack explained that the needs of 
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people were not met only by having governments of their own.
250
 Mack emphasised that 
the US supported the humanitarian concerns of Iraqi Kurdistan. The US essentially 
supported the rights of Kurds to have the rights that all Iraqis should have at managing 
their own political affairs and having a greater say how their country was run ‗but we do 
not support a Kurdish state.‘251 
 
In that context, the Kurds were not important and were an inconvenience. Galbraith argued 
that the US assumed that Kurds would behave as good Iraqis and that they did not want 
independence. On the Kurdish side, the Kurdish leaders, notably Barham Salih and to a 
lesser extent Jalal Talabani, encouraged the belief that the Kurds would be just good Iraqis. 
Galbraith argued that Salih and Talabani kept talking about the ‗liberation of Iraq‘, and 
referring to themselves as ‗we Iraqis‘ in order to persuade the US invasion. They left the 
impression that the Kurds would behave as the Bush administration wanted.
252
 Paul Pillar 
stressed that the Kurdish leadership were very much aware of Turkish government 
sensitivities and the red lines for the Turks. This  represented a substantial self-deterring 
factor.
253
 For these reasons, according to Pillar, the independence of Kurdistan was never 
seriously considered in Washington before the invasion. For Pillar there was no debate or 
agonising in the administration about the possible issue of Kurdish self-determination.
254
 
Additionally he made clear ‗you won‘t find anything in US policy to declare itself in 
support of an independent Kurdistan.‘255 As Michael Cox pointed out, US support for self-
determination (when and if afforded) was not entirely a product of ‗pure idealism‘ as the 
creation of new nations was strategically calculated and at the expense of other empires, 
weakening US rivals and increasing their own power.
256
 Thus in light of the points made 
above the creation of an independent Kurdistan and support for such an enterprise would 
conflict with US strategic priorities and interests.    
 
US policy towards the Iraqi Kurds is part of American policy towards Iraq, which is part of 
US policy towards the Middle East, which is part of US foreign policy in general. A State 
Department official explained to the author: ‗When we think of a policy we think of it as 
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something that stands on its own. How can you have a policy towards a part of a country?‘ 
The US does however see the Kurdistan Regional Government as a separate federal entity 
within the context of Iraq as provided for in the Iraqi constitution.
257
 The regional 
administration that has the Kurdistan Regional Government, as part of the nation of Iraq 
the US supports.
258
 Throughout Iraq, the US encouraged a process of developing 
democracy, with different provincial councils and regional groups running some of their 
affairs. However, the US also believed in a process of national government which brought 
the whole country together. To the degree that the Kurdish people worked through the 
regional and national instruments of democracy, they were working through the 
constitution that was created for the entire country; Matthew Stephenson, at US 
Department of State, stressed, ‗we support that constitution.‘259   
 
The United States had never supported the Kurds in Iraq within the context of Kurdish 
nationalist aspirations. For America it was merely support for 20% of the Iraqi population 
that was actively fighting Saddam. That is a critical distinction. The idea was that Kurds 
would be direct beneficiaries as free people in a semi-autonomous region in a federal 
republic of Iraq.
260
  
 
US Iraq policy at the sub-national level is not a policy of independence and separatism. It 
is a policy of sympathy and support for the welfare of Kurds.
261
 Daniel Pipes explained to 
the author that there is respect and sympathy for the Iraqi Kurds that did not exist before, 
based on what was achieved in the late 1990s. Pipes stated that many were surprised by 
how well things were going at the time. Even after the invasion there was considerable 
good will towards Kurdistan as it is perceived as the calmest region of Iraq.
262
 Kurdistan is 
also seen as a model for the rest of Iraq. Considering one of the purposes of the invasion of 
Iraq was to create a model for the Middle East, and since Arab Iraq had yet to be perceived 
to meet that standard, Iraqi Kurdistan had been presented as a model for Iraq and 
subsequently the rest of the Middle East. State Department Official Matthew Stephenson, 
who worked in the Office for Iraqi Economic Affairs and Assistance Coordination and was 
responsible for private sector development, banking reform and helping provide finance 
into Iraq, explained that the US saw Kurdistan as a prime example of economic success 
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within the country. The US appreciated how the Kurds had achieved that success and 
wanted the construction, opportunities and stability to be used as a model which other parts 
of Iraq could replicate and draw investment to improve the quality of life for their 
people.
263
  
 
After the security situation in Iraq deteriorated in 2006, Democratic Senator, Joseph Biden, 
championed the idea of a loose confederation of states as the only path to peace. This was, 
of course, an attractive prospect for the Kurds.
264
 The first indications of this appeared in 
The New York Times article by Senator Biden and Leslie Gelb on 1 May, 2006.
265
 This 
eventually led to a non-binding, so-called Sense of the Senate resolution passed on 26 
September 2007 which called upon the Bush administration to pursue federalist, semi-
autonomous regions in Iraq - Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish entities - with a modest federal 
government located in Baghdad. This was received with great relief by the Kurds. ‗I think 
the resolution passed by the Senate is a very good one,‘ Jalal Talabani said on CNN‘s ‗Late 
Edition‘ program. ‗It is insisting on the unity of Iraq, of the security of Iraq, of the 
prosperity of Iraq, of national reconciliation and asking our neighbours not to interfere in 
the internal affairs of Iraq.‘266 However, this argument lost favour as ‗the surge‘ started to 
improve the security situation.
267
 
 
Christopher Straub explained that he has seen no transition in US perceptions of the Kurds. 
The US, he stressed, has always seen the Kurds as part of Iraq. The US appreciates the fact 
that Iraq is free to make its own arrangements and Iraq is clearly determined on a federal 
status for the Kurdistan Region. This, Straub explained, has been a ‗long standing tradition 
in Iraq‘, ‗it just hasn‘t been honoured before.‘ He stressed that there is ‗really no change in 
US policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan.‘ The US supports what Iraqi people work out for 
themselves. The US does not want to be ‗accused of interfering in somebody else‘s internal 
affairs.‘268 The major departure seemed to be that the US acknowledged the structure of 
Iraqi society and felt it could address the various components, while trying not to 
antagonise the others. There was no US policy towards Iraqi Kurds. There was an Iraq 
policy in which the Kurds were a component. Qubad Talabani explained America had 
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finally become sophisticated enough to deal with the different components of Iraqi society, 
separately from each other.
269
  
 
The US was reluctant to involve itself in domestic Iraqi politics. Rumsfeld had made this 
clear in a 16 January 2004 Principals‘ meeting. He stated that ‗on all but a few key points 
of strategic importance…the US has no interest in pushing ideas on the Iraqis [because] 
Iraq is their country, and the Iraqis should make political arrangements that best suit them.‘ 
This was in response to a debate at the meeting on Bremer‘s disagreements with Sistani as 
regards elected delegates for the drafting of a new constitution and elections for a new 
legislative council.
270
 Similarly, in a stand-off in Afghanistan between Karzai and the 
warlord Pacha Khan the Bush administration refused to intervene, to avoid involvement in 
domestic Afghan politics.
271
 Henri Barkey explained that US policy was merely to 
continuously encourage a peaceful and legitimate resolution of the Kirkuk issue, support 
federation, and for Kurdistan to stay within Iraq. Barkey pointed out that the US supported 
the Iraqi constitution but perceived the application of Article 140 as a domestic Iraqi 
issue.
272
  It is worth noting that the US has involved the United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Iraq and its special representative, Staffan de Mistura, to tackle Article 140 as it wanted 
both, to defer and avoid taking sides.
273
 After the invasion, the Kurds were expected to be 
helpful to the US and not a source of instability. The Americans recognised the Iraqi 
constitution but were still ‗uncomfortable‘ with parts of it. Kenneth Katzman, a senior 
Middle East analyst in the US Congress, asserted that the US had worked to persuade the 
Kurds to mute their aspirations, especially by delaying Article 140 in order to avoid 
irritating the largely stable north.
274
  
 
Barkey argued that the US looked at the Kurds in the light of the US concerns as regards 
Iraqi unity and for avoiding problems with Turkey; in particular, it did not want the Turks 
to invade northern Iraq. The US does not want to risk poor relations with the Turks, 
because it needs the Turks. So the presence of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan was an issue. 
However, Barkey stressed that the US had done nothing to get rid of the PKK; one reason 
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for this was that the US did not have enough forces in Iraq and another was that the 
American public would not accept more casualties from fighting other peoples‘ wars.275  
 
The major change in US-Kurdish relations came as the Kurds took on an official position 
in Baghdad after April 2003. The Kurds became leaders of Iraq in addition to being leaders 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Bush administration dealt with them as genuine and legitimate 
Iraqis, particularly after the first elections in January 2005. And, since the referendum on 
the Iraqi constitution and the official acceptance of federalism, the US has dealt with 
Kurdistan as an entity. Every time US officials went to Baghdad, they made a point of 
going to Kurdistan. Before April 2003 they dealt with the KRG separately from Baghdad. 
The same relations existed after April 2003, but with a different emphasis; the KRG was 
seen as, and treated as, an established entity.
276
 After being officially elected as the 
president of the Kurdistan Region, and after the constitution, which recognised federalism, 
was approved in the referendum of October 2005, Massoud Barzani made an official visit 
to the White House. He was received on 25 October 2005 by President Bush; it was the 
first meeting of this nature in Kurdish history. President Bush met again with Barzani on a 
further official visit to the White House on 29 October 2008. During this meeting Bush 
praised the Kurdish role in supporting the strategic security agreement between Iraq and 
the US. So, again, during the last days of the Bush administration, the Kurds regained 
value; when the Security Accord saw setbacks in Arab Iraq, the Kurds were used as a 
proxy to advance the agreement, which was eventually signed. In the same visit to 
Washington and during a talk at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Barzani 
even referred to the possibility of basing US forces in Kurdistan: ‗if the United States asks 
for its forces to be based in the Kurdistan region, I am confident that the Kurdistan regional 
parliament and the people of Kurdistan region and the Kurdistan regional government would 
welcome that.‘277 But, as the US had lessened its dependency on the Kurds, it was only 
natural that they did not hold the status they held at the beginning of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.   
 
The Kurds are vulnerable; their status has not changed as regards the international context 
of the Middle East. As a pawn they gain value, when redundant they are insignificant, but 
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overall they remain an asset in a hostile region. The place of the Iraqi Kurds in US foreign 
policy ends up being re-negotiated all the time. It is an ongoing subject of negotiation; 
based partly on what is happening in Baghdad, partly on regional alliances, partly on how 
the US sees its long term role in Iraq and the Gulf. In many ways the policy towards the 
Kurds has been, in political science terms, a ‗dependant variable.‘ US-Kurdish relations 
primarily depend on what else is going on. There is a recognition in Washington that, in a 
region with a variety of problems, where a lot of people are seen as problems, the Kurds 
are an asset. The US recognises that things get done with the Kurds; promises are kept. 
Iraqi Kurdistan is seen as a place where the US can work with the people rather than a 
problem that America wants to wish away.
278
 Aijaz Ahmad, political commentator, 
asserted that the US benefits from sustaining the Kurdistan Region entity in Iraq as a 
source of pressure on Turkey. The US wants more Turkish compliance as regards its 
regional interests, especially Turkish disassociation from Iran in addition to greater Turkish 
influence on Turkic nations of Central Asia that were growing closer to Russia.
279
 Marc 
Lynch, a Washington based Middle East expert, explained to the author that the Kurds 
seem to have had no particular strategic importance in US national interest calculations in 
the Middle East. The US at the bipartisan level, however, appreciated the premise of a 
special relationship with the Kurds, so they then worked backwards, rather than having a 
US strategic interest in Iraqi Kurdistan per se - a principle which had no relevance in 
International Relations.
280
 Kurdistan is not a place that the US government has a specific 
policy towards. US policy is always an extension, a function of Turkish policy and/or of 
Iraq policy. Barkey stressed that there is no policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan. There was no 
such thing as ‗Kurdistan policy.‘281 There is a confidence and comfort in the Kurdish 
relationship, but no desire to do anything that would  make the US have to take action to 
defend the Kurds.
282
  
Regardless of the tensions and clashes of interests, there still appears to be recognition of 
US-Kurdish friendship. Some in the US describe it as sympathy, others as strategic. The 
relationship changes, as regards their demands on the Kurds, with the nature of US 
interests. The Kurdish side has consistently sustained its friendship with the US as it deems 
it strategic for its protection and survival. But, since the Kurds are in a partnership that is 
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heavily outbalanced by the US and its interests, this partnership remains shaky. The Kurds 
seemed to have a fluctuating status in the new Iraq; generally they have considerable 
sympathy but, when it comes to actual partnership, there seems to be reluctance. The US 
does see Kurdistan as an ally, albeit in an unofficial capacity; Qubad Talabani stated that, 
in this ‗game‘, it was not really about friendship but interests. If Kurdistan could serve 
America‘s interests for a given issue, then the Kurds were allies. However, if the Kurds are 
an impediment to US interests on a certain issue, ‗we‘re maximalist, a problem, 
overreaching Kurds.‘ When the Kurds are compared to groups hostile to the Americans, 
they were considered as allies; the Kurds are not hostile to the US and the US knew and 
appreciated that.
283
 The State Department‘s Matthew Stephenson explained that the Kurds 
and the US are still seen as close friends. Additionally the US continues to support the 
Kurdish successes in northern Iraq, including the economic resurgence.
284
 The US is allied 
with the Iraqi Kurds; however, not in an official way nor a formal way. The US recognises 
the good feeling between Americans and Iraqi Kurds, and that is ‗important‘, Straub, told 
the author. He also emphasised that it is as important as relations between nations, and 
that‘s important for the Kurds to remember. There is sympathy because of all the 
victimisation by Saddam and the way the Kurds rallied against him. But there is no 
‗separate policy about Iraqi Kurdistan compared to Iraq‘ he continued. Straub stressed that 
the US dreams of a good outcome for Iraq where Iraq‘s Kurds are content in Iraqi 
Kurdistan; content in an Iraq that has peace and a representative government, and that is 
economically prosperous and federal.
285
 Andrew Morrison argued that the US did not have 
mutual defence pacts with Israel and Kuwait, and Kuwait was not even designated as a 
major non-NATO ally of the US until 2004; but the US relationship with both countries 
had been and is characterised by intense cooperation and thus does not diminish its depth 
and strength.
286
 He stressed that although the US cannot have a treaty of alliance with the 
Iraqi Kurds, this has not detracted from the strength of the relationship.
287
 
 
Enhancing this friendship was the establishment of a Congressional Caucus. In May 2008 
the Kurdish-American Congressional Caucus was established. The establishment of the 14-
member caucus according to the Director of the Washington Kurdish Institute was another 
‗big step‘ towards American-Kurdistan relations in addition to its importance for Kurdish 
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Americans living in the US.
288
 During the inauguration of the bi-partisan caucus on 25 
May, Congressman Lincoln Davis (D-TN) stated that he hoped that it would ‗stand as a 
symbol of continued friendship and cooperation between the United States and Iraq‘s 
Kurdish people‘ in America‘s effort to bring ‗peace and stability to a federated Iraq.‘ 289 
However, he carefully clarified on a different occasion in July that the establishment of 
caucus was not an attempt to ‗help Kurds form their own independent state.‘290 
 
The US sees the Kurds of Iraq strictly within the dimensions of the structural composition 
of the region. It is bound by the state-centricity of the international system and is 
profoundly dedicated to its preservation. The policymakers and practitioners in 
Washington are strictly committed to the maintenance of the international system. The 
modification of the geographical boundaries of the neighbouring states is considered 
politically risky. The US has no stomach to protect the Kurds in the likely scenario of 
Iranian or Turkish invasion, and the US public has neither awareness of, nor interest in the 
Kurdish issue. Thus it would be difficult for any administration to commit American blood 
and treasure to such a prospect. The argument in Washington as regards Kurdish 
independence has constantly rotated around the instability produced if the Kurds achieve 
independence. Since the war, in US foreign policy the Kurds have been seen as one 
component of the new Iraqi government and the new Iraqi way of life, and favourably so, 
as long as they do not seek independence. Ayal Frank believed that the Kurds had been 
doing the right thing and were playing a constructive role for the most part. They were 
considered a good model for the new Iraq. Most people in the US government - in both the 
executive branch and legislative branch - know that, he continued.
291
   
 
There has been a gradual evolution in US-Kurdish relations; from 1991-1998 the premise 
of US interaction with the Kurds was mostly a humanitarian operation with the 
containment of Saddam in mind. From 1998-2003, there was a very sharp increase in 
cooperation, assistance and support due to the public policy of regime change. From 2003-
2008, there was a more steady and gradual improvement in relations.
292
 US policy towards 
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the Iraqi Kurds has always been a dependent variable, inseparable from the US policy 
towards Iraq as a whole, Turkey and Iran. As described above, this has developed in such a 
way as to give Iraqi Kurds, almost as if by accident under the George W. Bush 
administration, the opportunity to realise many of their aspirations, and to achieve political 
and economic advances unprecedented in centuries of Kurdish history.  
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Chapter 7:  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Iraq has gone from a brutal dictatorship and a sworn enemy of America to an 
Arab democracy at the heart of the Middle East and a friend of the United 
States. 
George W. Bush, 15 January, 2009.
1
 
 
 
 
This study has attempted to address US Iraq policy at three major levels: the supra-national 
level, the national level and the sub-national level in order to assess US foreign policy as 
one of continuity or change. The national level (the first level of this study) has been 
restricted to US policy towards Arab Iraq; the second level, however, has addressed US 
Iraq policy at the sub-national level focusing on US-Kurdish relations.  
 
The supra-national level was the highest of the three levels of US foreign policy analysis 
this study implicitly addressed. At this level US foreign policy was directly influenced by 
US Grand Strategy. The period this study covers presents visible departures in US Grand 
Strategy which reflect constantly on both US policy towards Iraq at the national and sub-
national levels. For the 1979-2008 timeline this thesis covers, US Iraq policy corresponds 
neatly to the three Grand Strategies transcending this period. Phase I, 1979-1990, was Cold 
War influenced. Phase II, 1991-2001, was influenced by a Liberal Internationalist Grand 
Strategy; and Phase III, 2002-2008, influenced by the War on Terror. These distinct 
transitions in Grand Strategy make the research highly relevant for testing consistencies 
and departures in US Iraq policy under the George W. Bush administration. Grand Strategy 
is the overarching global guiding tool, supreme above any other considerations in US 
foreign policy. As a superpower, America adapted effectively to these different periods of 
its Grand Strategy, affecting subsequently its regional and bilateral interactions. Since 
Grand Strategy takes precedence over regional geostrategic foreign policy calculations and 
bilateral foreign policy interactions, US Iraq policy fell naturally into these three different 
realms.  
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The first era of US Iraq policy conformed to the Cold War Grand Strategy. This era of US 
Iraq policy was defined by the policy parameters prescribed to this period. During the Cold 
War era the grand strategic purpose of the US was predominantly defined as the 
containment and deterrence of the ideological spread of communism.
2
 Cold War presidents 
shared the conviction that public and elite support for foreign policy could be most 
effectively built on a strategic framework of global, anticommunist containment. This 
policy of containment represented the best way to stop further Soviet and Soviet-sponsored 
expansion.
3
 Within this context the US primary objective was to contain Iraq, limiting any 
advances made towards its special relationship with the Soviet Union. This era was 
characterised by the use of the Iraqi Kurds as a pawn in the Cold War to contain Soviet ally 
Iraq. In 1972 the CIA sponsored the Kurdish movement in order to assist the Shah‘s Iran in 
its fight to contain Soviet influence penetrating the Middle East through its proxy Iraq. Iran 
was one of the US pillars in its fight to contain the Soviet Union, and Iraq was becoming a 
threat to US interests and allies in the region. Iraq‘s 1972 strategic agreement with the 
Soviets meant it had to be contained. Ironically, history repeated itself as this containment 
policy was also revived after Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait, with the Kurds involved in 
containing and weakening the Baath regime in Baghdad. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush‘s foreign policy strategy was 
one of post-Cold War order-building, based on institution building and strengthening, 
essentially a Liberal Internationalist Grand Strategy. Bush wanted the US to recreate a 
New World Order under US leadership and in pursuit of its goals use multilateralism to 
achieve them. With the end of the Cold War the Bush senior administration put on course 
and articulated steps with the end objective of expanding NATO, establishing greater 
interaction with the European Community and expanding the role of the Conference on 
Security Cooperation in Europe. On the regional level, the Bush administration pushed for 
the North American Free Trade Agreement and in East Asia helped create the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation.
4
 With this new mindset the US dealt with Saddam‘s aggression on 
Kuwait through the UN. The US built an international consensus to liberate Kuwait from 
Saddam Hussein‘s regime through the UN Security Council. The liberation of Kuwait and 
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the multilateral approach exhausted in achieving the goal was hailed as a major victory for 
a New World Order.     
 
Continuing this trend, the Clinton administration pursued its strategy of ‗enlargement‘ 
through institution-building. This strategy involved using multilateral institutions to 
integrate and stabilise new and emerging market democracies into the Western democratic 
world. The Clinton administration went to great lengths to make the World Trade 
Organization a reality, a major step towards establishing international trade law. Anthony 
Lake argued, the idea was to ‗foster and consolidate new democracies and market 
economies where possible.‘5 Within this context and in this international environment, the 
Clinton administration pursued and made possible the continuation of Security Council 
consensus to endorse the UN mandated sanctions regime on Iraq.  
 
This was followed by the third era of Grand Strategy, described as the War on Terror. In 
terms of continuity with its previous administration the Bush presidency was already in 
continuance with that of President Clinton. Unilateralism was already on the agenda from 
the mid 90s, mainly due to the Republican takeover of congress in 1995 after the mid-term 
elections and due to the emergence of the United States as an unrivalled international 
military and economic power.
6
 The increasing terrorist attacks on US interests in Africa 
and the Middle East were the third factor. The flexibility the Clinton administration 
enjoyed in its early years had diminished. In 1998 the US retaliated against Afghanistan 
and Sudan for harbouring al-Qaeda. In Sudan, the US destroyed a pharmaceutical plant it 
claimed was producing chemical weapons. This attack was a precursor to the US invasion 
of Iraq, with the same intention of destroying WMD producing facilities. It was also a 
precedent to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan where a terrorist associated nation was 
being attacked without explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council. Other 
contemporary examples of US unilateralism, endorsed by a coalition of the willing, include 
the 1999 US intervention in Kosovo and Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998. Desert Fox, 
executed by the Clinton administration, and similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, 
had no Security Council authorisation other than the numerous resolutions condemning 
Iraqi noncompliance.  
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The end of the Cold War brought positive and negative consequences for the Middle East 
region. The main positive outcome was the end to superpower rivalry and the interference 
associated with vital strategic interests in the region. However, the most immediate 
negative effect of the end of the Cold War was the perceived relaxation of political 
impediments, which led to Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait. This result gave rise to 
the ‗jihadist‘ struggle of Osama Bin Laden and other Islamist factions and gave a new 
thrust to Political Islam in the Middle East.
7
 The US-led military campaign to expel Iraq 
from Kuwait brought major US military bases to Saudi Arabia that remained after the Iraqi 
defeat. Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait brought a sense of insecurity to the oil rich and 
security deficient US dependent Gulf States. This invited Western presence that perhaps 
contributed to the attacks on 9/11. The presence of these US bases fuelled Islamic 
extremists, destabilising Saudi Arabia and leading to a fully fledged insurrection against 
the US. The Islamic jihadists already believed they had defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan 
in 1989 and thus were determined to force US withdrawal from Muslim lands.  
 
Although the Bush foreign policy was continuing an already established unilateral trend 
before the 9/11 attacks, it was characterised by a sharp departure in US Grand Strategy, a 
shift from the liberal internationalist agenda pursued by Clinton. The attacks on 9/11 and 
the seriousness of Islamic extremism had essentially done what the Soviet threat had 
achieved during the Truman administration, permitting a rethinking of US strategy. Bush‘s 
September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) argued for a dramatic rethinking of the 
international order and condemned the fact that it has taken ‗almost a decade‘ to 
‗comprehend the true nature of this threat.‘ The US had already suffered major terrorist 
attacks on its interests during the Clinton presidency: the bombings of the Khobar Tower 
(1996), US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (1998) and the USS Cole (2000). The Bush 
administration policy was a return to the US 19
th
 century policies of unilateralism as 
opposed to its role as ‗multilateral alliance leader and institutional builder‘ of the 20th 
century.
8
 Essentially, Bush‘s 2002 NSS Grand Strategy for a ‗War on Terror‘ was on a par 
in significance and substance to Truman‘s NSC-68, which advocated a Cold War Grand 
Strategy of globalised containment.  
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Moreover, US unilateral intervention and the promotion of democracy were on the US 
foreign policy agenda long before George W. Bush‘s accession to power. An early instance 
of such a venture was the US invasion of foreign territory during the Spanish America war 
in 1898 in which demands for Cuban self-determination and the subjugation of natives in 
Spanish colonies were cited as a cause for concern in addition to the alleged and still 
disputed sinking of the USS Maine by a Spanish mine. The very same scenario was 
repeated during the invasion of Iraq when the chemical attacks on the Kurds and human 
rights abuses of the Baath regime, plus Iraq‘s alleged possession of stocks of WMD, were 
invoked as a cause for intervention. The Vietnam War is also consistent with this theme 
where the Gulf of Tonkin incident was used to justify drawing the US into the conflict after 
two alleged attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.  
 
US foreign policy is predominantly characterised by its consistency, tending to be drawn to 
the centre. According to Walter Russell Mead US foreign policy may veer left and right, 
but always pulls back toward the centre as a result of a political gravity reasserting itself.
9
 
Adam Garfinkle argues for a constant four-stage understanding of the consistency of US 
foreign policy. This can be applied to most US interventions throughout history. The first 
stage is the ‗shock‘ stage where the US finds itself in a state of aggression. The British 
provocations associated with the war of 1812, the sinking of the USS Maine, the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the attacks of 9/11 were all received with 
shock as response to acts of unprovoked aggression. The second phase which is repeated 
with all these incidents is a two stage reaction. The first is a ‗realist‘ reaction, addressing 
the problem to prevent it from happening again and restabilising the status quo. This stage 
is concerned with bringing the perpetrators to justice. The second stage of the reaction is 
the ‗metaphysical‘ stage where the retribution forced upon the US becomes an act of 
ending tyranny and evil. It becomes an attempt at defeating oppression and bringing 
freedom to the oppressed. The third stage of this constantly repeated cycle is ‗overreach.‘ 
In this stage, mission creep becomes a constant feature of all these US military 
interventions where the US adopts a goal which exceeds its capabilities and commitment 
threshold. Finally these three steps always end with the ‗holdback‘ stage, a return to 
cautious realism.
10
 This is not to say the US invasion of Iraq is common practice for 
America. Only in two other instances in US military history has the US veered out of the 
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Western hemisphere, where there has been no immediate threat to US national security. 
One parallel to the Iraq invasion, smaller in scale and also not mandated by the UN, was 
the US Cambodian campaign of May-June 1970 where the American military launched 
several incursions into sovereign Cambodian territory as part of the Vietnam War. A 
second example would be the US invasion of North Korea in 1950. This too had no 
explicit UN authorisation despite the wider Korean War being fought under UN auspices. 
Though both examples show remarkable resemblance to the Iraq venture, they do not in 
any shape or form reflect the scale and objectives of the US campaign in Iraq and the 
relatively lengthy occupation of this country.                               
                           
With regards to democracy promotion and respect for human rights, these objectives have 
been a guiding tool and influence on US foreign policy since its founding in 1776. The 
Declaration of Independence, the preamble of the US constitution, and the Bill of Rights 
are the foundation stones of US foreign policy idealism. The importance of these values 
and its universality are unique to the United States. As a nation it reflects the history, 
structure and nature of the US, President Woodrow Wilson being one of the most vocal 
advocates of an idealist approach in US foreign policy. Thus the promotion of democracy 
and the defence of human rights is inherently a US principle and is by no means a concept 
introduced by the George W. Bush administration. The heightened emphasis of this aspect 
under the Bush administration was only a reaction to a belief that genuine stability could 
not be achieved unless these principles planted in Iraq and the Middle East.   
 
Moreover, the US has had a long history of intervening in sovereign states primarily, of 
course, in the Western hemisphere without international authorisation to achieve regime 
change and promote democracy. One of the most recent of these was the invasion of 
Grenada in October 1983 under the Reagan administration, controversially conducted to 
overthrow Marxist revolutionaries and install democratic rule. Another example was the 
US invasion of Panama to depose General Manuel Noriega in December 1989. One of the 
reasons given for the invasion was to defend democracy and human rights in Panama. 
After the invasion the democratically elected Guillermo Galimany was sworn into the 
presidential office. In July 1994 the UN Security Council issued resolution 940 authorising 
a US led military campaign under the Clinton administration codenamed ‗Operation 
Uphold Democracy‘ to restore the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide in Haiti.  
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As regards the US policy of regime change, this has remained constant since Iraq‘s 
occupation of Kuwait. The policy of regime change in Iraq was a policy objective devised 
by President George H. W. Bush and signed in October 1991 in an authorised presidential 
‗lethal finding‘ which authorised the CIA to facilitate the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.11 
This policy continued into the Clinton administration, in addition to the already pursued 
sanctions-based containment which essentially became known as ‗containment-plus.‘ It 
was also the Clinton administration which signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, making 
it declared US policy to topple Saddam‘s regime. Bush senior had anticipated regime 
change after his re-election in late 1992; neither of these goals materialised but the policy 
remained intact. After the Iraq defeat and expulsion from Kuwait in 1991, UN Security 
Council resolution 686 set out the terms of the cease-fire, which was signed by both US 
General Norman Schwarzkopf and Iraqi General Sultan Hashim on 3 March 1991 in Iraq 
near the Kuwaiti border. Interestingly, the war and the resolution that followed had 
achieved the initial stated goal of returning Kuwait sovereignty. However, UNSCR 686 
was augmented and succeeded by resolution 687. Section I (paragraph 33) of resolution 
687 stated the conditionality of the ceasefire, contingent upon Iraq‘s dismantling and 
destruction of all proscribed WMD. Iraq failed to achieve this, or in others words failed to 
satisfy US suspicions as regards its claims of total destruction. As a result of heightened 
fears, after 9/11, and the US government‘s belief that Saddam Hussein has accumulated 
stockpiles of WMD it was only normal that the ‗conditional ceasefire‘ be invoked to 
resume an already ignited war to settle the pending Iraq issue permanently.      
 
When UNSCR 687 was drafted, the economic sanctions imposed initially in resolution 
661, after Saddam‘s occupation of Kuwait, were only reintroduced to further pressurise the 
Iraqi regime, hoping this would accelerate its downfall. The sanctions initially were a tool 
to pressurise Iraq‘s withdrawal from Kuwait and had no relevance to a post liberated 
Kuwait environment. UNSCR 687 was essentially a UN mandated US designed document 
for regime change. The US had no intention whatsoever of allowing these sanctions to be 
lifted, permitting Iraq a return to normality. The disarmament demanded from Iraq had 
very little to do with the actual economic sanctions imposed on the regime. The sanctions 
were merely an attempt at weakening the regime, with the objective of its eventual 
downfall, rather than an exercise in punishment for non-compliance with articles of the 687 
resolution. As the nature of resolution 687 was strict and did not correspond to its initial 
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objective of the liberation of Kuwait, the US made its ratification possible by introducing 
paragraph 14 into the resolution, to purportedly to allow the creation in the Middle East of 
‗a zone free from weapons of mass destruction‘ only to mollify reluctant Security Council 
members.
12
 This paragraph was considered a ‗throwaway‘ paragraph by US policy makers 
and thus had no intention of its implementation.
13
  
 
Secretary Madeleine Albright, in a speech delivered at Georgetown University on 26 
March 1996, stated that the sanctions against Iraq would not be lifted as long as Saddam 
Hussein remained in power. This was before the passing of the Iraq Liberation Act in 
1998. Condoleezza Rice also asserted that Saddam has ‗no useful place in international 
politics.‘ This was made public in early 2000 during the election campaign before Bush 
was elected to the White House. The policy of regime change was a constant in US policy 
that had been reiterated constantly throughout the presidencies of three successive 
administrations and was neither new nor novel as a US policy objective. Secretary of State 
James Baker had disclosed US views vividly and unequivocally on 23 May 1991 when he 
stated that the US could have a ‗formal ceasefire but no genuine peace‘ as long as Saddam 
remained in power and that Iraq would not join the international community until there is a 
‗change in regime.‘14       
 
Furthermore, the end of the First Gulf War was only an end to major conventional kinetic 
warfare and by no means an end of hostilities. The very nature of the conditionality made 
the continuation of peace between the US and Iraq dependent on the implementation of the 
operative paragraphs of resolution 687. Moreover, the US and Iraq were at a constant state 
of war from 1991, well in advance of the actual regime change and before the declaration 
of the Bush doctrine in 2002. In early August 2002, while briefing the NSC on the 
military‘s plan to invade Iraq, Tommy Franks informed the president that Iraqi air defences 
had targeted US aircraft or violated the No-fly zones fifty-two times, double the number of 
2001.
15
 The US was also retaliating for these attacks. The Iraq war was not pre-emptive in 
many senses. The US had been in a military confrontation with Iraq since 1991. The very 
fact that the US was containing Iraq, itself a form of military action, through the No-fly 
zones, is another testimony to this argument. Additionally, pre-emption itself was not a 
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new concept in US military policy. Brent Scowcroft argued that this had always been a 
valid resort in US policy. The only difference was it had never been made public in any 
official US document or presidential statements.
16
  
 
With regards to US interests in Iraq at the national level, there are five major areas of 
concern that have dominated US Iraq relations since the early eighties and beyond:
17
 a 
secure supply of oil, concerns about Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism, the proliferation of 
WMD, the containment of Iran and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Iraq has had a history of being 
seen as a potential source of threat from its WMD programmes. The earliest of these 
concerns was raised in 1973 with Congressman Robert Huber‘s (R-MI) floor speech to the 
US Congress on possible Soviet supplies of chemical weapons to Iraq.
18
 The issue of 
WMD was also discussed, though maybe casually, in Donald Rumsfeld‘s first and second 
encounter with Iraqi officials in the early 80s. With respect to terrorism, Iraq was also a 
founding member of the US State Department‘s state sponsors of terrorism in 1979. All 
these issues during Saddam‘s reign (some even preceding Saddam Hussein‘s presidency) 
have constantly and continuously directed US Iraq policy.  
 
This study contests that Iraq has always been seen as a function of US policy towards Iran. 
During the Kurdish revolt of 1975, the covert support the Iraqi Kurds received was in the 
context of helping Iran. In the first instance the Kurds were used as a pawn to weaken 
hostile Iraq, whilst after the Shah‘s overthrow, Iraq was used to weaken Iran and ideally 
create out of Iraq the long needed ally lost in the Shah‘s Iran. The US has always seen Iraq 
through the lenses of its interests and the geopolitical significance of Iran. During the 
Shah‘s reign it was seen as a rogue element affecting Iran‘s interests in the region. After 
the Shah‘s overthrow it was seen as a check on Iranian influence in the region. A 6 May 
1965 State Department document to the US embassy in Baghdad makes clear that it was in 
the interest of both US and Iran that both Iran and Iraq improve relations.
19
 Toppling 
Saddam and the creation of democracy in neighbouring Iraq would serve as catalyst in 
Iran, helping to dethrone the theocratic regime. The US containment policy of Iraq in the 
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90s did not exclude Iran either. Dual containment was implemented this time to contain 
both Iraq and Iran. Iraq, this study contends, has always been seen in the context of Iran.  
 
The five factors mentioned above are constants in US Iraq policy that have not changed. 
The only departures have been in the strategies pursued in achieving these goals. These 
five constants are also a function of three regional constants defining US Middle East 
policy. These three are: access to oil resources, the security of Israel, and intense US 
opposition to the emergence of potential regional powers. At the regional level, US policy 
towards the Middle East has been surprisingly clear and consistent. What distinguishes the 
Middle East from the rest of the world (compared to Africa, Latin America and Asia) is the 
unwillingness of the US to soften, much less renounce, its hegemonic role; or even more 
significantly, to act in such opposition to world public opinion with respect to a fair 
resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict.
20
 These three US regional concerns, in addition 
to the five mentioned national concerns, have consistently guided US policy and 
consequently been pursued within US global Grand Strategy.  
 
This study contends that US Iraq policy has been one of consistency as opposed to new 
departures. Iraq was constantly considered a rogue state and a threat to Israel and oil 
supplies for many years. Iraq was perceived this way after the overthrow of the Iraqi 
monarchy in 1958 until 1963 when a coalition of Baathists and nationalists gained power 
in 1963. However, the Baathist rhetoric during this period also became a source of US 
concern. The US saw favourable to the revival of healthy US-Iraq relations the removal of 
the Baath Party from power in late 1963. However, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with 
the US as a result of its support for Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. The positive US 
attitude changed again with the Baath Party‘s resumption of power in a 1968 coup. Since 
the Baath Party‘s inception again in 1968, this regime and the country have not been 
favourably looked upon as an ally nor friend by the United States. During the Iran-Iraq 
war, one of the objectives of this conflict was to allow the weakening of both hostile 
regimes. Iraq was used as a pawn in this war to contain Iran and maintain the balance of 
power in this region.  
 
A policy is a vision, a view, and a goal. US foreign policy towards Iraq has been pretty 
much consistent in its goals. What has happened is that different issues have gained 
heightened attention at different times.  The goals mentioned above have amplified or 
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reduced in relative importance based on the geopolitical context of the era. What could 
also be argued is that different strategies have been pursued, adopted and then adjusted to 
achieve these goals. In essence what has changed are the strategies of (what to do?) and 
tactics (how to do it?) when it has come to issues of US foreign policy related to Iraq.            
 
Moreover, if the US military campaign in Iraq is taken within a broader historical context, 
there it becomes remarkably similar to a previous imperial venture. The US intervention in 
Iraq is considerably similar to the British invasion of Iraq. Charles Tripp makes a 
compelling comparison between the US invasion and the British invasion of Mesopotamia 
in 1914. Before the actual US military undertaking, in January 2003, Tripp predicted two 
scenarios and phases for the US upon Saddam‘s removal. Both these phases had been 
witnessed by British occupation authorities after the fall of Baghdad in 1917. The same 
history of the British occupation repeated itself for the US in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. 
The first phase would be the United States full engagement in the country to bring about 
fundamental change in the way Iraq was governed. This would require immense resources 
and time to achieve. The second would be to facilitate the creation of a new Iraqi 
government, which brings order to the country and respects US strategic interests in the 
region, eventually allowing US withdrawal from the country. The second scenario would 
mean recognising the existing power structure in Iraq. Tripp predicted that the US, if faced 
by internal resistance and loss of American lives and treasure would avoid a state-building 
project and take the second route and disengage from Iraq‘s internal affairs. In this case he 
argued, the US, would favour lesser risks and costs and prefer short-term advantages of 
sustainable social transformation of Iraq.
21
 The US did exactly this. The United States, 
upon claiming the role of occupying power, engaged in a highly ambitious project of 
reforming and transforming Iraq. Highly progressive and liberal market rules were 
introduced, a bill of rights was drafted on a par to Western democracies. The US, however, 
was confronted with major obstacles: growing internal public resentment, an insurgency, 
hostility of regional powers and the lack of support from previous opposition groups. This 
environment made the US opt for the second option where the creation of an Iraqi 
government was eventually chosen.  
 
The second major dimension of this research was US Iraq policy at the sub-national level. 
The US-Kurdish relationship is a particular strength of this research, as it deals with an 
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area of US foreign policy which is highly important, yet which has been largely ignored in 
contemporary scholarship. The same consistency can be argued for US policy towards 
Kurdish Iraq under George W. Bush. A Circular Airgram sent from the State Department 
on 2 March 1963, shortly after the inception of Kurdish revolt in 1961, defines the US 
policy position as one of finding a political solution within Iraq‘s national boundaries. It 
was US policy that the Iraqi government and the Kurds would be able to ‗come promptly 
to a mutually satisfactory agreement.‘22 This had been a constant policy objective 
throughout the Bush administration, as the US under Bush dealt with the Kurdish 
nationalist movement within the confines of Iraq. Secondly, the document stipulates the 
Kurdish issue as ‗strictly an internal Iraqi matter.‘ This US policy of neutrality has also 
remained largely the same since the US avoided taking sides with the Kurds in Iraq after 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. An area of major departure under Bush, however, was 
the actual occupation of Iraq by the US. The ‗strictly hands-off policy‘ which the 1963 
document prescribed in relation to the Kurdish issue after the 2003 overthrow, changed due 
to direct US influence in Iraq.  The third area stipulated in a 6 August 1963 declassified 
State Department document was also highly consistent with Bush‘s policy as regards Iraq‘s 
Kurds. It saw validity and legitimacy to their demands merely on sympathetic grounds and 
not on grounds of vital interest to the US.
23
 The position described in another US State 
Department Telegram on 5 April 1963 defines two other policies that remained largely 
intact under Bush.
24
 The fourth constant: the US perceived its relations and interests with 
Arab Iraq far superior to its sympathy for Kurdish nationalist aspirations in Iraq. The fifth 
constant was the US position under Bush, which considered Kurdish nationalist aspirations 
as maximalist; the same document reflected the same attitude towards Kurdish aspirations 
and advised compromise. A sixth factor was the US interest in maintaining stability in Iraq 
and the Middle East. The US advised the Kurds to avoid being used as ‗agents for interests 
of others‘ in a 16 December 1964 US embassy telegram.25 They urged restraint on the 
Kurdish movement in its opposition to the government in Baghdad. This remained largely 
the same during the Bush presidency.     
 
A real interest in Kurdish independence has never emerged on the US agenda for various 
reasons. Nationalism in the United States was defined by creed and a sense of mission and 
not based on ethnicity, which was largely associated with European nations and the treaty 
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of Wesphalia of 1648. The very nature and structure of the US denies any such sentiment 
significant value. The US, a nation of ethnic pluralism, was established on the basis of 
immigrants from all corners of the earth and as such no ethnic national identity has 
effectively been established. Thus any attempts at carving out ethnic nation states from 
post-colonial nation states hold little merit in US foreign policy. This also explains the 
Americans‘ early proposal for geographic federalism, based on the 18 provincial 
boundaries of Iraq, which was only overruled by Kurdish protest. Furthermore, the US has 
demonstrated no genuine interest in national liberation movements which do not coincide 
with furthering US national interests. US rhetoric supports the right to self-determination 
as a concept, but in practice there is no evidence to further this claim. The US has 
maintained and supported ethnic strife during the Cold War in efforts to weaken the 
Soviets and their allies. The US supported the Kurds from 1972-1975 to weaken Soviet 
ally Iraq and support its ally Iran. The US has maintained this policy not only during the 
Cold War, but as far back as Theodore Roosevelt‘s administration, when it supported 
Colombian separatists, leading to the creation of Panama in exchange for US control over 
the Panama Canal. The US, however, has a constant tendency rhetorically to support 
human rights as timeless and universal values. The US consistently defends the human 
rights of political dissidents, religious and ethnic minorities even within friendly nations.  
 
US national interest has overridden any regard or consideration for national liberation 
movements abroad. The fact that any support for self-determination would encroach on the 
national interest and sovereignty of other states has made such support inappropriate. As 
the ultimate guiding moral principle of a state is its survival, the US has only encouraged 
and supported these movements where US national interest has been at stake. The risk of 
breaching the national interest of another state, where little US interest has been at stake, is 
out of bounds in US foreign policy. Any support for Kurdish independence in the near 
future falls squarely within this formula. Any attempts at advancing Kurdish separatism 
based on US support has been, and will be, met by a negative response as it touches on US 
interests with NATO ally Turkey, potential and former ally Iran, Arab Iraq and a large 
number of friendly Arab nations.  
 
Nevertheless, the Kurds‘ standing has changed. The Congressional Kurdish-American 
Caucus was established on 25 May 2008. This is a major departure from former US lack of 
understanding of the Kurdish issue in Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government has a 
highly effective and active representation in Washington that did not exist until the early 
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nineties. This representation has managed to develop a range of contacts and relations with 
various US agencies and influential figures in the US. The US initially had a lack of 
understanding of Iraq‘s composure and its ethnic makeup. This educational process has 
been slow, but considerable progress has been made. Washington now understands the size 
and complexity of the Kurdish problem in Iraq and the region in general. It has a more 
sophisticated approach in dealing with Iraq. It is able to deal to with Iraq at the national 
and sub-national level with a sophistication that it lacked in the early sixties and the 
beginning of the Kurdish revolt. The US acknowledges the ‗special case‘ of the Kurds and 
for this reason endorses federalism. It wants to prevent Kurdistan from being overrun from 
Baghdad, through its autonomous region, hence allowing preservation of the Kurdish 
identity without becoming a separate nation. Washington has also surpassed the 
psychological barrier that an independent Kurdistan is impossible. With the start of 
Operation Provide Comfort, interaction between US officials and the Kurdish leadership 
increased. Many visits from US officials, diplomats and military personnel from 
Washington, enhanced by the friendliness and appreciation of the Kurdish people, have 
helped establish a broad understanding of the distinctness of the Iraqi Kurds. It also helped 
nurture an admiration for Kurdish achievements and an appreciation of their alliance with 
the United States. The US has not and still does not support nor envisage an independent 
Kurdistan, but will likely help its succession if its association with Iraq leads to instability 
in the country and the region, with the caveat of Kurdish appreciation for Turkish and US 
regional concerns. In a hostile region like the Middle East, where the US cannot afford to 
antagonise friends, the Iraqi Kurds are now perceived as a valuable political asset. 
 
Due to the broad nature of this research and its tackling of two major issues within US Iraq 
policy, US policy towards Arab and Kurdish Iraq, many areas of study remain to be 
investigated in greater detail. The Kurdish aspect of US Iraq policy is heavily under-
researched; its understanding remains an effective tool for studying US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. A study of US attitude towards the Kurds preceding the period 
covered by this thesis is valuable and worth consideration. Another potential area for 
research would be the evaluation of the different centres of influence in Washington as 
regards possible Kurdish independence. Washington is diverse in its opinions and attitudes. 
Different agencies are known for pursuing different policies. And within these substantial 
agencies there exist smaller interests and opinions, advocating a range of policy 
possibilities. US policy towards the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Syria requires even greater 
understanding. Another major area of study could be the influence of Turkey in preventing 
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the US from supporting the emergence of a Kurdish state. This study contends that the US 
has no solid policy of denying the Kurds an independent state. The major obstruction to an 
independent Kurdistan is US sensitivity to interests of regional powers, particularly 
Turkey. US rhetoric commonly argues that an independent Kurdistan would invite 
instability, a concept that could be refuted by citing the recent developments in Turkey. 
Firstly, Turkey‘s gradual relaxation of restraints on Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights in 
the country. Secondly, Turkey‘s increasing rapprochement with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. Finally the overall impact Kurdish nationalism has had on destabilising and 
weakening regional powers with sizable Kurdish minorities.  
 
Other areas of US Iraq policy remain of significant importance. US policy towards Iraq 
and its relation with the Israeli/Palestinian issue and US oil policy and its relation to Iraq‘s 
oil reserves and production could further be studied. Another area of research that could be 
studied thoroughly is the influence of Iran on US Iraq policy. All these and many other 
areas of research remain untapped and could be further studied and analysed. An area of 
significant research and detailed study could be restricted to the Reagan and the early Bush 
I administration and their attempts to moderate Iraq. Comparative and individual studies of 
US bilateral relations with other nationless ethnic and sectarian groups could also be an 
area of further future study. US interaction with Northern Irish Catholics and Tibetan 
Buddhists seem to be promising examples.         
 
Due to the contemporary nature of this study, my research has been profoundly 
handicapped by the lack of unclassified documents allowing a greater and detailed 
assessment of US Iraq policy under the George W. Bush administration. It has been 
additionally hampered by the lack of unclassified documents from previous 
administrations. Executive Order 12958 requires that at least twenty-five years pass before 
classified documents pertinent to national security, mostly of foreign policy value, are 
released. This restriction even applies to potentially valuable documents older than twenty-
five years, deemed too sensitive and relevant to current national security concerns. 
Furthermore, the fact that the author visited Washington, D.C. in the last year of the Bush 
administration (2008) made access to Bush administration officials very difficult. Some 
willing to be interviewed for the research requested their identities not be disclosed. Many 
of the officials relevant to this research were still in office and understandably reluctant to 
speak. Some individuals who agreed to be interviewed, and who were associated with the 
US government, were hesitant to speak candidly. Nonetheless the numerous interviews 
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conducted and the documents attained throughout this research have been highly useful in 
advancing this study, in addition to the many other primary and secondary sources used.  
This study also suggests that US intelligence should be neutral and not politicised to 
advance objectives of certain factions. This is not to say Washington in 2002-2003 did not 
believe Iraq had WMD. The error lay in the attempt of certain groups to shape intelligence 
around this point, in addition to their attempts at linking Iraq with al-Qaeda. To 
substantiate an assumption and to avert such an error in the future, an impartial assessment 
of available material is necessary to derive actionable intelligence. Moreover, in any other 
future venture of such nature, the US should allow greater time for understanding of the 
nation invaded and allow sufficient time for planning for the operational aftermath. The US 
should also avoid giving too much weight to claims of exiled oppositionists, as they too 
have their own agendas that do not necessarily coincide with US objectives.     
 
This thesis has benefited from a wide and diverse collection of sources enriching its 
academic content. The range, quality and quantity of original sources exploited in this 
thesis provide a vivid and well-rounded understanding of US foreign policy towards Iraq. 
It provides a rich understanding of Iraqi encroachments on US interests and an 
understanding of the compromises and engagements that can be achieved to advance US-
Iraqi relations.  
 
The policy-focused nature of this study makes it highly applicable to American policy 
practitioners and decision makers alike. It provides a clear and thorough understanding of 
the consistencies of US interests in Iraq. It demonstrates the consistency in US geopolitical 
considerations, when addressing Iraq at any stage or time in contemporary history. This 
study allows US decision makers, practitioners as well as researchers to create a 
framework for understanding from which they are able to form a platform to evaluate US 
Iraq policy. It allows them to gauge areas of gain and decline when it comes to the 
achievement of US interests in the country. 
 
For Iraqi policy makers and practitioners, this study is equally invaluable as it illustrates 
the intricacies of US goals and interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East. This study is 
particularly useful for scholars and students of US foreign policy alike as it is the first 
serious academic treatment of US-Kurdish relations. The scope and nature of this study 
will also help the Kurdish leadership in Iraq and policy practitioners of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government to understand the nature of US foreign policy towards Iraqi 
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Kurdistan. It allows them to comprehend the Kurdish issue in US foreign policy discourse, 
and helps formulate favourable policy positions in their dealings with the US government. 
This study will assist Kurdish officials maximise Kurdish interests in their interactions 
with the United States and helps demonstrate the restraints on US foreign policy as regards 
support for Kurdish independence.  
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